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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers some of the ways in which leading 
seventeenth-century English mechanical philosophers tried 
to account for the various motions of matter which played 
such a fundamental role in their philosophies. It 
argues that the Cartesian mechanical philosophy, in which 
matter is considered to be completely passive and inert 
and the amount of motion in the universe is constant (being 
merely transmitted and transferred by impacts), gained 
no full~ committed adherents in England. Only Thomas 
Hobbes tried to develop a similarly 'strict' mechanical 
system based on a concept of passive matter and his 
system completely failed to win support. All the other 
major thinkers examined in this study either show a 
marked tendency ~o wards a belief in a concept of active 
matter or include in their 3ystems some kind of physical 
principle capable of activating matter. 
After the Introduction, in which the scope of the enquiry 
. 
is delineated, Chapter 1 argues that the mechanical 
philosophers attempt to explain everything in terms 
of 'matter in motion' presented them with the metaphysical 
problems of defining matter and accounting for its motions. 
Subsequent chapters show the ways in which Hobbes, Sir 
Kenelm Digby, Walter Charleton, Henry More, Robert Boyle, 
Robert Hooke, Sir William Petty and Isaac Newton tried 
ii 
to account for the motions and other activities of matter. 
In the Conclusion it is reasserted that the concept of 
passive inert matter was never a major feature of 
seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy. 
This thesis also addresses itself to recent historiographical 
trends about the extra-scientific origins of the Scientific 
Revolution in seventeenth-century England. In particular 
it considers the attempts by recent commentators to show 
that a dichotomy between 'strict' mechanists who believed 
in passive matter and those who believed in active matter 
was merely a reflection of widely differing religio-
political views: Anglican-conservative on the one hand 
andSectarian-radical on theother. It is argued that 
these historiographical positions are inadequate because 
they are based on false assumptions about the nature of 
seventeenth-century matter theory. 
iii 
Parts of Chapter 1, Section 3 of this thesis have previously 
appeared in my article: 'Thomas Harriot and atomism: a 
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INTRODUCTION 
The mechanical philosophy of nature sought to explain 
all physical phenomena (and many mental phenomena) 
solely by matter in motion. All change in the natural 
world was to be conceived as the result of the 
rearrangement in space of material bodies of different 
sizes and shapes. This rearrangement of bodies was 
caused by their various motions and interactions as 
they came into contact with one another, uniting to 
ix 
form new bodies or rebounding to cause further interactions 
and further changes. In the strictest version of the 
mechanical philosophy, exemplified by Descartes' 
Principia philosophiae (1644) and Hobbes' De corpore 
(1655), matter was regarded as completely inert and 
passive and the motions of the system all derived from 
an initial thrust, provided by God at the Creation and 
subsequently distributed and transferred in accordance 
with the so-called 'laws of motion,.1 It is universally 
acknowledged that this strict form of mechanical philosophy 
is a seventeenth-century phenomenon; it originated in 
the works of Galileo, Beeckman, Mersenne, Descartes 
and Hobbes in the early years of the century. But 
by 1101 John Keill, a leading natural philosopher, felt 
able to sB3 that 'in most of the writings of the Philosophers, 
there is scarce anything mechanical to be found,.2 
Historians usually attribute this fundamental change in 
the character of natural philosophy to the influence 
of Isaac Newton. It is he who brought back into 
natural philosophy 'active principles', actions-at-a-
distance, and other 'occult qualities' which the 
mechanical philosophy had sought to exclude, or so it 
is alleged. 3 
It is the object of this thesis to show that in English 
natural philosophy, at least, active principles were 
never really dispensed with, even before Newton. I 
x 
hope to be able to demonstrate that the leading mechanical 
philosophers in England all felt the need at some stage 
in their speculations for an active principle, other 
than God, continuously operating in the Universe. It 
was this active principle, whatever it might be, which 
provided and accounted for the various motions of matter 
which the mechanical philosophy required. The evidence 
which could be marshalled in support of this thesis is 
surprisingly vast and I have had to limit my coverage 
in a number of ways. 
l"x>st obviously, I have concentrated on a small munber 
of the leading mechanical philosophers of the time. 
I could have extended my argument eno~ously by 
considering a number of lesser thinkers. However, by 
concentrating on the major thinkers I believe I have 
provided the strongest case. If I had chosen to 
devote most of my attention to minor characters my 
efforts would have been open to the charge that they 
did not represent the thought of the most influential 
seventeenth-century natural philosophers. 4 Similarly, 
I have tended to concentrate on the published works 
of the philosophers I have dealt with in order to 
avoid suspicions that I have to seek my evidence in 
rejected parts of a philosopher's output. 
I have also tried, as much as possible, to gather my 
evidence from treatments of general principles. That 
is to say, I have tried to concentrate on those aspects 
of my author's works where some form of active principle 
is introduced as an indispensable metaphysical principle. 
Here again, I believe I can provide the strongest case. 
It would certainly have proved easier to show the use 
of active principles in seventeenth-century chemical and 
medical theories which were also offered by the majority 
of my chosen representatives. Admittedly my decision 
to exclude chemical and medical notions is somewhat 
xi 
arbitrary and artificial but these facets of the mechanical 
philosophy mve been covered to a large extent in Robert 
Frank's recent study of Harvey and the Oxford phYsiologists. 
Frank's investigation culminates with the work of John 
M8\Yow (1641-1679), and what Frank refers to as his 'general 
physiology of active paxticles,.5 It should be recognised, 
however, that even Frank's study fails to provide a 
complete coverage of the role of active principles in 
seventeenth-century iatromechanism. Consider, for example, 
the work of Francis Glisson (1597-1677) whose Treatise 
on the energetic nature of substance (1672) provides 
unequivocal support for my contention that general 
systems of natural philosophy in early modern England 
often relied upon unexplained inherent activity in 
nature. 6 Similarly, Sir Kenelm Digby's ideas were 
tii 
clearly influenced by alchemical and medical traditions 
and Walter Charleton was essentially a medical theorist 
whose approach was influenced as much by the vitalistic 
William Harvey (1578-1657) as the mechanistic Pierre 
Gassendi (1592-1655).7 
In confining myself to considerations of activity in 
nature as a metaphysical principle I have also avoided 
a re-examination of the more technical developments in 
seventeenth-century dynamics which led to the modern 
concept of force in the work of Newton and Leibniz. 
This aspect of the story has been admirably covered in 
Richard S. Westfall's Force in Newton's physics and Alan 
Gabbey's 'Force and inertia in seventeenth-century 
dynamics,.8 I hope that my thesis may be regarded 
as complementary to those works; certainly it should 
be supplemented by them. Westfall and Gabbey are both 
dealing with the development of the concept of force 
as a functional ingredient in the science of dynamics. 
'Force' in this sense is essentially a mathematical 
concept which can be expressed in tems of the mass and 
speed of a particular body, and was often regarded 
merely as 'quantity of motion,.9 What I am concerned 
with, however, is the way in which seventeenth-century 
writers tried to explain the cause of such motion. 
Leibniz made this distinction clear: 
• •• although all particular phenomena of nature 
can be explained mathematically or mechanically 
by those who understand them, it becomes more and 
more apparent that the general principles of 
corporeal nature and of mechanics themselves 
are nevertheless metaphysical rather than 
geometrical and pertain to certain foms or 
indivisible natures as the causes of what appears 
rather than to the corporeal or extended mass. 10 
I have needed no further encouragement to focus my 
attention on the metaphysical rather than the geometrical 
aspects of these developments. 
Finally, it must be said that I have restricted myself 
to the immediate relevance of the concept of active 
principles to developments in natural philosophy. 
Underlying all the ideas I deal with, however, are 
changing ideas on the nature of causality which belong 
to a much wider philosophical context. The notion of 
cause and effect in the strict version of the mechanical 
philosophy seems, superficially, to be perfectly simple: 
one body affects another by contact action, imparting 
motion by impact. As the mechanical philosophy in 
xiii 
England began to recognise more oppuly the need for active 
powers to explain physical phenomena, a new concept of 
xiv 
causation had to be introduced. The culmination of this 
aspect of the intellectual revolution in England can be 
seen in the causal scepticism of David Hume (1711-1776). 
Hume's contention, that observations of repeated impacts 
tell us nothing about how one moving object causes another 
object to move, derived from the work of earlier natural 
philosophers which seemed to indicate the obscurity of 
our notions of causality. 'rhis is an extremely important 
facet of seventeenth-century thought which is only touched 
upon briefly in this thesis. However, a number of 
recent articles should be considered as essential 
supplements to my treatment. Keith Hutchison's article 
on 'Occult qualities in the Scientific Revolution' concentrates 
on natural philosophy, while R. M. Mattern has shown how 
contemporary natural philosophy influenced Locke's and 
Hume's ideas on the nature of causation. 11 
The begirmings of this reassessment of the nature of 
causality are perhaps to be found in the reactions of 
Henry More to the theories of Descartes. According to 
More, Descartes' laws of motion can only make sense if 
interpreted vitalistically: 
he is fabricating some kind of life in that when 
two bodies meet he is able to accomodate their 
motions so that each of them, notified by the 
other, the one about acceleration of its motion, 
the other about retardation of its motion, finally 
agrees on the same course of motion. And it is 
the same thing for the other laws of transport. 
For Descartes himself scarcely dares to assert 
that the motion in one body passes into the other 12 • • • 
More's follower, Joseph Glanvill, took a similar view 
of causality and he, in turn, as R. H. Popkin has shown, 
influenced Hume's view of causality. 13 Similar ideas 
on the inadequacy of strictly mechanical notions of 
causality may even be found in the philosophy of 
Thomas Hobbes; so S.I. Berm seems to suggest in his 
study of 'Hobbes on power,.1 4 
Evidence and arguments like these tend to support my 
own belief that the Cartesian concept of passive and 
inert matter which historians all too often regard as 
an essential feature of the mechanical philosophy Was 
never really accepted in England. On the contrary, 
English thinkers seem to have agreed implicitly with 
Leibniz in rejecting the concept of passive and inert 
matter as an ontological impossibility.1 5 
xv 
A synoptic treatment of all these facets of seventeenth-
century thought would undoubtedly enrich our understanding 
of the beginnings of modern science and philosophy. 
My own contribution in this thesis is far less ambitious 
in its scope. I have simply tried to show some of the 
ways in which the leading English mechanical philosophers 
relied upon some form of self-active principle, usually 
a self-active material principle. This task is 
particularly urgent at this time because the misconception 
that the mechanical philosophy relies upon a concept of 
completely passive matter is being used to argue for a 
number of historiographical positions which are rapidly 
becoming part of a new orthodoxy. Thes€ flourishing 
historiographical approaches seek to link the mechanical 
philosophy to contemporary socio-political developments 
in what seems to me to be a quite unacceptable way. 
And that is why my thesis also considers the validity 
of these 'ideological reconstructions' of modern science; 
xvi 
and if my own conclusions on this are far from incontrovertible, 
I hope they will at least serve to show the inadequacy of 
the opposing case. 
1 
CHAPrER 1 
MECHANISMS OF MATrER: 
'ATOMS AND THE VOID' vs. 'MATTER IN MarION' 
The mechanical philosophy can be epitomised as the 
endeavour to account for all physical phenomena in terms 
of the arrangement and rearrangement in space of the 
material constituents of bodies. The texture, 
consistency, colour and other attributes of body are 
all said to derive from the disposition or motions of 
the matter which makes up that body. Accordingly, 
physical change is regarded as nothing more than the 
redistribution of matter in space: either on a large 
scale in the case of local motion, or on an invisibly 
small scale in the case of changes in state or 
consistency. This being so, the historian may well 
expect the seventeenth-century proponents of the 
mechanical philosophy to wholeheartedly embrace the 
newly revived matter theory of ancient atomism. 1 
However, in her pioneering study of 'The establishment 
of the mechanical philosophy', Marie Boas Hall has 
argued that the matter theory underlying the mechanical 
philosophy was not merely a further development in the 
revival of the ancient atomistic matter theory of 
°t E ° 2 Democr1 us or p1CUruS. In subsequent essays she 
has reiterated this point, claiming that the matter 
theory underlying the mech~lical philosophy was at the 
2 
same time non-Aristotelian and non-atomic. She has even 
gone so far as to say that 'the actual concept atom is 
irrelevant' to the development of the mechanical philosophy.3 
Her insight, it seems, was extremely perceptive but she 
has made no attempt to explain why the ready-made matter 
theory of atomism was not taken up and has provided little 
evidence to back up her assessment. It is the aim of 
this chapter to provide some of that evidence and to 
explain why the matter theory of atomism was not adopted, 
except in the most equivocal way, by the new breed of 
mechanical philosophers. 
The fundamental reasons for this avoidance of what might 
seem to be a convenient systematic treatment of matter 
theory are quite simply stated. Most obvious, perhaps, 
are the religious objections. Atomism was associated with 
Epicurus who was frequently condemned as the' secretary 
of Hell' and as a lewd, immoral atheist. 4 To adopt 
atomism as a natural philosophy, therefore, was to adopt 
a materialist philosophy which denied providence, freedom 
of the will, and other essentials of Christian doctrine. 
The rehabil~tation of Epicurus began in the fifteenth 
century almost as soon as his wri tings5 and Lucretius' 
De rerum natura were rediscovered by Renaissance humanists,6 
and continued, with the work of Gassendi and others, into 
the seventeenth century.1 Nevertheless, the taint of 
immorality and atheism was hard to remove, and even Gassendi's 
3 
own version of the atomist philosophy has fundamental 
differences from the Epicurian original.8 In order to 
avoid charges of atheism the seventeenth-century mechanists 
had to dissociate themselves as much as possible fram the 
godless aspects of ancient atomism and to emphasise the 
providential and theistic aspects of their own natural 
philosophy. In so doing they developed a philosophy 
which differed in many respects from Epicurean natural 
philosophy. This aspect of the history of seventeenth-
century science is well-known and we need not dwell on 
it here. 9 Instead we will concentrate on the internal, 
strictly natural philosophical arguments which also 
militated against the acceptance of atomism, and which 
(surprisingly) have not received so much attention from 
historians. Once again the basic obstacles to 
an acceptance of atomism can be easily stated. 
Putting it simply, the two principles of ancient atomist 
matter theory - atoms and the void - were untenable in the 
seventeenth century almost to the point of being unthinkable. 
The arguments which had been raised against these two 
principles by Aristotle and his followers were so entrenched 
and had been indoctrinated into the minds of so many 
generations of university-educated men that they were 
virtually unassailable. As a result the mechanists never 
professed to explain phenomena in te:n:ns of 'atans and the 
void' but spoke instead of 'matter in motion'. It is 
the contention of this thesis that even this rubric -
'matter in motion' raised metaphysical and physical 
problems for seventeenth-century natural philosophers. 
Before turning to this, however, we must show why the 
principles of 'atoms' and 'void' were so untenable to 
the early modern mind. First of all, we must briefly 
consider the Aristotelian arguments against the atomist 
matter theory and then try to show the difficulties 
confronting those philosophers who wished to overcome 
the Aristotelian arguments. 
1 Aristotle, atoms and the void 
Aristotle's stratagem had been to attack atomism on two 
fronts. Firstly, he argued that the basic tenets of 
the atomists - atoms and void - were completely 
4 
untenable. And secondly, he took each of the explanations 
of physical phenomena which the atomists claimed as triumphs 
for their system and tried to demonstrate their inadequacy. 
What made the atom itself an untenable concept, according 
to Aristotle, was it indivisibility. There is only one 
self-consistent interpretation of 'indivisible magnitude' 
according to Aristotle and that provides no possibility 
of translation into physical terms, and so no valid heuristic 
ability. Any pronouncements about invisibly small 
particles which are physically indivisible simply because 
of their extreme hardness will not serve the turn, 
according to Aristotle, because they will be theoretically 
5 
divisible. A particle with size and shape cannot be 
truly atomic because the mind will be able to distinguish 
parts within it and will have theoretically divided the 
particle, ipso facto. The only alternative is to embrace 
a concept of infinitesimal - infinitely small - indivisibles. 
Such infinitely small particles, however, are tantamount 
to the dimensionless points envisaged by geometers. They 
have no size whatever and ~o cannot be said to have shape 
or any of the other physical attributes ascribed to atoms. 
These infinitesimals are completely vulnerable to the 
attack of Zeno of Elea that 'if what is had no size it 
10 
would not even be' • 
Aristotle explains this difficulty with some care. If 
a magnitude were to be built up of a succession of atoms 
then these atoms would have to be placed contiguous to 
one another. But bodies are said to be contiguous when 
their extremities come together. As soon as we speak of 
'extremities', however, we are distinguishing parts in 
our hypothetical indivisibles. The only way that two 
partless atoms could come to&~ther would be with respect 
to their wholes. In other words, they would be entirely 
coincident. It follows that no matter how many 
dimensionless points or atoms are brought together they 
f b . t . th d· . 11 can never accrue to onn an 0 J ec Wl. l.IDenSl.ons. 
Until recently classical scholars have been inclined to 
6 
suppose that Leucippus, Democritus and the other pre-
Socratic atomists insisted upon atoms which were 
physically unsplittable but, on account of their finite 
size, theoretically divisible. In The histoEY of Greek 
m~thematics, for example, Thomas Heath simply declared 
that Democritus was 'too good a mathematician' to believe 
in indivisible geometrical magnitudes. 12 However, we 
can infer from Aristotle's rare admiration that Democritus 
was a good philosopher too, and the concept of an atom 
with finite size was fraught with philosophical 
difficulties for the Greek mind. It did nothing, after 
all, to dispose of the arguments drawn up by Zeno of Elea 
against the concept of infinite divisibility. As soon 
as Democritus admits that his atoms are theoretically 
divisible then he is no better off than any other 
pluralist philosopher confronted by Zeno's monism.13 
As a result of very detailed considerations the two 
leading scholars on this aspect of Greek thought have 
concluded that Democritan atomism did involve theoretically 
indivisible atoms - that is to say infinitely small atoms. 
Moreover, this is certainly the view of Democritus which 
Aristotle took. 14 At the same time we have to admit 
to inconsistency in the Democritan treatment: 'We are 
faced with the conclusion that Democritus believed there 
were minute particles of matter which were not merely 
unsplittable but also theoretically indivisible. Yet 
7 
t • 15 hey certainly had size and shape. If the great ancient 
advocate of atomism fell into such entanglements it is 
hardly surprising that those who sought to revive it in 
the seventeenth-century found it an area of natural 
philosophy bedevilled by problems. 
~he second principle of the atomists: the void, was no 
less problematic for ancient and modern alike. In his 
Categories, Aristotle sketched out those circumstances 
which are required to describe or define an object. One 
of these was the object's position or place. 16 Accordingly, 
Aristotle devoted a great deal of effort to a philosophical 
analysis of the concept of 'place' Qut there is virtually 
no discussion of the concept of 'space' in his works. 
This contingency forms a crucial aspect of the background 
to Aristotle's rejection of the void. The abstract concept 
of space, which is a familiar part of our mental furniture 
today, hardly appears at all in Aristotle. For him, it is 
meaningful to say that bodies have a particular position relative 
to one another. It is perfectly correct, therefore, to 
say that water is in a vessel but if you were to say that 
the vessel was in space Aristotle would be forced to deny 
this as nonsensical. Putting it at its simplest, Aristotle 
denies the concept of space because it conveys nothing: to 
say water is in a vessel is to provide infonnation about 
its position, to say a vessel is in space is to say 
hi 17 not ng. 
Aristotle defines 'place' as the 'limiting surface of 
the body continent - the continent being a material 
18 
substance susceptible of movement by transference' • 
8 
An empty or void place would, therefore, be abs~ 'an 
empty limiting surface of the non-body continent'. As 
is well known, this was held to be so absurd that it 
was preferable to suppose that even the strongest vessels 
would collapse rather than allow the fonnation of a vacuum. 19 
A further difficulty for Aristotle (which reveals just 
how alien to us his way of thinking on this topic was) 
was that a vacuum would seem to violate one of the major 
principles of natural philosophy: that two bodies cannot 
occupy the same place at the same time. He expresses 
his difficulty like this: 
Now this yielding [Of one body to anotheij is 
impossible in vacuity, which is not a material 
entity at all and one must suppose that the 
dimensionality already there in the place before 
it was occupied must interpenetrate the equal 
dimensionality of the intrusive cube when it 
enters; just as if the water or air should not 
make way for the wooden cube but should permeate 
it all through. 20 
On the one hand Aristotle objects that the void is not 
material enough to be displaced by an encroaching object 
and on the other he objects that two physical, three-
dimensional objects will be interpenetrating in one 
place. This seems to be one of the most important 
and (unfortunately) influential manifestations of what has 
been regarded as a general failuro in Greek thought to 
9 
distinguish between corporeal and incorporeal. 21 
As well as his general points, Aristotle felt able to 
undermine atomism by showing that specific arguments 
proposed by the atomists were invalid. The major examples 
involve the phenomena of local motion. An extended void 
would necessarily provide an isotropic volume and so the 
concepts of 'up' and 'down', which are an important 
corollary of the Aristotelian concept of 'place', could 
have no immediate meaning. There would be no reason why 
it should not move any way at all. 22 Furthermore, the 
unnatural motion of projectiles would be equally impossible 
wi thout the continuous effect of the medium through which 
it was travelling. 23 Besides, the medium not only helps 
to propel projectiles it also influences the speed of 
bodie s moving through it. The total lack of resistance 
to movement which is provided by a void must entail an 
infinite speed. 24 By these arguments Aristotle hoped to 
establish that the phenomena of local motion do not prove 
-
the existence of void, as the atomists had claimed, but 
rather prove that the void could not possibly exist. 25 
Similarly, Aristotle insisted that the void need not be 
introduced to make sense of condensation and rarefaction. 
On the contrary, he believed that the atomist explanation 
was completely untenable. Any assumption that condensation 
10 
Was caused by the comin~together of the constituent 
particles of a substance implies that the particles are 
initially at some arbitrary distance from one another. 
This involves the existence of what Aristotle calls 'self-
determined voids' • The atomists can give no explanation 
of why a particular collection of atoms should stand off 
from one another in a rare body. There can be no escape 
by supposing the voids between particles to be determined 
by the way the particles are packed together. Admittedly, 
there must be empty spaces between close packed spherical 
particles but these voids cannot be filled up by compression 
or condensation (assuming that the particles are perfectly 
hard).26 
It should be clear from all this that Aristotle's approach 
to these problems is vastly different to the way we might 
approach them ourselves. In some cases Aristotle's way 
of thinking is so alien to us that our difficulty lies 
not so much in following his reasoning as in seeing where 
the problem lies. This was not so for the early modern 
thinker, however. Thanks to it s predominance in the 
pedagogical tradition, the Aristotelian arguments still 
held sway over all but the keenest minds. Indeed, it 
is possible to show that even the most able of natural 
philosophers experienced great difficulties in trying 
to circumvent the Aristotelian objections. We will try 
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to illustrate this in the next t-..,ro sections by considering 
a few salient examples. 
2. Indivisible magnitudes and the new philosophy 
Let us begin by considering the arguments of two of the 
greatest 'scientific' minds of the early modern period. 
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and his contemporary, the 
English mathematician, Thomas Harriot (1560-1621), seem 
to have recognised the explanatory power of the ancient 
atomist theories, and both men tried to develop a coherent 
concept of indivisible particles in order to explain 
various physical phenomena. For example, in his 
Discourses on two new sciences (1638), Galileo adopted 
atomistic theories in order to account for the impenetrability 
and cohesion of solid bodies. There are only two possible 
causes of coherence he claimed, 'one of which is the 
celebrated repugnance that nature has against allowing 
a void to exist' and the other is 'some sticky, viscous, 
or gluey substance that shall tenaciously connect the 
particles of which the body is composed,.27 During the 
discussion the latter of these is dropped and Galileo 
relies exclusively on the former. It is at this point 
that he turns to an atomic interpretation of the structure 
of matter. For, although the cohesive force due to horror 
vacui is strong enough on a large scale to account for the 
difficulty of pulling apart two glass plates, it is not 
strong enough to account for the much greater cohesion of 
most bodies. If, however, it is assumed that the force 
operates between minute particles of the body and that it 
is thereby multiplied, because there are an 'immense 
number' of such particles, then the observed strength 
of cohesion can be explained. However, as recent 
commentators have often been dismayed to realise, 
Galileo's atomism is by no means straightforward. For 
Galileo every body is composed of an infinite number of 
atoms. In fact, he is forced to say that a divisible 
magnitude cannot be constructed out of two or ten or 
a hundred or a thousand indivisibles, but requires an 
infinite number of them. 28 But why should Galileo take 
this, surely surprising, step? 
In fact, it was largely as a result of his mathematical 
approach to nature that Galileo was led along this path. 
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The Academician, as he called himself, 'according to his 
custom' demonstrated everything by geometrical methods. 29 
By insisting on the validity of geometry for understanding 
the physical world Galileo was forced to preserve continuity 
as a sine qua non. An acceptance of finite indivisibles 
would have to mean the rejection of geometry. Galileo 
explains this quite simply: if three, five or seven 
indivisibles can be added together to make a divisible 
line then bisection of that line would involve bisecting 
the middle particle which, therefore, could not be 
indivisible. Galileo, excellent mathematician that he 
was, recognised the need to uphold infinite divisibility 
and so rejected the physical concept of finite atoms. 
Similarly, Harriot also recognised the quandary and 
considered some geometrical problems which arise if a 
line is supposed to be made up of 'atoms', including the 
problem of incommensurability which defeated the 
Pythagore ans: 
Another difficultie ariseth from the square. If 
a line be compounded ex atomis the diametrall line 
will be fo~d to be equall to Lcommensurate wit!il 
the side. 3 
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Harriot promises to provide the solution to these problems 
but this promise remains unfulfilled in those of his 
manuscripts which have survived. 31 
Galileo seems to have progressed further since he was 
able to come up with a very elegant if not entirely 
convincing32 geometrical demonstration that a finite 
line could be composed of an infinite number of particles 
with an infinite number of vacua between them. This 
demonstration arises from a solution of the problem of 
'Aristotle's wheel' .33 The problem goes like this: 
how is it that a small circle, concentric to a larger 
one will rollout a line equal in length to the line 
rolled out by the larger one even though both circles 
have only made one revolution? (fig. 1) Galileo, working 
by analogy, shows that in the case of two concentric 
polygons, the sides of the inner polygon will not trace 
out a continuous straight line but will jump over parts 
of the line, so forming a line with gaps. (fig. 2) It 
follows, therefore, that a polygon of an infinite number 
of sides, that is to say a circle, can be made to trace 
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As the large hexagon ABCDE]l rolls about point 
B, point C will move along an arc to Q. The 
central point G will be raised in an arc above 
the line GV, only to return to the line at C. 
Similarly the side IK of the smaller hexagon 
will be lifted above the line IT and come back 
to it along OF as BC coincides with BQ. The 
line IO will be left empty. 
out a line with an infinite number of points alternating 
with an infinite number of gaps or vacua. Galileo 
subsequently insists that this geometrical demonstration 
must be understood to hold also in the case of surfaces 
and solid bodies, which must be composed of an infinite 
number of atoms with an infinite number of vacua between. 34 
It should not go unnoticed that althou@l Galileo is using 
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the word 'atom' (atomi) he is essentially talking about 
geometrical points. Certainly, these are atomic in the 
sense that they are indivisible but they are clearly not 
the same as the atoms of Epicurus. Evidently Galileo 
is actually in agreement with Aristotle about the 
untenability of physical atoms and has, therefore, 
developed his own notion of 'mathematical', infinitely 
small atoms. 35 Similarly, Harriot tells us that although 
a finite line 'cannot have his partes of a finite 
magnitude but they must be of a finite number', it 
could have an infinite number of parts if it 'be understood 
to be compounded of poyntes,.36 And like Galileo, he 
freely uses the word atamus even while talking about the 
infinitely small. For, example, he tells us that a 
circle is composed of an infinite number of atoms: 
Seeing that every line is compounded ex atomis 
& therefore in the peripherie of a circle one 
atomus is succeeding one another infinitelie in 
such manner as that the peripherie is at last 
compounded & made. 37 
It seems clear that both these thinkers, as a result of 
their knowledge of and respect for mathematics and 
geometry, had to accept that all quantity must be 
infinitely divisible, just as Aristotle had done before 
them. The only other route they could have taken would 
have been to try to develop a finitist or discrete 
geometry. But the problems involved in such a scheme 
seem to have been thoroughly daunting to all but those 
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with the most naively unmathematical minds. This can 
be clearly illustrated by considering two earlier thinkers: 
the Italian nature philosophers, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) 
and Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597). 
As a staunch and devoted Platonist, Patrizi wanted to 
defend his ancient mentor's belief in 'indivisible lines,.38 
So, when Patrizi confronted the difficulties arising 
from infinite divisibility of the sort we have just seen 
Galileo and Harriot consideri.ng, he showed no hesitation 
in rejecting the concept of infinite divisibility. 
Acceptance of this concept, he argued, would mean that the 
smalle st line linaginable would be equal to an infinite 
line, and a part of a line would be equal to the whole 
because they could all be divided equally, namely 
infinitely. Slinilarly, Bruno argued that if everything 
were infinitely divisible then everything would be equal 
in size: the whole universe equal to the world, and the 
world equal to an apple. 39 Accordingly, Patrizi insists 
that lines are composed of finite indivisible lines. 40 
Patrizi's Platonist priorities enable him to dismiss 
the absurdities which arise from his position as totally 
inconsequential in comparison to those arising from 
infinite divisibility. He admits that in the case of a 
triangle composed of three of these atomic lines it 
would be 'impossible' to drop a line from the apex 
perpendicular to the base because this would bisect the 
base line, but insists that this merely proves that 
geometry can only be applied when dealing with lines 
built up from several atomic lines (presumably in even 
numbers if they are to be bisected~).41 
Neo-Platonic and Pythagorean preconceptions also led 
Patrizi and Bruno into absurd attempts to defend 
Pythagorean wisdom from the threat of incommensurables. 
If it can be established that all lines are composed of 
a finite number of indivisible lines it follows that the 
diagonal of a square, for instance, must be commensurate 
with its side. Bruno's efforts to save Pythagoreanism 
in this way provide a fascinating example of what Kurd 
Lasswitz refers to as Bruno's 'ingenious fantasy' 
(geistvolle Phantasie). 42 
In the scholium to Book I, Chapter 7 of De minimo 43 
Bruno objects to the Aristotelian argument (outlined 
above) that infinitely small indivisibles cannot build 
up to form a finite object. 44 Bruno attacks this by 
insisting upon a distinction which, he feels, Aristotle 
has failed to observe. Bruno insists that the terminus 
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or boundary of a minimum is not a part of that minimum but 
is simply a necessary logical adjunct to the concept of 
body. It is possible, therefore, for the ter.mini of two 
bodies to come together without any increase - these 
ter.mini, having no parts, do absorb one another as 
Aristotle would have predicted. However, the minima, 
the indivisibles themselves are kept apart by their 
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tennini. 45 Now, this strategy seems at first sight to 
be superfluous effort (one might even say sheer futility) 
because Bruno has already established that atoms are not 
infinitely small (i.e. without parts) but are finitely 
small sphere s • Bruno, it seems, has completely missed 
the point of Aristotle's argument. He could have taken 
the much more straightforward line, like Epicurus, of 
insisting upon the hardness of his finite atoms to prevent 
their absorption or conglomeration into one another. 
What, then, is Bruno trying to do? 
The answer is simple but astounding. Bruno is not content 
with a concept of an atom which is physically indivisible 
on ~ hoc grounds. He wishes also to establish that it 
is indivisible in every sense, and that mathematicians 
and logicians are as wrong to believe in the concept of 
infinite divisibility as scholastic natural philosophers. 
Bruno is so unsympathetic to mathematics that if it does 
not coincide with his physics he believes it to be untenable. 
By making the distinction between the minimal part and the 
tenninal non-part (tenninus ergo est gui nulla est pars, 
et per negue minima pars) 46 he believes he bas undennined 
Aristotle's mathematical argument and has opened the way 
for a geometry of discretes. 
We need not pursue Bruno's elaboration of his concept of 
teminus; suffice it to sa:y that it is granted the partless 
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status of Aristotelian points, leaving Bruno free, so he 
thinks, to regard his atoms as the true primary principles 
of geometry. No one has ever begged a question to quite 
such an extent. When he argues that his two spherical 
atoms do not touch at a part of each other but at their 
partless tennini, he is merely affinning for the reader 
that two spheres touch at a dimensionless point, and the 
surface of a sphere (or the circumference of a circle) 
can be analysed, therefore, into an infinite number of 
such points. As Paul-Henri Michel puts it: 'this 
doctrine presents while it denies (and in the very moment 
of denying) the concept of the infinitely divisible,.41 
Even so, Bruno goes on to use his discrete geometry to 
reject the argument that the diagonal of a square is 
always incommensurable to the side. The seeming 
incommensurability is merely an illusion, Bruno claims, 
brought about by the mind's tendency to create perfect 
figures out of the true minimal. figures. 48 If we bear 
in mind that a true square is built up from an even number 
of spherical atoms then we can see with the aid of a 
diagram that the diagonal will always consist of an 
equal. number of atoms to the side (fig. ~).49 The 
mind deceives itself into notions of incommensurability 
when it fails to realise that the atoms touch each other 
along the sides but do not touch along th'& diagonal. 50 
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fig. 3 
Patrizi and Bruno could hardly have been so cavalier in 
sacrificing mathematics to their metaphysical and physical 
'preconceptions in these ways had they not been almost 
entirely insensitive to the systematic, logical coh~rence 
of geometry and mathematics. Their finitist geometries 
had no subsequent influence that I am aware of. Certainly, 
they were not followed by mathematical philosophers like 
Galileo and Harriot. For those '.Tho respected the demands 
of mathematical procedure and, one might even say, the 
demands of normal rational discourse,5 1 Aristotle's 
arguments against indivisible magnitudes proved insurmountable. 
Galileo's theory of indivisibles, accordingly, appears as 
an ultimately unsatisfactory compromise while Harriot's 
efforts to revive atomist noLions remain disjointed, 
incomplete and inadequate among his unpublished pape~s.52 
In view of these difficulties it is hardly surprising that 
the mechanical philosophers tended to agree with Aristotle 
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that matter was infinitely divisible. The word 'atom' 
often appears in the writines of seventeenth-century 
mechanists but it is always used 100sely.53 When being 
more careful mechanical philosophers chose instead to 
write of corpuscles or ni;:i.nirna naturalia. 54 Robert 
:. :~ .-', 
Boyle, to name just one:"example, reconciles Cartesianism 
and Atomism because botff,'philosophies explicate 'things 
by corpuscles, or minute bodies' and subsumes them both 
under the heading of 'corpuscular philosophy'. While 
elsewhere he chooses to fall back on the even less 
controversial and thoroughly traditional designation of 
the 'minute parts' of bodies as minima naturalia. 55 
3. Void space and the new philosophy 
The Aristotelian arguments against the other atomist 
principle - nothingness or void - proved less intractable 
than those against indivisible magnitudes but even so the 
story is a long and complex one. In a very real sense 
this story is inextricably bound up with the development 
of the modern world-view and it would divert us way 
beyond the bounds of this thesis to pursue all the 
threads here. For example, when thinkers like Galileo 
and Descartes wished to produce a new inertial theory of 
motion and to replace the Aristotelian belief that omne quod 
movetur ab alio movetur, they were able to draw on kinetic 
theories opposed to Aristotle's dating from at least as 
5() 
early as the sixth century. Nany of these earlier 
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impetus theories of motion were developed in response to 
Aristotle's arguments about the impossibility of motion 
in a vacuum and appeared as digressions in arguments to 
establish the possibility of void space. 57 
Moreover, as Edward Grant has convincingly shown, the 
philosophical possibility of space empty of body was 
always bound up with theological problems about God's 
omnipotence and his relationship to the world. 58 The 
resulting theological demand for the possibility of or 
even the necessity for void space remained a lively 
topic of debate well into the seventeenth century, as 
can be seen in the works of Henry More (1614-1687) and 
Isaac Newton (1642-1726).59 These two Englishmen and 
the Frenchman, Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), were largely 
responsible for introducing the concept of space as an 
absolute, three dimensional but immaterial entity into 
the mainstream of European thought. In view of the 
eventual longevity of their concept of space and its 
near unanimous support by natural philosophers until the 
twentieth century it can hardly be denied that they 
succeeded in overcoming Aristotle's objections to the 
concept of void space. The history of this triumph over 
Aristoteleanism has been amply dealt with in a number of 
books and articles and we need not go any further into it. 60 
However, it should not be forgotten that Descartes, Hobbes 
and other contemporary mechanical philosophers rejected 
the concept of void space as completely insupportable. 
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The most familiar and perhaps the most important example 
of a plenist mechanical philosopher is Ren~ Descartes. 
His metaphysics led him to define body exclusively in 
terms of extension (res extensa), so the very idea of 
extension without body was self-contradictory. Although 
Descartes presents his arguments in an entirely original 
way, fundamentally they are based on age-old Aristotelian 
assumptions that three dimensional extension can only be 
predicated of an extended something and that something 
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must be body. Moreover, the whole of Cartesian physics, 
like Aristotelian physics, required an uninterrupted 
succession of bodies in all directions, since the sequence 
of cause and effect could only be transmitted by contact 
action. 
Thomas Hobbes did not accept the Cartesian identification 
of matter and extension because, as he himself put it, 
'extension is one thing and the thing extended another,.6~ 
Nevertheless, he too was a committed plenist and his 
essentially Aristotelian approach to the concept of space 
and place is obvious from even a cursory glance at his 
discussion in De cOEPore. 63 Like many a scholastic 
philosopher before him Hobbes dismisses the concept of 
empty space merely as 'imaginary', a 'phantasm' which 
only becomes real space when it is co-extended with the 
. 64 
magnitude of a bo~. 
Perhaps the final testimony to the continued vigour of 
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the Aristotelian arguments against void space is provided 
by Robert Boyle. Although Boyle performed many elegant 
experiments with his renowned air-pump, he never unequivocally 
committed himself to the existence of a vacuum within his 
pump. Writing in 1670 he felt bound to apologise for his 
free and easy use of the term Vacuum Boylianum 'because, 
to call it vacuum absolutely, would be judged by many a 
declaring himself a vacuist, who does not yet own the 
being either of their opinion, or a downright plenist,.65 
Boyle's equivocation is fully in keeping with his habitual 
cautious scepticism but it is also an indication of Boyle's 
awareness of the philosophical difficulties confronting 
the notion of vacuum. 
One of the greatest stumbling-blocks which Aristotle had 
presented to atomism was his insistence that the atomist 
account of condensation and rarefaction implied the 
existence of 'self-determined voids,.66 The cogency of 
the Aristotelian arguments are superbly illustrated by 
the Aristotelian mechanical philosopher, Sir Kenelm Digby 
(1603-1665). Digby is quick to acknowledge the elegant 
simplicity of the atomist account, in which rarefaction 
is defined merely in terms of an increased distance 
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between the constituent particles of the body. The problem, 
of course, is that some means of holding the particles 
apart from e2.ch other must be found. Calling upon 
the researches of Galileo and the fifth century neo-
Platonist, Marinus Ghetaldus, Digby points out that gold 
is 7,600 times heavier than air. 67 If all matter qua 
matter is uniform in weight, then this difference in 
weight can only be explained by the fact that there is 
corre~pondingly less matter in a volume of air equal to 
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a volume of gold. It follows that the 'body of air' 
must 'appeare to be like a net, whose holes and distances 
are to the lines and thriddes in the proportion of 
7,600 to one'. The proportion of vacuity to matter 
on this assumption is too absurd to be admitted, or so 
Digby believes. Furthermore it seems to deny the very 
nature of rare bodies which are generally judged to be 
fluid: 
If such vacuities were the cause of rarity, it would 
follow that fluide bodies being rarer than solid 
ones, they would be of themselves standing, like 
nettes or cobwebbes: whereas contrariwise, we see 
their natures are to runne together, and to fill up 
every little creek and corner: which effect, 
following out of the very nature of the th:ings 
themselves, ~ust needes exclude vacuities out of 
that na tu:re. 9 
This was to prove an :insurmountable problem until Newton 
simply cut the Gordian knot by postulating the existence 
of repulsive forces acting at a distance between the 
particles of bodies.10 The fact that Newton could only 
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circumvent this problem by denying one of the major precepts 
of the mechanical philosophy - that action does not occur 
over a distance - is a sure testimony to the vitality of 
the Aristotelian arguments. 71 
4. Matter in motion: the problems resolved? 
In conclusion, therefore, we can say that Aristotle left 
a legacy not only of doctrine but also of heuristic, which 
prescribed the way in which the problems associated with 
indivisible magnitudes and void space were approached. 
The result was that the concept 'atom' with its clear 
implications of indivisibility tended to give way to a 
much more amorphous concept - the corpuscle. Likewise, 
arguments about the existence or impossibility of void 
spaces were not allowed to interfere with the development 
of the mechanical philosophy as a new and pragmatic way 
of understanding the workings of the world. In a sense, 
therefore, the mechanical philsophy developed independently 
of arguments concerned with' atoms and the void'. The 
ancient principles of atomism were indeed, as Marie Boas 
Hall has said, virtually irrelevant to the development 
of the new philosophy. The rubric which summarised the 
new Weltanschauung was 'matter in motion'. This phrase 
was superficially unproblematic. It would not excite 
reactions of incredulity or even contempt fran the lay 
audience for natural philosophy the way the phrase 'atoms 
and the void' undoubtedly would. However, as soon as 
the details C£ the mechanical philosophy began to be 
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worked out, a whole series of crucial new questions had 
to emerge. Where does the motion come from? How is it 
preserved? Is it innate in matter? Is it perhaps 
supplied by an immaterial active spirit? If so, what 
can we learn about the nature of this active spirit? The 
list could easily be extended. 
Hitherto, questions like these, regarding the nature 
of activity in the world, have been seen by historians 
of English science as unique to Cambridge Platonists, 
like Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, and to I saac Newton. 72 
Certainly these three men were explicit in their denial 
of the strict mechanical account of nature in which the 
amount of motion in the world was constant and merely 
transmitted and transferred by successive impacts between 
bodies. Newton, for example, foresaw a number of problems 
in this view: 
If you think that the vis inertiae is sufficient 
for conserving motion, pray tell me the experiments 
from whence you gather thy conclusion. Do you 
learn by any experiment that the beating of heart 
gives no new motion to the blood, that the explosion 
of gunpowder gives no new motion to a bullet or that 
a man by his will can give no new motion to his body? 
Do you learn by experiment that the beating of your 
heart takes away as much motion from something else 
as it gives to the blood or that explosion takes 
away as much motion from something else as it gives 
to a bullet or that a man by his will takes away 
as much motion from something else as he gives to 
his body? If so, tell me your experiments; if 
not your opinion is precarious. Reasoning without 
experience is very slippery.73 
28 
As a result of such obvious divergence from Descartes, 
Newton has come to be seen as fundamentally different 
from other mechanical philosophers. It has even 
been noticed that Newton was so far from being a 
mechanical philosopher in the accepted sense as to have 
declared: 'We cannot say that all nature is not alive,.74 
Similarly, the Cambridge Platonists, with their vigorous 
rejection of Hobbes, and Epicurus, and their superimposition 
of a hylarchic principle onto the Cartesian philosophy, 
have also been regarded as far removed from mechanism. 
It is my contention in this thesis that, contrary to what 
has usually been supposed, the gulf is not so wide 
between Newton and the Cambridge Platonists on the one 
hand and those who are considered to be straightforward 
mechanists on the other. In the following chapters I 
hope to be able to show that metaphysical problems about 
the source of the perpetual motions and activities in 
nature are never far from the minds of all the major 
English exponents of the mechanical philosophy. The 
Cartesian suggestion, that there is no new motion in 
the world because the amount of motion has remained 
constant since God gave an initial puSh at the Creation, 
gained no fully-committed adherents in England. All 
of the major figures in English mechanical philosophy 
rely to some extent on some fo~ of active principle. 75 
Even the Yorkshire philosopher, Henry Power (1623-1668), 
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who is frequently regarded as one of Descartes' most 
devoted English followers, seems in fact, to have 
believed that matter was inherently active. Perhaps 
this is most clearly highlighted by comparing this 
so-called Cartesian with the outrageous freethinker 
and vitalist philosopher, John Toland (1670-1722). 
Toland's insistence, in 1704, that 'matter is necessarily 
active as well as extended' ,76 is indistinguishable from 
Power's belief, recorded in 1661, that motion 'is as 
inseparable an attribute to Bodies, as well as Extension 
is,.77 Similarly, Toland's doctrine that 'all the matter 
in Nature, every Part and Parcel of it, has bin ever in 
motion and can never be otherwise', may be directly 
compared with Power's rhetorical question: 'is it not 
probable that Motion also may be indefinitely swift or 
slow, and yet never come to a quiescency? and so 
consequently there can be no rest in Nature, more than a 
Vacuity in Matter' .78 It would seem that for Power no 
less than for Toland 'motion is essential to matter'. 79 
It may well be argued that the difference between the 
two men lies in the fact that Power hoped to find a 
strict mechanical account of his incessM.t:mo.tions • 
.. " J.:',:,::, 
There is, however, no evidence for this .• Although he 
.'. 
promised, in the Preface to his Experimental philosophy, 
to deal with the problem of motion 'in another place',80 
as far as we know he did not. We can only conclude 
that he found the endeavour too daunting. As he said, 
'the Speculation of Motion, and its Origin [iil, as I 
conceive one of the obscurest things in Nature' .81 
The 'mechanical philosophy' does not begin with Henry 
Power, however. In order to establish our case we 
must begin at the beginning and proceed to the demise 
of the mechanical philosophy - when active principles 
emerge triumphant in the philosophy of Newton. If 
we are to begin with the very first efforts to explain 
the phenomena of nature in terms of 'matter in motion', 
then we must look to the 1630s when, inspired by his 
discovery of Euclid and Galileo, Thomas Hobbes turned 
from classical studies to natural philosophy.82 
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CHAPrER 2 
THE NON~CHANICAL ORIGINS OF THE MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY: 
THE BACKGROUND TO HOBBES' LITTLE TREATISE 
It is usually accepted that a short manuscript tract 
written by Thomas Hobbes in the 1630s is the earliest 
contribution by an English thinker to the mechanical 
philosophy of nature. Hobbes entitled this manuscript 
'A short tract on first principles' but it is more usually 
known as The little treatise. 1 The foremost student of 
Hobbes' mechanical philosophy, Frithiof Brandt, has argued 
that 'the gexm of the mechanical conception of nature is 
found in this treatise' and has therefore insisted that 
'this treatise is Hobbes' most important work on natural 
philosophy,.2 Accordingly, Brandt has provided a detailed 
and penetrating study of The little treatise in his yet 
to be superseded study of Thomas Hobbes' mechanical 
conception of nature. However, there are one or two 
extremely significant aspects of Hobbes' 'Short tract' 
which Brandt failed to elucidate. In particular, 
Brandt was unable to detexmine any significant influences 
upon Hobbes' new way of thinking and was forced to come 
to a somewhat romantic conclusion which is rather 
unsatisfactoxy to the historian: 
When Hobbes' interest in philosophy was re-awakened 
by the problem of the act of sense, and the idea of 
motion 'forte fortuna' occurred to him, the babe of 
thought leaped in him as Kirke~d would say; 
at that moment he was a genius. 3 
Moreover, try as he might Brandt could not understand 
Hobbes' theory of motion. Hobbes' discussions of 
objects with 'inherent power to move' seemed to 
Brandt to be 'a singular concept' which 'remained 
obscure' •4 It is the purpose of this chapter to 
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extend Brandt's studies and to suggest answers for these 
two problems. In order to be able to understand the 
second problem - the nature of Hobbes' concept of bodies 
or agents with 'inherent power to move,5 - we must first 
know something about the sources from which he drew 
those ideas. We turn first of all, therefore, to a 
consideration of the influences upon Hobbes, during 
the earliest phase of his career as a natural philosopher. 
1. Thomas Hobbes' early influences 
We can be certain that Hobbes wrote The little treatise 
before October 1636. For, at that time he wrote a letter 
in which he upholds a mediumistic theory of light transmission. 
At this stage he admits that his speculations are incomplete 
but he is nevertheless adamant that light is merely a 
motion in the medium surrounding all bodies. 6 Hobbes 
never again changed his opinion on this matter and so we 
can be fairly certain that The little treatise, which relies 
upon a corpuscular theory of light, belongs to a period 
before this date. Ferdinand T6nnies and Frithiof Brandt 
argue that the most likely date for the composition of 
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these 'First principles' is 1630. The evidence for 
such an early date, however, is far from straightforward. 
In order to defend himself from charges of plagiarism, 
levelled at him by Descartes, Hobbes wrote to Mersenne 
that he explained hie theories about 'the nature and 
production of light' to William and Charles Cavendish 
'in the year 1630,.7 Five years after writing this 
letter, in 1646, Hobbes actually wrote a short optical 
treatise which he evidently hoped to publish. In the 
intervening years Hobbes could hardly have forgotten the 
earlier charges of plagiarism and so it comes as no 
surprise that he inserted an oblique reference to the 
antecedents of the ideas presented and their date. In 
the dedicatory epistle, therefore, he wrote: 
That which I have written of it Loptic~ is grounded 
especially upon that wch about 16 yeares since I 
affirmed to your LoPP at Welbeck, that light is a 
fancB in the minds, caused by motion in the braine 
• • • • 
The veracity of these claims is undermined slightly, I 
feel, by the fact that Hobbes is disingenuously concealing 
the fact that the theory of light presented in The little 
treatise is very different from the views which he 
developed after October 1636. After 1636 his theory did 
suddenly become mediumistic and much closer to Cartesian 
ideas than anything in The little treatise. 
In view of the undeniably bitter rivalry between Hobbes 
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and Descartes I think it is unsafe to take Hobbes' 
claims about the early date of composition as totally 
reliable. Furthermore, in his autobiography he quite 
clearly states that 'he began to investigate the principles 
of natural science' while on his third visit to Paris 
during the tour he made between 1634 and 1636. 9 It 
would seem from this that the earliest date for the 
composition of The little treatise is 1634. Brandt's 
efforts to extend this terminus a guo back to 1630 by 
an over-scrupulous reading of Hobbes' autobiographical 
writings do not affect this conclusion. 10 All Brandt 
succeeds in doing is arguing that before he began to 
write Hobbes must have already been thinking along 
'mechanist' lines. But what then or who was the 
inspiration for this new way of thinking? 
Brandt considers the influence of Francis Bacon, whom 
he regards as a proto-mechanist, and Galileo but finds 
little in Hobbes' earliest philosophical work which 
bears the unmistakable imprint of either thinker. 11 
Hobbes himself tells us of the stimulating effect that 
Euclid's Elements had upon him but this influence extends 
only as far as Hobbes' method and cannot be said to have 
12 inspired his mechanical philosophy in any detailed way. 
Brandt seems rather to regard Aristotle as the major 
influence on Hobbes. 13 There is a great deal of truth 
in what Brandt says and it should be recognised as a 
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further indication of the prolonged influence of 
Aristotle even upon leading thinkers of the so-called 
'Scientific Revolution,.14 Nevertheless, the Aristotelian 
aspects of Hobbes' early work are matters of method and 
approach. We can still find nothing to help us explain 
the details of Hobbes' mechanical philosophy as he unfolds 
it. It is this which led Brandt to emphasise the 
creative nature of Hobbes' Little treatise and see it as 
'the babe of thought' leaping in Hobbes' mind. 
Some of Hobbes' contemporaries were rather more cynical 
and, it must be admitted, somewhat less sympathetic to 
Hobbes' genius than Brandt. John Wilkins and Seth Ward 
do not confine themselves to speaking of 'influence' but 
insist that Hobbes' Little treatise is a work of plagiarism. 
So far, these accusations have received virtually no 
attention from scholars. They have tended to be dismissed 
merely as further examples of the vilification heaped upon 
Hobbes as a result of what were taken to be his atheistic 
. . 1 15 prmc~p es. However, if we take these accusations 
seriously for a moment we are led to examine the manuscript 
papers of an early but scarcely remembered associate of 
Hobbes, Walter Warner (1570-1642/3). For it is he who 
was singled out by Seth Ward as the major 'influence' on 
Hobbes: 
That which he nffobbeil so much glories in, is not 
his owne invention, but is contained for substance 
(as I am certainly informed by one who hath 
seen it) in Mr Warner8 Papers, W~Ch Mr Hobbs 
had long since in his hands •••• 1 
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Walter Warner was one of the three magi. That is to say 
he was one of the three 'wise men' who, so we are told by 
John Aubrey and Anthony Wood, helped the so-called 'wizard 
earl', Henry Percy (1564-1632), ninth Earl of Northumberland, 
to pass the time while he was imprisoned in the Tower. 17 
The wizard earl's three magi or three pensioners were 
Thomas Harriot (1560-1621), Robert Hues (1553-1632) and 
18 Walter Warner. So far Warner has failed to excite much 
scholarly attention. In comparison with his close friend 
Harriot, for example, the amount of work on Warner is 
virtually negligible, and yet it seems to me that he is 
at least as interesting as Harriot. 
What makes Warner so interesting is that he did leave 
substantial remains about a carefully thought-out 
system of natural philosophy - something which Harriot 
never did19 - and this system alone deserves much closer 
20 
scrutiny than it has received so far. I will give 
a brief outline of Warner's system here but first I will 
try to establish the clear similarities between Hobbes' 
Little treatise and Warner's philosophy. 
Hobbes knew Warner very well. They were both members, 
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for a time, of the so-calle; Welbeck Abbey circle which 
clustered around William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, 
and his younger brother Sir Charles. 21 Furthennore, 
there are strong indications that the two men were 
rivals in natural philosophy. This rivalry is made 
most explicit in a letter from Hobbes to William 
Cavendish written in August 1635 where it becomes clear 
that both men were engaged upon psychological studies. 
Hobbes wrote: 
For the soule I know he has nothing to give your 
Lordship any satisfaction. I would he could give 
reasons for the facultyes and passions of the soule, 
such as may be expressed in playne English, if he 
can; he is the first, that ever I heard of, could 
speak sense in that subject. If he cannot I 
hope to be the first.22 
It is clear from this not only that Hobbes knew what 
Warner's opinions were on these matters but also that 
he approved of them to a large extent. As Hobbes deals 
with 'the facultyes and passions of the soule' in The 
little treatise we have every reason to suppose that he 
felt this was his own attempt to be 'the first' to 
'give reasons' for them. It is fitting, therefore, to 
compare these aspects of The little treatise with the 
corresponding discussion in "I.Tarner's papers. To this we 
we now turn. 
The starting point for the third and final section of 
The little treatise is the problem of how animals move. 
This constitutes a major problem for Hobbes because he 
has previously insisted that 'Nothing can move itself' .23 
Hobbes' opening gambit in Section III, then, is to 
presuppose that there are 'Animal spirits ••• which are 
the instruments of sense and motion'. Now, according 
to Hobbes' earlier conclusions (remem~Jer he is imitating 
the method of Euclid)24 if these 'animal spirits' are 
responsible for moving the body they must do so either 
by some inherent power or by virtue of passing on a motion 
which they have received from outside the boqy.25 If 
animal spirits had inherent power to move, however, it 
would be impossible for any animal to stop moving because 
'The Agent that moveth by Active power originally in it 
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self, applyed to the patient, 0hall always move it'. 
As animals can remain at rest, 27 it follows that the 
animal spirits merely transmit motions which they receive 
from external stimuli. 
We find essentially the same argument in Warner's papers. 
\'Thile trying to explain the operations of the standard 
Galenic notion of 'locomotive faculty' Warner insists 
that the animal cannot be 'automaticall or self-motive 
without a distinct principiummovent because absolutel~" 
such there can be none'. Furthermore the 'principium 
movent' cannot be an inherent power because the animal 
would then be condemned to move incessantly: 
the princlplUID by which it is activated is not 
connatural with it or so internally conhmct or 
connected unto it or dependent on it the.t it 
must necessarily and perpetually and invariably 
move ••• 
Warner concludes that because the activating principle 
brings about motions that are variable and occasional 
it must receive motion itself from an external and 
independent source. 28 
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Hobbes' animal spirits and Warner's locomotive faculty are 
both held to be activated by the effects of the various 
bodies in motion which impinge upon the animal body and 
transmit their motions through the animals sense organs. 
Hobbes puts it succinctly: 
Ligbt~ colour, heat and other proper obiects of sense, 
when they are perceived by sense are nothing but 
the severall actions of External thing~ upon the 
Animal Spirits by severall Organs ••• 9 
However, the operation of external things upon the senses 
and then, in turn, upon the animal spirits to bring about 
local motion is not envisaged in crudely mechanistic terms 
of impact and recoil. As Warner is quick to point out, 
to 'imagine the activation of the locomotive faculty to 
be by corporall compulsion' is clearly absurd. 30 Hobbes 
too is fully aware than an object impinging upon our sight, 
for instance, may sometimes cause us to move and sometimes 
not. Similarly, we can be, indeed often are, moved by 
the memory of a thing which is not actually present. 
Accordingly, both men introduce the concept of appetite 
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to play an inte~ediary role between sensory in-puts 
and the locomotive faculty (or animal spirits). Animal 
motion, when it occurs, is brought about by a complex 
chain of reactions. For Warner: 
The locomotive faculty cannot be activated but by 
way of appetition or by the intervention and 
preactivation of the appetite or faculty appetitive 
and not possibly otherwise. And the appetite 
cannot possibly be activated but by some motion 
or cognoscitive obiect presented to it. 31 
While for Hobbes an external object is the efficient 
cause which acts upon the appetite or 'the act contrary 
to the Act of Appetite' which in turn sets up 'a motion 
of the Animal Spirits towards [Or away fro!!:! the obiect 
that moveth them,.32 Appetite and its opposite also 
provide both men with working definitions of what is 
signified by good and bad - which both men choose to 
refer to in Latin: bonum and malum~3 
In order to explain how it is that the animal spirits or 
the locomotive faculty may be moved one way or another 
even in the absence of a bonum or a malum the two men 
have to address themselves to the problem of memory and 
the imagination. Hobbes refers to the inhabitants of 
memory and imagination as 'phantasma', Warner calls 
them 'fantasmes'. According to Hobbes 'a Phantasma 
is an action of the Brayne on the animal spirits by the 
power it receiveth from external sensible things'. 
While he looks at a man, Hobbes says, he sees a man but 
when his eyes are closed or averted what he sees is the 
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phantasma of a man. Or, as Warner puts it: 'as the 
fantasme is but the continuation of the original sensible 
passion after the object is gone, so the fantasy is but 
the continuance of the sense'. 34 The next problem 
for Hobbes and Warner is to explain how the brain can 
summon up 'the effect Lof the sensei! after the cause 
is gone', and even after 'interpolation or inter.mission 
of quiet'. 35 
Once again both come up with essentially the same answer. 
This is how Hobbes deals with it: 
The Act of Understanding is a Motion of the Animal 
Spirits by the Action of the brayne, qualifyed with 
the active power of theexternall obiect. 
We are said to understand a thing when we have 
the Phantasma or Apparition of it; but a Phantasma 
is the action of the. brayne qualifyed on the Animal 
Spirits ... Corollary - Understanding (as a power) 
is a passive power in the Animal Spirits to bg 
moved by the action of the brayne qualifyed. 3 
Warner, using the old-fashioned terminology for the' brain 
as 'the organ of the spirits sensitive' puts it like this: 
the maner of the causation of these impressions or 
figurations by the action of the obiect and. . 
alteration of the spirits with their receptl.on l.n 
organs seu subiecto sensitivo and the retention 
of them after the recesse of the cause impriment is 
nothing els but a kind of habituation of the ~aid 
orean sensitive •••• And the faculty sen8it:ve 
after the originall impression is made, that 1.8 
42 
after his subiect or organ, if habituated, in 
all succeeding acts of fantasiation may be said operari 
or pati or movere ex habitu ••• it being thus concluded 
and resolved on that the maner of retention of the 
original impressions of sensation is by way of 
habituation of the faculty sensitive, that is by a 
certaine fixed or permanent figuration or information 
of the subiect or organ of the spirits sensitive.37 
For both Hobbes and Warner, therefore, an idea can be 
'called up', as it were, because the brain has been 
'qualified' or 'habituated' or given a 'permanent 
figuration' in such a way that it can generate these ideas 
in the animal spirits. 
Such changes in the brain are evidently brought about by 
the action of earlier sensory 'in-puts'. Hobbes illustrates 
his 'qualification' of the brain with an interesting analogy: 
Though it may be doubted how the brayne can receive 
such power from the externall obiect; yet it is 
no more, nor otherwise, than when steale touched 
by the Loadstone receiveth from it a Magneticall 
virtue, to wo3g the same effects the Loadstone itself doeth. 
Walter Warner, writing a much more comprehensive account 
of natural philosophy than Hobbes' Short tract on first 
prinCiples recognises the need to explicate his notion 
of 'habituation'. However, he decides to postpone this 
elucidation, but not before drawing the same analogy as 
Hobbes: 
11; may suffice for this time to have noted this much 
concerning the habituation of our faculties as well 
sensitive as Locomotive. But the maner of 
habi'tuation in generall is also to be considered. 
And how some things are altered and do acquire a 
fixed and pe~anent quality as well b,y one act as 
by a thousand, as iron by one touch of the magn~§, 
others do require many consuetudinary acts •••• 
It should be clear from all this that Warner's papers 
and Hobbes' Little treatise contain such remarkable 
similarities that the suggestion of influence can 
hardly be denied. I have concentrated here on the 
last section of Hobbes' Little treatise partly because 
it is in that section that Hobbes discusses 'the 
facultyes and passions of the soule' which he knew 
Warner to be concerned with. 40 f10reover, it is in 
this section that we can find similarities with Warner's 
vocabulaxy and words like appetite, phantasma (or 
fantasme), bonum and malum appear with their fairly 
specialised meanings, and so help to underline the 
similarities. Nevertheless, there is ver,y little in 
the first two sections of Hobbe~Little treatise which 
could not also have been taken from Warner's papers. 
In spite of the very different presentations (Warner 
discursive and verbose, Hobbes brief and elliptical) 
the similarity of concept and argument remains marked. 
There are even similarities between Warner's papers 
and the final published version of Hobbes' De corpore 
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(1655). Both men, for example, denounce the Aristotelian 
concept of materia prima as 'a vaine te~e' {Warner} 
or 'a mere name' (Hobbes), but immediately recant to 
admit the usefulness of the concept as an 'abstract 
consideration of matter' (Warner) or 'body considered 
universally' (Hobbes) so that fo~ or any accidental 
qualities need not enter 'into argumentation' (Hobbes).41 
The notion of 'habituation' as it appears in Warner's 
papers also appears in De cOEPore and Hobbes' well-
known but little understood concept of conatus -
usually believed to derive from Descartes - can also be 
found in Warner's work. 42 
Having looked at Warner's papers, then, I feel bound to 
endorse the words of John Wilkins; 
Though Hobbes for his part may think it below him 
to acknowledge himself beholding to Mr Warners 
Manuscripts, yet those amongst us who have seen 
and perused them must for many things give him 
the honour of precedency before Mr Hobbes. 43 
Once the influence of Warner upon Hobbes is accepted we 
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can use Warner's basic principles to help us to interpret 
and understand Hobbes' preconceptions when he wrote The 
little treatise. Before turning to this, however, we 
must first consider further influences upon Hobbes which 
have come to light since Brandt wrote his pioneering study. 
The Italian scholar, Arrigho Pacchi, has recently 
unearthed, among the Hobbes manuscripts at Chatsworth 
House in Derbyshire, a list, drawn up by Hobbes himself, 
of several selected titles from the manuscript library 
of Sir Kenelm Digby.44 We know this is a very select 
list because Digby donated his collection to the 
Bodleian Library and a complete list has been preserved. 
Hobbes' select list is dated 1634 and was made, Pacchi 
suggests, before the collection left Digby's possession. 
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The exact significance of this list must always remain 
uncertain but it is surely safe to assume that they 
represent works in which Hobbes was particularly interested. 
Now, this list is comprised mainly of works by Robert 
Grosseteste (d. 1253) and Roger Bacon (1214?-1294) but 
also includes a number of works from the neo-Platonic 
tradition, notably works by Hermes Trismegistus and Proclus. 45 
It also includes an Arabic work of profound influence upon 
Grosseteste and Bacon themselves: Al-Kindi's De radiis 
stellarum. 46 Since Pacchi published this list, another 
Italian scholar, Aldo Gargani, has pointed out that Hobbes' 
Lit'tle treatise is heavily indebted to the works of 
Grosseteste and Bacon. 47 
The clearest signal of the influence of Grosseteste and 
Bacon upon The little treatise is Hobbes' doctrine of 
'species'. Hobbes' short work sets the scene for 
subsequent mechanical systems of philosophy by relying 
upon a corpuscular concept of matter. Hobbes refers 
to these corpuscles as 'species': 
Every Agent that worketh on a distant Patient, 
toucheth it, eyther by the medium or by somewhat 
issueing from it self, which thing so issueing 
lett be call'd Species. 48 
The concept of 'species', albeit in a rather different form, 
was first developed by Grosseteste and Bacon. Indeed, 
one of Bacon's most important works, which naturally 
appears on Hobbes' list of manuscripts, is entitled De 
ti . 49 multiplica one spec~erum. 
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Hobbes' choice of the designation 'species' for his 
corpuscles is by no means simply a whim. Nor can it be 
seen as merely an attempt to avoid using the term 'atom' .50 
Simply by introducing the concept of 'species' into his 
Short tract on first principles Hobbes is assimilating 
into his natural philosophy a number of preconceptions 
without which his system could not operate. In order 
to understand this we must turn now to consider in 
detail Hobbes' early matter theory. In particular 
we must try to reach an unde~standing of Hobbes' belief in 
agents with 'inherent power to move' which Brandt 
found so unintelligible. 51 
2. Hobbes and 'The Agent that hath active power inherent 
in itself' 
At the outset of The little treatise Hobbes lists the 
principles of causality - of which he distinguishes 
sixteen. From these principles he proceeds to draw 
conclusions. Two of these conclusions seem to allow 
for inherent power within bodies. The eighth conclusion 
reads: 
The Agent that moveth by Active power originally 
in it~eI5~ applyed to the Patient, shall always 
move It. 
And the fifteenth reads: 
The Agent that hath active power inherent in 
itself, applyed to severall 5~ual Patients, 
shall worke on them equally. 
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The nature of these agents is otherwise left obscure. 
The only other information we are given about them 
is that they have power in themselves 'to produce ••• 
species', and because this power is inherent it follows 
(from the eighth conclusion) that 'Agents send out 
their species continually' .54 I believe that we can 
only fully understand the intellectual background to 
these remarks by considering the similar concepts proposed 
in those thinkers whose work we have just shown to be 
influential upon Hobbes. Let us consider first the 
basic principles of Walter Warner's natural philosophy. 
Warner's natural philosophy is based on four metaphysical 
principles: time, space, matter and vis. The demands 
of his ontology are delivered under the heading 'Of 
states, alterations, causes,.55 The concept of existence 
he tells us, necessarily involves the concepts of time 
and space. If an object exists it must exist in time 
and space: 'The state of being or existence of a thing 
is the continuation of the being thereof in and for a 
certain time and space' .56 Time and space themselves 
are, of course, exceptions to this - they must exist 
but they cannot be said to exist in time or space (to 
'd ' f' 't ) 57 avo 1 1n lnl e regress • 
Warner's definition of time in terms of duration rather 
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rather than in terms of matter in motion marks a 
radical departure from the Aristotelian definition. 58 
Similarly, in a section on 'Spacium, Locus, Ubi', Warner 
gives a definition of space completely at odds with 
that of Aristotle. Space is said to be the 'universal 
vessel or receptacle of things' and is described as 
continuous, ecernal, immoveable, homogeneal, absolutely 
penetrable, and without solidity or resistance. 59 Even 
these few opinions are sufficient to indicate the major 
influence on Warner's ideas. These notions are entirely 
characteristic of neo-Platonic thought. Aristotle denied 
any absolute status to time and space, regarding them as 
sufficiently defined in terms of the motion or position 
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of body. The insistence upon the absolute nature of 
time and space is characteristically neo-Platonic. Plato 
himself referred to space as the 'Receptacle - as it were, 
f 11 B ., 61 the nurse - 0 a ecomlng • While early neo-Platonists 
like Plotinus (205-270) and Proclus (410-485) rejected 
Aristotle's theory of time. 62 
Having established that time and space are essential 
prerequisites for all other existence Warner then argues 
that 'the first thing that offers itself for a subject 
to the state of existence or non-existence is matter,.63 
Once again Warner's definition is strictly neo-Platonic: 
The very quiddity and proper essence of matter 
is corporeity or resistibility (or antitypia or 
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hardnes) for in that it is continuall or hath the 
three corporeall dimensions of longitude, latitude 
and profundity it agrees with space to wch that 
condition ~oth properly or at least primarily 
belong ••• 4 
Warner's comment here is particularly important because 
it shows his recognition of the need to deny the 
Aristotelian identification of body with three-
dimensional extension. Warner insists here that 
the so-called 'corporeall dimensions' are actually 
the proper qualities of space rather than body.65 
This being so, Warner must characterize matter in a 
different way. Here again he draws upon neo-Platonic 
traditions. Even Warner's use of the word 'antitypia' 
betrays that influence since it is a word frequently used 
by neo-Platonic writers ( and in exactly the same sense) 
66 but rarely found elsewhere. 
Having defined matter, Warner must press on because his 
system is still incomplete. Time, space and matter could 
remain: 
without the access or production of any other thing 
& with out any alteration or difference in themselves, 
both in eternal time and infinite space. 67 
However, such a state of affairs is 'repugnant to the 
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testimony of our senses and present appearances'. What 
Warner's system lacks is an active principle to account 
for the phenomena of motion: 
neither time and space at one, nor time and space 
with matter are sufficient without the position of 
some fourth thing for the production of all the 
species, motions, alterations and affects wch 
are actually apparent in the universe. Some 
such fourth thing is therefore to be admitted 
and the nature and conditions thereof as of a 
thing fit for such and such offices and the 
execution of such and such gffects is to be 
examined and considered of. 9 
A little later, while reiterating this point he gives 
a name to thi s 'fourth thing': 
as none of the se /ihenomen..;j that are in motu 
(as they all are) can possibly be salved by the 
solitary existence of matter we must of necessity 
aclmowledg a fourth thing as a cause of motion 
wch may therefore well be termed vis or power 
by the quality of his office. Whatsoever his 
substance or quiddity be.70 
The nature or 'quiddity' of this active principle -
once it is revealed - est~blishes beyond any doubt the 
neo-Platonic nature of Warner's thinking. Referred to 
variously as vis radiativa or 'vertue radiative' we are 
told that this fourth principle is, like space, a three-
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dimensional incorporeal entity.71 The clearest indication 
of its true nature, however, reads as follows: 
All bodies have in them an efficient power or 
vertue wch maY7~e called iight whether sensible 
or insensible. 
It is perfectly clear from this that Warner is drawing 
upon the neo-Platonic tradition of 'light metaphysics,73 
to provide him with his active principle or 'cause of 
motion' • 
The tradition of light metaphysics apparently originated 
with Plotinus and subsequently became a distinguishing 
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feature of neo-Platonic thought. 74 Essentially, the 
tradition owes its origins to the belief that light 
provides the closest physical analogue to the nature 
of the God-head, and to the Creator's means of operating 
in the world. In theological discussions within this 
tradition the phenomena of illumination and other aspects 
of the behaviour of light are often used as metaphors of 
various theological doctrines. 75 More important for our 
purposes, however, is the belief that light performs 
some universal aetiological function, so that all 
physical causation is said to take place in a way 
analogous to the behaviour of light. Indeed, one of 
the major sources of the light metaphysical tradition 
is the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de causis. 76 As a 
r~sult of this universal aetiological role light also 
becomes a fundamental ingredient in various cosmogonical 
speculations. 77 
The full extent of Walter Warner's neo-Platonism and his 
place in the tradition of light metaphysics is best 
brought out by comparing his own system with that of one 
of the leading neo-Platonist light metaphysicians of the 
late sixteenth century, Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597). 
Patrizi is distinguished for being the first philosopher 
to hold a Chair in Platonic philosophy at any European 
University. 78 His works seem to have been well-known in 
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England and were almost certainly known to Walter Warner. 79 
The similarities between the ideas and even the arguments 
of Warner and Patrizi are quire remarkable. With the 
exception of time, Warner's metaphysical principles are 
exactly equivalent to Patrizi's. Warner's arguments 
about the nature of space, matter and vis are all 
prefigured in Patrizi's Nova de universis philosophia. 80 
Patrizi based his cosmology on the four principles of 
space, matter or fluor as he called it, light and heat. 
When we realise that heat is in fact just another for.m 
of light for Patrizi and that Warner's vis is light the 
similarity becomes truly striking. 
Consider space first of all. Both men subscribe to the 
Platonic notion of space as the receptacle of all things. 81 
Both men argue that space is logically prior to bodies 
because it can exist without body but body cannot exist 
without space. 82 Similarly, Warner's declaration that 
'if it La bodll hath being it is contayned in space and 
if it be contained in space it hath being and yf not in 
space, no being', can be directly compared to Patrizi's 
'if they Lbodie~ exist they cannot exist nowhere. Hence 
they exist somewhere and so in some place, and so in 
space,.83 Moreover, both philosophers insist upon the 
homogeneity of space, its total lack of resistance to 
• 
penetration, its general passivity, its immoveability 
and its eternity.84 We have seen how Warner regarded 
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the three dimensions of longitude, latitude and profundity 
as belonging properly to space and yet still slipping into 
the Aristotelian way of thinking by referring to the 
'corporeall dimensions,.85 Elsewhere he speaks of 
incorporeal space being 'corporeally or spherically 
inf · 't ,86 P t ' 'I b ~1 e • a r1Z1 a so la oured under the same 
difficulties of vocabulary. Patrizi tried to confront 
the difficulties head on by referring to space as a 
'corporeal incorporeal' or an 'incorporeal corporeal'. 87 
Cumbersome though Patrizi's designations may be they 
did at least enable him to proceed beyond the Aristotelian 
arguments. It may well be that Warner's own talk of 
space as corporeally infinite and yet completely 
penetrable is only presented as being unproblematic 
because Warner has thoroughly absorbed Patrizi's earlier 
and very detailed arguments. 
Similarly, Warner mc\y also have derived his definition of 
matter from Patrizi. Like Warner, Patrizi characterises 
matter in terms of its 'antitypia ••• which is proper to 
a body' • It is the resistance to penetration which 
distinguishes, for Patrizi, between a 'corporeal' and 
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an 'incorporeal corporeal'. Patrizi's matter principle 
is referred to as fluor and in its pristine existence it 
is unfonned. The different manifestations of matter in 
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the natural world and the changes which occur incessantly 
in nature are brought about by Patrizi's active principle, 
light. The importance of light in Patrizi's system may 
be seen from this brief description of his Nova philo sophia 
which he sent to Baccio Valori89 in November 1589: 
Just as Aristotle discovered the prime mover by 
way of moti.2,n, so in Panaugia LBook I of Nova 
philo sophia/I find it by way .£f 'hnn~n' and 
'lux' and then in Pancosmia LBook IYJ by wa;y of 
a Platonic method I descend to the products of 
light. 90 
The fact that Patrizi can refer to his natural philosophy, 
as presented in the Pancosmia, as an account of 'the 
products of light' shows clearly his position as a light 
metaphysician. The same position is adopted by Warner 
when he insists upon an active principle 'for the 
production of all the species, motions, alterations and 
affects wch are actually apparent in the universe'. That 
principle, as we have seen, is 'light whether sensible 
or insensible,.91 Even Warner's conception of 'insensible 
light' is a standard feature of the light metaphysical 
tradition. 92 
I believe the similarities between Patrizi's metaphysical 
principles and Warner's are so close as to suggest a 
direct influence. Perhaps the truth of this cannot now 
be establiShed. However, the close similarity between 
Warner's philosophy and that of the leading late 
Renaissance light metaphysicist surely makes it undeniable 
55 
that Warner himself is best understood as a member of the 
same tradition. 93 Furthermore, in view of the strong 
influence of Warner upon Thomas Hobbes, which we have 
already seen, we can expect there to be elements of that 
tradition visible in Hobbes' Little treatise. Before 
turning to this we must consider the likely outcome of 
the other influences upon Hobbes, first pointed out by 
Pacchi and Gargani, namely Robert Grosseteste and 
Roger Bacon. 94 
Within the period known to historians as the middle ages, 
Robert Grasseteste and Roger Bacon were the two foremost 
exponents of the neo-Platonic tradition of light metaphysics. 95 
Like Piotinus, Proclus, st. Augustine (354-430) and others 
in this tradition, their imaginations were powerfully 
effected by the splendour of light. Furthermore, they 
developed (as Patrizi and Warner were to do later) a 
natural philosophy which was based on what they took to 
be the inherent power and efficacy of light. Light was 
the efficient and the formal cause by which God brought 
about his creation. The physical world was seen in 
terms of a series of emanations from God. 96 The 
unformed first matter becomes spread out into its three-
dimensional disposition by the action of light whose 
nature it is to spread out spontaneously and instantaneously. 
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As the light spreads prima materia through the universe 
it gives it form and produces individual, separate bodies. 
The crucial role of light in the formation of the physical 
world is well illustrated by some famous passages from 
the work of Grosseteste. Although these are well-known 
it is worth quoting them again here because they so 
clearly establish the light metaphysical outlook: 
The first corporeal form, which some call corporeity, 
I hold to be light. For light of its own nature 
diffuses itself in all directions, so that from a 
point of light a sphere of light of any size may be 
instantaneously generated, provided an opaque body 
does not get in the way. Corporei ty is what 
necessarily follows the extension of matter in 
three dimensions, since each of these, that is 
corporeity and matter, is a substance simple in 
itself and lacking all dimensions. But simple 
form in itself and in dimension lacking matter 
and dimension, it was impossible for it to become 
extended in every direction except by multiplying 
itself and suddenly diffusing itself in every 
direction and in its diffusion extending matter; 
since it is not pOGsible for form to do without 
matter because it is not separable, nor can matter 
itself be purged of fonn. And, in fact, it is 
light I suggest, of which this operation is part 
of the nature, namely, to multiply itself and 
instantaneously diffuse itself in every direction. 97 
Light not only provides matter with its three dimensional 
forms but also provides it with an active principle of 
motion. In Grosseteste's De motu corporali et luce 
we read: 
But motion is present in eyery body from an intrinsic 
principle which is called natural. Therefore an 
effioient cause simply proportional to the motion 
is present in all bodies. But nothing is present 
in common in every body except primitive matter 
and primitive form and magnitude, which necessarily 
follows from these two •••• But simply through 
magnitude a body does not receive motion •••• 
Not, therefore, simply because of magnitude or 
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something entailed by magnitude is a body productive 
of motion. Nor is primitive matter productive of 
motion, because it is itself passive. It is 
therefore necessary that motion follow simply fram 
the primi ti ve fonn as from an efficient cause •••• 98 
The 'primitive fonn' as we saw in the previous extract is 
nothing other than light. So , Grosseteste is making 
essentially the same point as Warner when he wrote 'all 
bodies have in them an efficient power or vertue wch may 
be called light,.99 Grosseteste is every bit as explicit 
as Warner and-more discursive: 
I hold that the first fonn of a body is the first 
corporeal mover. But this is light, which as it 
multiplies itself and expands without the body of 
matter moving with it, makes its passage instantaneously 
through the transparent medium and is not motion but 
a state of change. But, indeed, when light is 
expanding itself in different directions it is 
incorporated with matter, if the body of matter 
extends with it, and it makes a rarefaction or 
augmentation of matter: for when light is itself 
charged with the body of matter it produces 
condensation or rarefaction. So when light 
generates itself in one direction drawing matter 
with it, it produces local motion; and when the 
light within the matter is sent out and what is 
outside is sent in, it produces qualitative change. 
From this it is clear that corporeal motion is a 
multiplicative power of light, and this is a 
corporeal and natural appetite. 100 
Al though Grosseteste assumes in this passage that there 
is 'light within matter' he is clearly not suggesting 
that all matter is luminous or light-emitting. As we 
have seen in the case of Warner, there is an implicit 
assumption that there can be 'insensible light'. 
light is only one manifestation of ~ which is an 
Sensible 
101 
emanation of power. A similar concept is to be found 
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in an Arabic philosopher of major influence in the 
tradition of light metaphysics, AI-Kindi (d. ca. 873). 
In his influential De radiis stellarum102 AI-Kindi spoke 
unspecifically of 'rays' of influence, although it was 
evident that light provided the major exemplar of such 
radial power. 
'It is perfectly clear LAI-Kindi wrotiJ that 
everything in this world, whether it be substance 
or' accident, produces rays in its own manner like 
a star •••• Everything that has actual existence 
in the world of the elements emits rays in every 
direction, which fill the whole world,. 103 
Similarly, Grosseteste's follower, Roger Bacon, chose 
to use the word species rather than lux to refer to his 
conception of a general radiation of force or power in 
the universe. One of Bacon's major works, De multiplicatione 
specierum104 is not, therefore, confined to a discussion 
about light although the particular species of light and 
colour are those most frequently invoked as examples. 
Grosseteste's major work in the tradition of light metaphysics, 
De luce, AI-Kindi's De radiis stellarum and Roger Bacon's 
De multiplicatione specierum all appear along with other 
works in the light metaphysics tradition in Thomas Hobbes' 
select list of manuscripts in Sir Kenelm Digby's collection. 105 
We have every reason to suppose, therefore, that Hobbes 
mew these works well. But we do not have to leave it 
as mere supposition. The time has come to retum to 
Hobbes' Little treatise. We are now fully equipped to 
see it for what it is: a blend of light metaphysics and 
the mechanical philosophy. 106 
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Having established by two conclusions in section 1 of his 
Little treatise that there are agents 'that hath active 
power inherent', Hobbes proceeds in section 2 to establish 
the nature of the effects produced by such agents. It 
is at this point that he introduces the concept of 'species': 
Every Agent that worketh on a distant Patient, 
toucheth it, eyther by the Medium, or by somewhat 
issueing from it self, which thing so issueing 
lett be call'd Species. 107 
Since an agent can only effect a patient by contact action 
of some sort it follows that the agent must either send 
out these species or stimulate a shock wave of some kind 
in the intervening medium. While accepting that 'the 
medium successively wrought on' m8¥ transmit an influence, 
Hobbes.prefers to emphasise the efficacy of species. 
Significantly, all the examples he gives to illustrate 
the nature of his species and their means of operating 
rely upon analogies with light. He rejects the tranElllission 
of light by a 'successive illumination of the air' because 
it would result in the transmission of light even round 
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corners which is 'contrary to Experience'. When 
trying to establish that 'Species proceede infinitely' 
he shows that the contrary would have to mean that a 
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heap of sand has a limit of visibility no greater than 
. 1 . f 109 a slng e graln 0 sand. The fact that light passing 
through a coloured glass projects a coloured image is 
used to prove that 'Species that come in one and the 
same straight line from severall objects, are by the 
. 'd ' 110 sense percelV as one • 
Hobbes, just like Roger Bacon in De multiplicatione 
specierum, considers the concept of species to cover 
all kinds of radiated power - we are told that 'Agents 
send out their species continually' and 'infinitely,111 -
but it is clear that light and associated phenomena 
provide him with the clearest examples. After one of 
his optical examples he remarks: 
The same may be demonstrated in the multiplication 
of heate •••• Further, from the Experience of 
Magneticall virtue, and of influence from the Moone 
on humide bodyes, and generally from the starres 
on sublunary things, the same may be demonstrated 
in o~her ~p~cies~1~esides heat, light, and other 
specles vlslble. 
Further evidence of the light metaphysical background to 
Hobbes' thinking in The little treatise is provided by 
Hobbes' distinction between ~ and lumen. This 
distinction is extremely common in the light metaphysics 
tradition. ~ is the light of the source, whether it 
be God, the Sun or a candle name, while lumen is the 
113 brightness derivative from that source. For Hobbes 
the brightness surrounding a luminous body is derived from 
the species surrounding the body and the species 
themselves are derivative from the source. 114 
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Al though Hobbes dra~:.Ts heavily upon the tradition of light 
metaphysics in The little treatise he has made one 
fundamental and crucial innovation. Hobbes' species 
are material substances. In other words they are 
invisibly small corpuscles of matter continuously 
emitted from all agents. 115 While Grosseteste and 
Bacon regarded the multiplication of species as a 
succession of modifications in the surrounding medium, 
Hobbes insisted that 'species are moved loCally,.116 
Since Hobbes' prime example of a species is light it 
follows that light is a body. According to the 
prevailing view in Hobbes' day, light was propagated 
instantaneously by a 'successive' modification of the 
d ' 117 me l.UID. But even Hobbes could not countenance the 
possibility of a body moving infinitely quickly and so 
had to take pains to deny the instantaneous transmission 
of light. 118 
It was the material, corpuscular nature of Hobbes' species 
which led Frithiof Brandt to regard The little treatise 
as a thoroughly mechanistic philosophy of nature and as 
'Hobbes' most important work on natural philosophy,.119 
However, because Brandt was lmaware of the sources from 
which Hobbes drew his major conceptions, he failed to 
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realise the equally important light metaphysical cast 
of The little treatise. Without the knowledge of this 
background it is impossible to understand Hobbes' concept 
of agents with inherent power to move, and it is no wonder 
that Brandt found it obscure. 120 The simple truth is 
that Hobbes was drawing on an age-old tradition in which 
light was regarded as a self-active, self-motive entity 
whose major characteristic was its autodiffusive ability 
to spread itself out in all directions from a point source. 
The fact that Hobbes considers light and all other species 
emitted continually and infinitely from bodies to be 
bodies themselves121 forces us to conclude that Hobbes 
believed that some matter, at least, was inherently 
active. 
Hobbes does not go so far as AI-Kindi and insist that 
.. d· ti 122 everything emits rays or spec1es 1n every 1rec on. 
He allows some physical phenomena to be explained in the 
strictly mechanistic sense - by transference of motions 
in contact actions. Nevertheless, it should not be 
overlooked that some phenomena are explained by recourse 
to concepts of innate activity: 
Whatsoever moveth another, moveth it either by 
active power inherent in it self, or by motion 
received from another. 123 
Al though Hobbes tried to explain many everydq phenomena 
in mechanistic terms, he evidently felt no compulsion 
to explain his active agents, such as the sun, in mechanistic 
terms, the way Descartes would do. 124 Hobbes merely 
established their inherent active power by his rational 
Euclidean procedure from principles to conclusions and, 
occasionally, by reference to 'experience,.125 Furthermore, 
there is a strong suggestion in Hobbes' Little treatise 
that he accepted, as a result of experience, the 'occult' 
concepts of sympathy and antipathy. It is worth 
studying this passage in detail. Conclusion 9 of 
section 2 begins: 
There is betweene Species Conveniency and Disconveniency, 
by which the Agents whence they issue, attrude and 
repell one the other. 
This is manifest by Experience in things that attract 
or repell one the other by Sympathy and Antipathy. 
For seeing they touch not one another, and motion 
of the Attraction or Repulsion is not wrought by 126 
alteration of the Medium (by the 2, Concl. Sect. 2) 
it must be by Species; and seeing all Agents and 
Patients do not so move one the other, it follows 
that those which doe so worke, must worke by somewhat 
proper to their Species, which is what we call 
Conveniency or Disconveniency and the Greekes, 
Sympathy and Antipathy. 127 
Now, it may be supposed that this is simply a typical attempt 
.to explain phenomena normally referred to sympathy and 
antipathy in mechanistic terms. After all, Hobbes is 
trying to explain attraction and repulsion in terms of 
the interaction of material particles (the species). 
However, I do not believe such an assumption is entirely 
justified in this case. Let us consider Hobbes' example: 
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Hence may be collected the manner how the Loadstone 
attracts Steale. For the Species of the Loadstone 
meeting with the Species of the Steale in the 
medium, do so fortify their motion by conveniency 
with them, that they issue out of the steale, with 
more speede and abundance than otherwise they 
would; and the body of that steale admitting but 
a determinate affluxe, is drawen to follow after 
the Species, and so is moved to the Loadstone. 128 
Hobbes is suggesting here that steel is sucked towards a 
magnet because its species, usually emitted with a 
'determinate affluxe' are drawn out more quickly and in 
greater numbers than usual and so resulting in the motion 
of the steel itself. But how are the species drawn out? 
The~e is no suggestion that the species of the magnet enter 
into the steel and drive them out that way. We are 
specifically told that they meet 'in the medium'. It 
seems that Hobbes is explaining the attraction of steel 
towards a magnet in terms of the attraction between the 
species of steel and the species of a magnet. The 
statement that the species of steel 'fortify their motion 
by conveniency' with the species of the magnet cannot possibly 
be reduced to a mechanistic explanation, especially when 
we realise that the species of steel and the species of 
the magnet must be travelling in opposite directions 
when they meet 'in the medium,. 129 
Whether my interpretation of this passage is accepted or 
not - admittedly Hobbes is so elliptical that his true 
meaning may remain inscrutable - the' view of The little 
treatise as purely and simply a work of mechanical 
philosophy oan no longer be upheld. Hobbes' early 
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natural philosophy depends very largely upon the 
assumption that some matter in the universe, if not 
130 
all, has an innate tendency to move and is, therefore, 
self-active. Assuredly it is mechanistic in so far as 
it tries to explain phenomena in terms of matter and 
motion but it is very different from the Cartesian 
notion of the mechanical philosophy, in which all 
matter is passive and motion is initiated and preserved 
from outside by God. 131 
Subsequent chapters in this thesis will show that the 
approach adopted by Hobbes in The little treatise was by 
no means unusual. The Cartesian belief that a fixed 
amount of motion was impressed upon passive matter at the 
Creation and subsequently distributed, transferred and 
preserved by means of collisions in accordance with the 
laws of motion was never wholeheartedly accepted by any 
of the leading English 'mechanical philosophers'. On 
the contrary, the metaphysical problem of motion and its 
origin always led these thinkers to subscribe to some 
form of unexplained active principle. Furthermore, I 
hope to be able to show that in nearly every case the 
tradition of light metaphysics played a part in seventeenth-
century English attempts to account for the unceasing 
motions of matter. 
A.C.Crombie in his indispensable study of Robert Grosseteste 
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and the origins of experimental science, 1100-1700 132 has 
already shown the importance of the light metaphysical 
tradition in the establishment of modern science. Dr 
Crombie indicated the ways in which this tradition led 
not only to experimentalism but also to the seventeenth-
century attempts to analyse nature in mathematical terms. 133 
I hope that this present study will complement Crombie's 
earlier work by showing the importance of light metaphysics 
not only to the methodology of modern science but also to 
its metaphysical foundations. 
I hope I have shown that Hobbes' earliest attempts to 
develop a natural philosophy in which all phenomena were 
to be explained in terms of matter in motion was not 
strictly mechanical. His system relies to a large extent 
on some form of inherently active matter. Although this 
active principle is fully in keeping with Hobbes' materialism 
(since it is material) it owes its conception to the age-old 
notion of light as a self-active principle whose major 
characteristic is to spread itself out spontaneously in 
all directions. The autodiffusion of light had been seen 
as a means of producing change in the material world. 
Light could produce qualitative change in matter or it 
could put matter in motion. As st. Augustine put it, 
light 'is ultimately the oriein and principle of natural 
. ,134 
mot10n • 
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The picture of Hobbes presented here is far from familiar 
and it would be unforgiveable to leave the story here. 
Almost immediately,1 35 Hobbes changed his mind about 
some of his fundamental assumptions in The little treatise 
and he moved progressively further from his light 
metaphysical beginnings. By the time Hobbes came to 
publish his De corpore (1655) he had developed a mechanical 
philosophy in the strict sense. Matter was inert and 
motions were merely preserved and transferred by impact. 
The motions in nature all originated from an initial 
push by the first cause, God. 136 Hobbes could now 
dismiss his own earlier efforts along with all other 
natural philosophies: 
as for those that say anything may be moved or 
produced by itself, by species, by its own power, 
by substantial forms, by incorporeal substances, 
by instinct, by anti-peristasis, by antipathy, 
sympathy, occult quality, and other empty words 
of schoolmen, their saying so is to no purpose. 137 
However, Hobbes did not achieve this strictly mechanical 
position until 1655, by which time he was no longer a 
pioneer. We will investigate the reasons for this 
delay and the problems confronting Hobbes' strictly 
mechanical account in Chapter 4. While Hobbes 
procrastinated English philosophy did not wait for him. 
In 1644, the year that Descartes published his Principia 
philosophiae,1 38 the first fully-developed system of 
mechanical philosophy to be written by an Englishmrul was 
also published. What is more, this work, Sir Kenelm 
Digby's Two treatises, was written in English. 139 The 
full significance of this work has never been appreciated. 
It is my contention that its importance lies, not so much 
in the technical details of its science or philosophy, 
but rather in the ideological and religious intentions 
underlying its composition. The time has come to 
introduce the second major theme of this thesis. 
CHAPrER 3 
THE CATHOLIC ORIGINS OF THE MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY: 
SIR KENELM DIGBY, THOMAS WHITE AND 'ARlSTOTELIAN ATOMISM' 
The fact that Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise on body, the 
first of his Two treatises,1 was the earliest fully 
developed system of mechanical philosophy to be written 
by ariEnglish thinker should have ensured it a prominent 
position in the history of English science. However, 
it has tended to be dismissed as merely an interesting 
oddity which throws no light whatsoever on the historical 
development of the new science. 2 The reasons for this 
are essentially two-fold. Firstly, Sir Kenelm Digby 
(1603-1665) was a staunch, indeed a notorious, Roman 
Catholic. Digby's work has been dismissed, therefore, 
as irrelevant to the development of science at that 
time because it could not be fitted into the historiographical 
thesis that the new science was developed by Puritans. 
Even those historians who have sought to refute the 
Puritanism-and-science thesis have not made a close study 
of Digby's philosophy but have preferred to negate and deny 
the various details propounded by the subscribers to the 
so-called 'Merton thesis,.3 The second reason for Digby's 
ignominY in the eyes of historians of science is his 
undoubted enthusiasm for and adherence to the principles 
of Aristotle. Here again, Digby cannot be fitted into 
the prevailing historiographical assumptions. The 
'Scientific Revolution' is characterized as the overthrow 
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of Aristotelianism. No advocate of Aristotle, the argument 
goes, could possibly have contributed to that revolution. 4 
In this chapter I hope to sllow that, despite the prevailing 
historiographical positions, a full consideration of 
Digby's natural philosophy and its background is essential 
for a complete understanding of the development of natural 
philosophy in seventeenth-century England. Digby was not 
a solitary figure, writing natural philosophy during the 
years of Puritan ascendency because 'for those excluded 
from civil office or political participation, the sciences 
were an unexceptionable form of recreation,.5 On the 
contrary, Digby developed his natural philosophy, like 
the Puritans, with conscious reference to his religious 
views in order to promote a particular theological 
standpoint. 6 Digby embarked upon his studies in natural 
philosophy side by side with a Catholic priest who was the 
leader of a heterodox faction of English Catholics. Sir 
Kenelm Digby and his mentor, Thomas White (1593-1676), 
were the leading members of a counter-reforming group 
of Catholics known as the Blackloists (after one of 
White's pseudonyms, Blacklo).7 These two men developed 
a mechanical system of philosophy, I contend, in order 
to promote their own counter-reforming religious views. 
They believed that they could re-establish the true faith 
with the aid of reason and philosophy. As we explore 
this previously overlooked aspect of seventeenth-century 
natural philosophy we will be providing much more than 
another negative critique of the Merton thesis. By 
uncovering the ideological intentions of the Blackloists 
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and the role played by natural philosophy in their endeavours 
we will enrich and expand the prevailing historiography 
beyond the bounds of the Puritanism-and-science thesis. 8 
1. The origins of the Blackloist religio-political programme. 
Although he was brought up as a Roman Catholic, Digby 
abandoned his mother church in 1630 and became an Anglican. 
It may be that he became disenchanted with the Catholic 
church at this time because he recognised that 'Rome 
fetters reason', but for the most part his conversion 
seems to have been an understandable case of opportunism, 
in order to avoid the disadvantages of being Catholic at 
a time when Catholicism was anathema to most Englishmen. 9 
However, by 1635 he had returned to the church of his 
birth, and Rhortly after this (1638) he embarked upon 
his career as a philosophical writer. Undoubtedly Digby 
reached this turning point and was given new direction 
by the aid and influence of the now little-remembered 
Catholic priest, Thomas White. Very quickly after their 
first meeting White's influence upon Digby became more 
and more profound. Digby seldom failed to recommend 
the philosophy of this priest who, thereby, was initiated 
into Mersenne's circle and attracted the interest of 
Digby's friends, Descartes and Hobbes. Digby repeatedly 
referred to White as his masier, mentor, and teacher. 
He once wrote to White sayinG that his whole philosophy 
had been shaped by the priest, even going so far as to 
say: 
I should not lie if I said that your redeeming me 
out of vulgar ignorance hath been in some regard 
a misfortune to me, as the cure of madness was 
to the poor wretch who then saw his misery.10 
The congruence between the ideas of these two men can 
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be seen from even a cursory comparison of their published 
works, and yet the full significance of this intellectual 
11 partnership has yet to be fully assessed. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to give an exact date 
for their meeting, but the circumstances which brought 
them together are fairly evident. It is reasonable 
to assume that during the few years which Digby spent 
as an uneasy Anglican he would have been interested in 
ecumenical movements. During this period he was a close 
friend of Archbishop Laud whose 'high-flying' Anglicanism 
was often thought to be dangerously close to Catholicism. 12 
Quite quickly after Digby's conversion to Anglicanism 
there was a softening in attitude towards Catholicism 
among many Englishmen, and there were even a number of 
converts to the ChurCh of Rome. Perhaps the most 
surprising of these,was the temporary conversion of 
William Chillingworth, a thinker more usually known for 
his vociferous opposition to Catholicism. 13 It began 
to seem to the Papal authorities that some sort of 
reconciliation between Rome and Canterbury was possible 
and in 1634 Pope Urban VIII sent Gregorio Panzani over 
to England to negotiate along ecumenical lines. 14 
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In 1633 a former colleague of Thomas White at the English 
College in Douai, Christopher Davenport, published Deus, 
natura, Gratia 15 which argued that no fundamental dogmas 
separated Anglicans and Catholics, White indicated his own 
ecumenism by writing a commendatory preface to the work. 
During Panzani' s vi si t, White played a large role in hi s 
attempts to reconcile rival factions among English 
Catholic clergy. By 1636 when Panzani left England, 
White had emerged as a powerful figure in the secular 
clergy and had even been nominated as a possible candidate 
for the Bishopric of Chalcedon - the Catholic Bishopric 
so-called in order not to 'prejudice any right his majesty 
hath to the nomination of English bishops'. 16 It seems 
quite likely that Digby became acquainted with White 
during these hopeful times for Catholics, and that White 
was one of the Catholic friends who, we are told by Laud, 
guided Digby back to his mother Church in 1635. 17 
Certainly, by 1637 both men were well acquainted. 18 
The ecumenical intentions of the Blackloists had their 
beginnings during these times, but the hoped for 
reconciliation between Rome and England did not materialise. 
Digby and White, however, despaired of nothing. From 
this time onwards they dedicated all their efforts to 
gaining toleration for English Catholics. Thomas White's 
most recent biographer19 has argued forcefully that, as 
far as White was concerned, all his writings, in whatever 
field of human knowledge, were part of a unified whole, 
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a comprehensive system of religion, politics and philosophy. 
When one of White's most trenchant critics objected that 
it was,not possible to know where his philosophy ended 
and where his theology began, White merely replied: 'I 
see not how you could give a schollar a greater praise,.20 
On another occasion White declared that all his endeavours 
were directed towards showing the conformity of faith 
. th ,. f' . , 21 w~ ~ er~or sc~ences • It is my contention that 
the one guiding principle which directed all of White's 
unified efforts was his belief in the importance of ecumenism. 
White and his faithful follower and accomplice, Digby 
(along with other followers), tried to accomplish this 
(as we shall see) by direct political means: Negotiating 
with members of the English Government or with Papal 
authorities in Rome. But what is more significant from 
our point of view is that they hoped to gain toleration 
for Catholics by making a deliberate effort to develop 
a reformed Catholic theology which was close to, or 
amenable to, English Protestant thought. Their writings, 
therefore, were all carefully composed with a view to 
removing those doctrinal differences between Catholics 
and English Protestants which stood in the way of 
reconciliation. In order to see this we must briefly 
examine the wS'3 their works developed from the late 
thirties to the early sixties. 
In their earliest published works Digby and White tried 
to defend the Catholic emphasis on tradition as an 
authority equal to the scriptures. For Catholics, 
the oral traditions of the early Church seemed to be 
every bit as reliable as the written testaments because 
they, so Digby and White claimed, could all be traced 
back to the direct teachings of Christ. While study 
of the scriptures alone could lead a man to the truths 
of religion, more often than not the difficulties of 
interpretation will lead to error and controversy. The 
proliferation of different sects within Protestantism 
testify to this. It is necessary, therefore, to be 
guided by the use of reason and by the traditional 
interpretations given to those controversial parts of 
scripture by the early members of the Church. These 
early fathers, of course, had every advantage over the 
moderns in being able to determine Christ's original 
meanings. Those to whom Jesus preached, they argued, 
ought to be believed as firmly as Jesus himself. The 
Roman Catholic Church was held to be unique in having 
an unbroken line of masters and disciples which could 
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be traced back to Christ and his original chosen disciples. 
This was sufficient to guarantee that no false doctrines 
or errors could have crept in: only what Christ himself 
taught has been handed down. As White put it: 'If we 
look into the immediate progresse and joints of the 
descent we cannot find where it can misse,.22 Digby 
concluded that it was safe to allow oneself to be: 
guided by the unanimous consent of the wisest, 
the learnedest, and the piousest Men of the whole 
world, that have bene instructed in what they 
believe by men of the like quality living in the 
age before them, and soe from age to age untill 
the Apostles and Christ, - and that in this manner 
have derived from that founta~e, both a perfect 
and a full knowledge of all. 25 
Now, White first developed these ideas in the context 
of a polemic with the Anglican apologist, Lucius Cary, 
Viscount Falkland (1610-1643). However, White's An 
Answer to the Lord Faulklands discourse of infallibility 
was not the last word on the matter. Falkland himself 
was quick to reply and his close associate, .,oilliam 
Chillingworth (1602-1644) also entered the lists by 
composing a refutation of White's ideas which was 
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published posthumouSly.24 We also know that Chillingworth 
and White debated this topic face to face in Digby's 
l~dgings sometime between 1635 and 1637. 25 The arguments 
of Falkland and Chillingworth were essentially the same. 
They sought to show that the doctrinal development of 
the Roman Cburch was by no means as smooth and indeflectable 
as White and Digby wanted their readers to believe. They 
were able to find a number of doctrines which separated 
Protestant and Catholic and which they could show had 
equally divided Catholic from Catholic in the past. 
The major doctrinal issues were the tmmaculate conception 
of the Blessed Virgin, infants receiving the Eucharist, 
transubstantiation, Papal infallibility and eschatological 
beliefs. 26 From this moment on the theology of Digby 
and White underwent an astonishing transfonnation. They 
recognised that the arguments of Falkland and Chillingworth 
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were sufficient to undenmine completely their own arguments 
about the infallibility of tradition and the historical 
coherance of orthodox Catholic theology. From then on 
White and his followers became convinced of a genuine 
need to refonm the Catholic Church from within. White 
and the Blackloists now began to reject certain Catholic 
do~as in the hope of making their own refonmed Catholicism 
not only more amenable to English Protestants, but also 
more confonnable to the true faith. 
When White wrote his own mechanical system of philosophy, 
an expansion of Digby's Two treatises, he showed no 
hesitation in denying that an accident could exist out 
of its own subject. As White himself pointed out, he 
thereby denied Catholic teaching upon transubstantiation~ 
nevertheless he was adamant: 
'Tis answered there's neither Authority nor 
Demonstration in Theologie, which convinces that 27 
an Accident may be preserv'd out of a Subject ••• 
Similarly, he indicated that he held no brief for Catholic 
Mariology.28 However, by far the most important aspect 
of the new theology of White and Digby was their rejection 
of the concept of purgatory and their development of a 
new Catholic eschatology. 
Much recent research has shown the prevalence and importance 
of apocalyptical beliefs and related eschatological concepts 
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in seventeenth-century England. 29 The work of White 
and Digby, completely overlooked in all of this research, 
is highly significant in this respect and adds greatly 
to our understanding of this recent historiographical 
development. In view of the apocalyptic excitement 
which we now know was stirred up in those times, it is 
hardly surprising that White and Digby recognised its 
importance inEnglish religious thought. Furthennore, 
Digby's friend Thomas Hobbes, as is well known, was 
developing his own eschatology which emphasised the 
resurrection of the body and the Last Judgement. 30 
And then, in those works of Falkland and Chillingworth 
directed against White, millenariani'~ appeared as one 
of the major examples of a piece of early Catholic 
tradition now rejected as heresy. 
Chillingworth rightly insisted that the 'doctrine of 
the millenaries' was 'by the present Roman Church held 
false and heretical,.31 However, bearing White's 
cri teria in mind it ought to be part of the true faith 
because it was 'believed and taught by the Eminent Fathers 
of the Age next after the Apostles, and by none of that 
age opposed or condemned'. Irenaeus, for example, was 
said to have derived it 'from Priests which saw John, 
the Disciple of the Lord,.32 Similarly, Justin Martyr 
is quoted as saying that those who denied the millennium 
also denied the Resurrection. 33 Furthermore, the doctrine 
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of millenarianism is to be found in the Revelations to 
st John and were accepted parts of Christian belief 
within thirty years of his death, 'when in all 
probability there were many alive, that had heard him 
expound his own words and teach this doctrine'. 34 It 
remained part of the orthodoxy, according to Chillingworth, 
for two hundred and fifty years until contradicted1Jy 
Dionysius Alexandrinus. 35 
Al though Falkland and Chillingworth invoke millenarians 
in this way it should not be assumed that they ~{ere 
thoroughgoing millenarians themselves. The evidence 
tends to suggest that they were simply using these 
arguments to demonstrate the untenability of the Catholic 
claim to a theology based on the earliest traditions of 
the Church. In fact the recent proliferation of studies 
on millenarianism has rather tended to obscure the fact 
that it was regarded by most English thinkers as an 
unorthodox view, which could lead to heresy in religion 
and political upheaval in everyday life. 36 This is not 
to say that orthodox Anglicans denied the general 
resurrection and the Last Judgement, but for the most 
part they concentrated more on the very clear scriptural 
statements that the blessed would enter heaven and the 
damned would be punished immediately after death. This 
emphasis straight away raises questions about the importance 
of the Last Judgement - most obviously: why should it be 
necessary at all? AnglicanD for the most part followed 
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Calvin's teaching in the Institutes of the Christian religion: 
••• as the Scripture uniformly commands us to look 
forward with eager expectation to the coming of 
Christ, and defers the crown of glory which awaits 
us till that period, let us be content within these 
limits which God prescribes to us - that the souls 
of pious men, after finishing their laborious 
warfare, depart into a state of blessed rest, 
where they wait with joy and pleasure for the 
fruition of the promised glory; and so, that 
all things remain in suspense till Christ appears 
as the Redeemer. And there is no doubt that the 
condition of the reprobate is the same as Jude 
assigns to the devils, who are confined and bound 
in chains till they are brought forth to the 
punishment to which they are doomed. 37 
The Last Judgement, therefore, is still anticipated but, 
in the mean time, the departed souls are kept at some 
sort of half-way stage. It is essential to think in 
such terms in order to account for Jesus' promise to the 
blessed thief: 'Today shalt thou be with me in paradise',38 
and for the fact that Dives, after his death, could see 
Lazarus comforted in 'Abraham's bosom' .39 Jeremy T~lor, 
writing in 1649, explained the quandary by relying on a 
distinction made by st Paul between paradise and the highest 
heaven: 
for paradise is distinguished from the heaven of 
the Blessed, being itself a receptacle of holy 
souls, made illustrious with visitation of Angels 
and happy by being a repository for such spirits, 
who at the first d~ of Judgement shall go forth 
into eternal glory.~O 
From this point of view, however, it seems that the Last 
Judgement has been reduced to a mere formality: those 
in Abraham's bosom know their blessedness will be ratified, 
while those 'bound in chains' must know there will be no 
. 41 
repr~eve. The only w~ that Orthodox theologians could 
make the Last Judgement relevant was to argue that 
complete justice could not be meted out to the whole 
person, body and soul, without the resurrection of the 
body. In life the bodies of the innocents suffered as 
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much as their souls and bodies too deserved their rewards, 
and conversely it was often bodily pleasures which led 
the wicked astray and so it is fitting that their bodies 
should be punished. 42 
In spite of these efforts it should still be recognised 
that, in general, the Day of Judgement was played down 
by representatives of orthodoxy and more emphasis was 
given to the immediacy of punishment or re-"rard after 
death. This was partly in order to avoid encouraging 
the political and social upheavals that seemed inherent 
in the millenarian views, but orthodox thinkers were also 
determined to reject the heresy of mortalism which was 
becoming, from their point of view, alarmingly prevalent. 
Mortalism, the belief that the soul dies with the body 
or, in a less extreme version, remains sleeping in total 
oblivion until theresurrection (when it is resuscitated 
a.long with the body), was feared to have social implications 
as bad as those of millenarianism. If the soul died 
with the body then the normal religious constraints 
towards good morals counted for nothing, and immorality 
of the worst kinds would ensue. Implicit in these fears 
is the assumption that reward or punishment deferred 
indefinitely to the time of the Last Judgement would 
simply be ignored by most people. 43 
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Be that as it may, the more radical protestant thinkers 
were not satisfied with the comparatively unimportant 
Last Judgement of orthodoxy. For them, the bodily 
resurrection and the Last Judgement were the major 
aspects of their belief; the culmination of the history 
of the world. 44 The state of souls between death and 
the eventual Judgement Day, therefore, required more 
careful consideration than it was granted by conservative 
theologians. It was clearly for this very reason that 
mortalism became so prevalent. 
It is only in the light of all this that we can see the 
ideological purpose behind the philosophical works of 
Digby and White. In order to reunite all Christians: 
Puritan, Anglican and Catholic, in a reformed Ecumenical 
Church, Digby and White would have to rediscover the true 
fai tho Furthermore, they had to be able to demonstrate 
that it really ~ the one true faith in order to persuade 
all Christians to join them. In general terms they 
sought to do this by developing a unified philosophical 
theology based on what they took to be the three major 
sources for incontrovertible knowledge: scripture, 
tradition and reason. Throughout their work Digby 
and White return again and again to these three sources 
as the only infallible guides to the doctrines of the 
true faith, and it is this which accounts for the striking 
83 
coherence of all White's works which has already been 
noted. 45 More specifically, what the Blackloists 
required was a reformed theology which would include 
the early traditional belief in the general resurrection 
and the Last Judgement, but would also avoid the mortalist 
heresy and prove the immortality of the human soul. 
2. The mechanical philosophy in the service of eschatology. 
The first major step towards this counter-reforming theology 
was made in Digby's Two treatises. Although it is the 
Treatise on body which has attracted most attention from 
historians of science, for Digby the really important 
part of the work was its development of a comprehensive 
physiology of the human soul, in the second treatise. 
As he wrote in the 'Dedicatory epistle', he intended to 
study corporeal agents only in so far as 'the knowledge 
of them serveth to the knowledge of the soul,.46 That 
the Two treatises were actually written with this religious 
purpose in mind is also clear from what Digby wrote in 
1642 in his Observations upon Religio medici. 47 In this 
short work Digby insists that the immortality of the soul 
can be demonstrated by philosophy 'as well as faith 
delivereth it': 
I take the immortality of the Soule (under his 
LBrowne'il favour) to bee of that nature that to 
them onely that are not versed in the wayes of 
proving it by reason, it is article of faith; 
to others it is an evident conclusion of demonstrative 
Science. 48 
He then gives advanced notice that he has demonstrated 
the immortality of the soul by rational means in a long 
philosophical work. It would seem from this that the 
Two treatises were actually written sometime before the 
end of 1642. Digby also makes it abundantly clear that 
his philosophy can be used to refute mortalism: 
I shall observe how if hee had traced the nature 
of the soule from its first principles, hee could 
not have suspected it should sleepe in the grave 
till the Resurrection of the body.49 
In order to trace the nature of the soul, however, Digby 
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felt it 'an unavoydable necessity' to deal in an exhaustive 
way with the nature of bodies. Furthermore, he recognises 
the need to explain all the properties of bodies in 
mechanical terms. The current doctrines of the schools 
make no real distinction between material and spiritual 
things whose operations are alike attributed to 'certain 
powers or qualities' and so, as Digby complains: 
What hope could I have, out of the actions of the 
soule to convince the nature of it to be incorporeall 
if I could give no other account of bodies operations, 
then that they were performed by qualities occult, 
specificall or incomprehensible?50 
If, on the other hand, he could banish occult qualities 
and powers from the realm of physics he would be at liberty 
to explain spiritual phenomena in terms of occult qualities. 
An exhaustive account of the phenomena of bodies which 
relied only on the principles of the mechanical philosophy 
would enable Digby to show that the operationsof the soul: 
are such as cannot proceed from those principles, 
which being adequate and common to all bodies we 
may rest assured, that what cannot issue from 
them, cannot have a body for its source. 51 
The essence of Digby's thesis is to show that the soul 
is incorporeal and to go on from there to demonstrate 
its immortality. Mortality, involving change, decay, 
dissolution and so forth, can only apply to material 
entities since all change can ultimately be explained 
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in terms of the rearrangement in space of the constituent 
parts of bodies. A separated or 'unbodyed' soul, therefore, 
must be completely incapable of change. The very last 
chapter of the Two treatises treats 'Of the perseverance 
of the soul in the state she findeth her selfe in, at 
her first separation from her body,.52 Here, Digby 
reaches the conclusion that 'no change at all can happen 
to an abstracted soul,.53 Once again, there are 
intimations of these ideas presented in his Observations 
upon Religio medici. For example, he tells us that 
'in the state of eternity there is no succession, no 
change, no variety. Soules or Angells in that condition, 
doe not so much as change a thought,.54 He also takes 
Browne to task for implying a contradiction 'in his 
consideration of the activity of glorified eyes (which 
shall be in a state of rest; whereas motion is required 
to seeing),.55 
Implicit in Digby's conclusion to the Two treatises is 
a denial of the Catholic concept of purgatory. If the 
soul is unchanging after death then it is ludicrous to 
suppose that souls can be purged of their sins before 
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. 56 the resurrect~on on the Day of Judgement. Digby 
makes it rather more explicit in his shorter Observations: 
to be in such a condition as maketh us understand 
damned soules miserable; is a necessary effect 
of the temper it is in, when it goeth out of the 
Body, and must necessarily (out of its owne 
nature) remain in, invariably for all eternity.57 
It is quite evident that Digby's Treatise on body, the 
earliest fully worked-out system of mechanical philosophy 
in English was written to provide a philosophical basis 
on which to erect a new eschatology. 
The details of this new eschatology were set out clearly 
and fully for the first time in Thomas White's De medio 
animarum statu, which was published in 1650. 58 This 
work marks the culmination of White's attempts to arrive 
at a reformed Catholicism with no fundamental doctrinal 
differences from English Protestantism. With this new 
theology he believed he could bring together the more 
radical Protestant sects which emphasised the apocalyptic 
and eschatological features of Christianity and the more 
conservative Anglicans who tended to deny or play down 
the apocalyptic aspects. By paying sufficient attention 
to the 'middle state' of souls, he believed he could 
avoid the heresy of mortalism while also placing great 
emphasis on the importance of the resurrection and Last 
Judgement. As he himself insisted: 'whether we cast 
our eyes on the old or new Testament, we shall find our 
faith founded and rooted in the resurrection,.59 
From the outset of White's Middle state of souls it is 
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clear that the author has thoroughly absorbed the 
criticisms of Falkland and Chillingworth. However, 
this does not mean that he must rescind his views on 
the infallibility of tradition. On the contrary, he 
reaffirms it by following the paths indicated by the 
two Protestants. He categorically repudiates the 
concept of purgatory as something 'new in the Church' 
and so not part of true tradition. 60 furthermore, from 
the stand-point of his own natural philosophy he is able 
to argue that the very idea of purgation of sins after 
death and prior to a bodily resurrection is completely 
untenable. 
Following Digby, he argues that only corporeal entities 
can suffer from external corporeal agents such as fire 
or instruments of torture. It is 'a fiction vain and 
altogether impossible', therefore, to suppose that a 
spiritual, 'indivisible subject' like the human soul 
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could be affected by such external agents. But, if 
it is true that purgatory cannot purge the soul, it 
must also be true that the soul cannot suffer in hell-fire. 
It would seem that White's theology is leading him towards 
tal ' 62 mor ~sm. White manages to avoid this by introducing 
a concept of internal gladness or, when appropriate, 
suffering. In other words he introduces a strictly 
psychological interpretation of Abraham's bosom, and 
the torments of the soul in the interval between death 
and the resurrection. So, just as 'the Embrio or 
seminal concreation delineats the future man', similarly 
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the whole course of a man's life will determine the 
state of his soul at the moment of his death. As 
White himself puts it: 'to have had, in the course 
of his whole life, these and these thoughts and 
affections, designes and points out, by the impressions 
left, the future condition of his soul'. 63 However, 
as soon as the soul becomes separated from the body 
it is no longer capable of or susceptible to change -
since change is a phJrsical phenomenon which it is 
nonsensical to apply to spiritual entities. 64 Therefore, 
the disembodied soul must remain in the state it was in 
at the very moment of death: 'the Entity so made continueth 
such', White says, 'till it be, as it were, new moulded, 
which is the worke of the Resurrection,.65 
The soul neither dies nor sleeps, then, but remains fully 
self-conscious, indefinitely, in a state of self-inflicted 
guilty torments or tranquil joy, until the resurrection 
when it is once again conj oined to the body. The whole 
person, body and soul, can then suffer hell-fire, or be 
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'admitted locally to Heaven'. White sums it up like 
this: 
Being therefore by the operation of death, as it 
were new moulded and minted into a purely spiritual 
substance, he carries inseparably with him the matter 
of his torment in the like manner as he also doth 
who takes leave of the body with his affections 
only venially disordered. We have no occasion 
here to employ infernal Architects to invent 
strange racks and dungeons, since the innate and 
intimately inhering strife and fury of the affections 
bent against reason, perform alone that execution; 
which is therefore proportional to the sins, 
because springing and resulting from them, nor 
ever otherwise possibly capable to cease and 
detenmine, unless the soul by a new conjunction 
with the body, became ~ susceptible of 
contrary impressions. 67 
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Clearly, White's carefully-thought-out natural philosophy, 
leading him to his new psychology of the disembodied soul, 
enabled him to develop a theology which he believed could 
resolve the exegetical problems of eschatology which 
divided English Protestants. Furthermore, if Catholics 
would accept, as he had, the arguments of Falkland, 
Chillingworth and other Protestants, that purgatory was 
not part of the true tradition of the Church, then 
White's theology could be accepted by all as the true 
faith. 68 
The fact that the Blackloists' natural philosophy was 
intended to provide a foundation for the establishment 
of their new theology did not go unrecognized by their 
contemporaries. The link between their 'new system of 
phylosophy' and 'Divinity' was made explicit by one of 
their most eloquent critics when he drew up an analysis 
of the historical development of their work: 
Now as the order in which this new fabrick of 
Purgatory, and indeed the whole new system of 
phylosophy and Divinity was made publick; it 
was (as I take it) this: after the Book of the 
immortality of the soul, fathered on Sir Kenelme 
Digby; Master White appeared himself on the stage, 
under the name of Thomas the Engli shInan ••• where, 
in a moderate volume entituled Peripatetick 
Institutions •••• He discovered the great 
mine of this Phylosophy; here the suttleties 
of Logick, the secrets of nature, the hidden 
properties of bgdies, both heaven and earthe are 
layed open •••• 9 
Similarly, another observer declared that Digby: 
was easily wrought upon to help to bolster up 
and spread the Atomical philosophy, which Blacklo 
persuaded him would shortly prevail in the 
Christian world ••• which Honour they said he 
should have of founding this new doctrine, & 
divinity it self, which was to be new modeled also 
according to these unheard of principles •••• 70 
It should also be noticed that White's new eschatology 
carried with it some important corollaries which could 
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only have helped his ecumenical designs. Keith Thomas has 
pointed out that the belief in ghosts - souls revisiting 
their haunts from purgatory - was seen as a Catholic 
superstition which tended to be denied by Protestants. 71 
For this very reason, White was concerned to deny the 
reality of ghostly appearances. 72 More importantly, 
White's denial of purgatory undermined the validity of 
indulgences. The idea of buying one's way out of 
purgatory, to which the concept of indulgences so often 
amounted, was anathema to Protestants. Besides, the 
abuses of indulgences were still remembered as one of 
the major incentives to the initial Lutheran reformation. 73 
3. The Blackloists and political developments. 
Thomas White and his fellow traveller, Kenelm Digby, it 
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should now be said, were not such ivory-tower intellectuals 
that they believed their new philosophical theology would 
be sufficient to ach~eve the ecumenical ends for which 
they yearned. Both men, and their devoted group of 
followers who were mostly, like White, secular priests, 
were actively engaged in various political machinations 
all bent upon the same objective. The full details of 
these political manoeuvres are extremely complex and 
have yet to be fully charted, but the broad outlines 
are perfectly clear. 74 In 1639 Digby had been prevailed 
upon by Queen Henrietta Maria to ask English Catholics 
for funds which would enable King Charles to put down 
the Scottish rebellion. 75 This marked the beginnings 
of a close relationship between Digby and the Queen. 
In 1644 when Henrietta Maria arrived in Paris she made 
Digby Lord Chancellor of the Court-in-exile, and 
commissioned him to go to Rome to entreat for Catholic 
funds. This errand was potentially crucial not only 
to the plight of the King, now embroiled in the first 
Civil War, but also to the future of English Catholicism. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Thomas White chose 
to accompany his close friend on this mission to Rome. 76 
Needless to say, Digby failed in his endeavour. The 
Pope's conditions were ludicrously impractical, including, 
for example, the conversion of Charles. 77 A second 
and longer sojourn at Rome from 1646 to early in 1648 
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also produced no results. Digby was profoundly 
disappointed at his failure to help his King and Queen 
and there is good evidence to suggest that he was thoroughly 
disgusted with the Pope, Innocent X. 78 It seems that 
White too, shared this low opinion of the Papacy and 
as a result decided to emphasise \vhat previously had 
been only implicit in his intentions. The main problem 
confronting English Catholics, and preventing their 
toleration by English Protestants, was, at its simplest, 
the belief that no-one could be the servant of two 
masters: King and Pope. White and his followers, 
therefore, began to promote a schism between English 
Catholics and the Papacy. By this time the Blackloists 
constituted a powerful faction in the Chapter of secular 
clergy. 
Many of the details of their schismatical plotting have 
been preserved in an account evocatively entitled: 
Blacklo's cabal. 79 In September 1647 the Blackloists 
drew up a list of 'Instructions' in which they detailed 
the concessions which Catholics should make in order to 
gain toleration of worship. These included taking an 
oath of loyalty to the English Government, denying 
fealty to the Pope, the establishment of six or eight 
Bishops who were completely autonomous and concerned 
exclusively with spiritual matters, and finally, the 
Blackloists recommended the expulsion of the Jesuits, 
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who were seen as the biggest obstacle to ecumenism. 80 
By this time, of course, the King's cause was in ruins 
and the Government which had to be persuaded to grant 
freedom of worship was that of the rebels. It is 
an indication of the single-mindedness of the Blackloists 
that in 1649 shortly after the execution of the King, 
Digby returned briefly to England and once again 
negotiated for toleration for his fellow communicants. 
This time, he was dealing, in secret, with Oliver 
Cromwell, but like his other efforts it came to 
nothing. As well as a denial of the temporal power of 
the Pope, Cromwell wanted English Catholics to provide 
an army of ten thousand men for the service of the 
Commonwealth. Neither Digby nor any other Catholic 
could guarantee that. 81 Evon so, Digby did not despair 
and, as is well known, when Cromwell became Lord Protector 
in 1653, he returned to England and recommenced his 
efforts. And so, s~rising though it may seem, this 
man who was once so ardent in his support of the King, 
now became something of a favourite in the eyes of the 
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Lord Protector. 
Meanwhile, the philosophical work of Digby and White 
was beginning to win the approval of leading Protestant 
thinkers. When John Webster recommended the reform of 
the university curriculum in his Academiarum examen 
of 1653 he took for granted the importance of Digby 
and White: 
What shall I say of the A tomical learning revived 
by that nobel and indefatigable person Renatus 
des Cartes, and since illustrated and improved 
by Magnenus Regius, White, Digby, Phocyllides, 
Holwarda and divers others. 83 
It would be wrong to assume that Webster was so radical 
as to be unrepresentative. It has been pointed out 
that the works of Digby and White frequently appeared 
alongside those of Descartes, Gassendi and Mersenne on 
the shelves of Oxford College libraries just after the 
Civil Wars. 84 And Thomas Barlow of Queen's College 
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included their works in his recommendations for A library 
for younger schollers. 85 When Webster's book was 
answered by the more conservative Seth Ward and John 
Wilkins, the mechanical philosophy of our two Catholics 
was spared from the vilification heaped upon that of 
86 Thomas Hobbes. Indeed, Ward accused Hobbes of 
plagiarising from 'Des Cartes, Gassendi, S.K. Digby, 
and others,.87 Two years later Ward, once again, 
praised 'illustrious' Digby and White in the same 
breath as Gassendi, and described the two Englishmen 
I . .. 88 as praec ar1SSJ.In1. John Wallis, the Oxford mathematician 
dedicated his Commercium epistolicum to Digby and included 
in it a letter fulsome in its praise of Digby and declaring 
that he, Wilkins and Ward were all 'deeply indebted to 
M. White,.89 Ralph Bathurst, Fellow of Trinity, has 
also been recorded giving high praise to Digby and White. 90 
Gratifying though these praises must have been, it is 
clear that they did little to serve the Blackloists' 
great purpose. Evidently something more had to be 
done and in 1655 White made his boldest attempt to 
ingratiate the Blackloist cause to Oliver Cromwell. 
In that year he published a political treatise entitled 
The grounds of obedience and government. 91 This work 
purported to give a strictly rationalist account of the 
circumstances under which a government should be 
obeyed and when it should not. White argued that 
although people prefer to make their own choices about 
how to act, lack of time and expertise, and the 
complexities caused by living in large communities 
made it expedient to entrust certain decisions to 
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others. This delegation of responsibility is voluntary 
and derives from self-interest. Men are best governed 
when they are themselves convinced of the rightness of 
the course of action outlined for them. So the governors 
should aim at what is best for the people. 92 Under these 
conditions obedience is justified and desirable, but the 
governors must not exceed or abuse their power. White 
defines government, then, as 'a power or right of 
directing the common affaires of a multitude, by a 
voluntary submission of the communities wills to the 
will of the Governours,.93 If, however, the governors 
should cease to serve the best interests of the people 
then a revolution to depose that government and replace 
it with another is justified. Furthermore, White even 
declares that it is reasonable to kill the dispossessed 
governour if he is threatening a revenge which is not 
consonant to the public good. 94 For, 'when ever ••• 
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the common good is clearly on the possessor's side then 
the dispossessed hath no claime,.95 Inspired largely 
by the rationalist politics of Hobbes, the motivation 
behind this work is perfectly obvious. 
Clearly, White was engaged in a blatant attempt to 
demonstrate to the Lord Protector that Blackloist 
Catholicism could be counted upon to back him if he 
granted toleration to this new refonmed Church. It 
hardly needs saying that it all came to nothing. The 
mistrust of Catholics was evidently so deep-seated that 
no matter how far White travelled away from the doctrinal 
norms of the church of his priesthood, he still could 
not win toleration. What is more, making his political 
intentions as obvious as he did in The grounds of obedience, 
he had very definitely put all his eggs in one basket. 
When, in 1660, King Charles II ascended his father's 
throne, White's political views were, to say the least, 
extremely embarrassing. He had expressed himself so 
clearly and so forcefull~r that it would have availed him 
nothing to rescind his views on government. Digby, in 
spite of all, was still Chancellor and friend to Henrietta 
Maria but even he was compromised now by his association 
with White, and never really gained the new King's favours. 96 
Blackloism as a movement, continued its campaigning but 
White himself retreated increasingly into the background. 97 
In view of the virulence of ;~ti-Catholic feeling in 
England during the Interregrnun and the Restoration it 
is hardly surprising that Digby and White failed to 
persuade their fellow countrymen that they had 
rediscovered the true faith. Indeed, the Jesuit 
scholar, R.I. Bradley has forcefully argued that the 
Blackloists unwittingly eroded what remained of the 
Catholic Church in England and brought it to its final 
collapse. 98 One further irony is the fact that no 
matter how far they compromised themselves in the 
eyes of their Mother church, Digby and White were 
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still regarded fearfully as Catholics by English Protestants. 
In spite of the willingness of the Blackloists to deny 
the secular power of the Pope, and in spite of White's 
explicit denial of Papal infallibility in his Tabula 
suffragiales of 1655,99 Digby was still said to have 
'pursued nothing with so much vehemence as the establiShment 
of Popery in England', and Thomas White was alw8\YS regarded 
as 'the great Papist'. 100 
4. Blackloism and Aristotelian atomism. 
It may be that the modern reader will simply suppose that 
White and Digby were out and out opportunists, willing 
to sacrifice any Catholic doctrine in order to gain 
toleration for their fellow communicants. If this 
were so, however, we would have to ask ourselves why 
they should have bothered to retain the name of Catholic. 
If they were willing to sacrifice so much of the doctrine, 
why not sacrifice the name a I ~30? In fact, the only way 
to do justice to the Blnckloi~t programme is to see it 
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as a major development within a particular tradition 
of counter-Reformation theology. There were many 
Catholic thinkers who believed that the counter-
Reformation should not be simply a negative reaction 
to the Protestant Reformation, seeking merely to restore 
the pre-Lutheran supremacy of the Roman Church. Such 
men envisaged the counter-Reformation as a new reformation 
of the Apostolic Church from within. A successful 
reform would rediscover and re-establish the true faith, 
which, by definition, would be unique and would once 
again be accepted by all Christians. If we see the 
Blackloists in this light it is possible to make sense 
f th · t·· t . 101 o e1r ac 1V1 1es. They saw no contradiction in 
arguing for the truth of certain typically Protestant 
beliefs while still insisting upon the general supremacy 
of Roman Catholicism. After all, the Blackloists could 
only be sure they had recovered the true faith of primitive 
Christianity because it accorded (so they thought) with 
the three epistemological principles of Catholicism: 
scripture, tradition, and reason. 
It should now be recognised why White and Digby based 
their natural philosophy upon Aristotelian principles. 
For them, Aristotelianism was one of the traditions of 
the Catholic Church. In spite of their close 
association with original thinkers like Hobbes, Descartes, 
and Gassendi, they wanted to eschew originality and to 
pretend that their advanced mechanical philosophy was 
all to be found in Aristotle's works. So when Hobbes 
wrote that 'Aristotelity' was nothing other than 'a 
handmaid to the Romane Religion', he took it as a 
sufficient reason to reject Aristotle. 102 For Digby 
and White, however, it was necessa~, on the same 
assumption, to re-emphasise Aristotle~ Just as 
Catholic theology was always inextricably linked with 
Aristotelian philosophy, Digby and White judged it 
fitting, and even inevitable, that their reformed 
Catholicism should be inextricably linked with their 
reformed Aristotelianism. In both areas there was 
nothing arbitrary about their reforms. The ir natural 
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philosophy, as much as their theology was.guided by tradition 
as well as by reason. 
Fairly detailed outlines of Digby's Treatise on body, 
showing its indebtedn,es~, to Aristotle, have been provided 
elsewhere 103 and we':':;;eed no'.£ repeat it here. Suffice 
it to say that while working almost entirely within an 
Aristotelian framework, Digby developed a heuristic 
system which has justly been described as 'impeccable' 
according to the precepts of the mechanical philosophy. 104 
.,":4 F
f 
' 
In essence' Digby expounded what might well be called 
, Aristotelian, atomism' • Thi s may seem a peculiar hybrid 
,,', 
but Digby himself tried to pass it off as a thoroughbred: 
.<'1, 
Let any man read his LAr1stotle'!7 books of 
Generation and Cor:ruption, and say whether he 
doth not expressly teach, that mixtion (which 
he delivere~h to be the generation or making of 
a mixt body) is done per minimum, that is in 
our language in one word by atomes. 105 
According to Digby's exegesis, Aristotle professed that 
the natural qualities which arose from the combination 
of elements were brought about: 
by the mingling of theleast partes or atomes 
of the said Elements, which is in effect to say 
that all the nature of bodies their qualities 
and their operations, are compassed by the 
mingling of atomes: the showing and explicating 
of wh~ch ~~gh been our labour in this whole 
Treat~se. 
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Unfortunately, the fact that Digby chose to develop his 
quasi-atomistic mechanical philosophy within the framework 
of Aristotelianism has tended to obscure his undoubted 
significance. There has been a tendency to see Digby 
as a hidebound, old-fashioned thinker, fighting a rear-
guard action at a time when all the major natural 
philosophers were trying to undermine and overthrow 
Aristotle. 107 Such an attitude involves a rather 
simplistic assessment of the so-called scientific 
revolution even in general tenns,108 and with regard. 
to the revival of atomism in the early modern period 
it is completely misconceived. For, thanks largely 
to the researches of Andrew van Melsen, we now know 
that one of the major factors in the revival of quasi-
atomistic or corpuscularian matter theories in the early 
modern period was the Aristotelian tradition of minima 
al . 109 natur ~a. If we accept Van Melsen's conclusion 
about the over-riding imporl.;mce of this Aristotelian 
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tradition then we can no longer regard Digby as a 
reactionary thinker. Rather his work must be seen 
as the culmination of this minima naturalia tradition. 
The tradition essentially originated from a particular 
interpretation of one of Aristotle's refutations of 
earlier thinkers. In the fourth chapter of Book I of 
the Physics, Aristotle examined the matter theory of 
the pluralist philosopher Anaxagoras. Like Democritus, 
Anaxagoras tried to find a way past the Eleatic elenchus, 
110 
and the arguments of Zeno. Essentially, his matter 
theory relied on two features. Firstly, he made it 
axiomatic that matter could be divided infinitely and 
t t Oll tOO t d 111 ye s l. re am some magnl. u e. And secondly, he 
avoided the Eleatic objection that change involved the 
coming-to-be of what previously had not existed, by 
insisting that everything contained 'seeds' or small 
particles of every other thing • ChWlge, therefore, 
simply involved the re-mixing or 'sifting-out' of the 
different 'seeds' of thing. 112 This second suggestion 
seemed possible to Anaxagoras because of his first 
principle: the seeds of all things could be in each 
individual object providing that the seeds were infinitely 
small. Aristotle differed. 
If we try to sift out one of the things, sa:y flesh, 
contained in water, then there can only be two results, 
Aristotle claimed. Either the last particle of fleSh 
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will eventually be removed from the water, in which case 
it is no longer true that there is 'a portion of every-
thing in everything'. Or the sifting process will go 
on indefinitely. In that case, however, as each part 
of flesh has some definite magnitude, it will be possible 
to extract a quantity of flesh greater than the original 
quantity of water. This is, of course, impossible. 113 
As a result of this argument Aristotle insisted that 
'neither flesh nor bone nor anything of the kind can be 
great or small beyond limit,.114 
This small hint was seized upon by subsequent philosophers 
and developed into a vigorous aspect of Aristotelian 
natural philosophy. Andrew van Mel sen has traced 
the beginnings of minima tradition as far back as the 
commentator, Alexander Aphrodisias, who flourished about 
200 A.D. 115 Subsequent Greek commentators often followed 
Alexander but it was the Arabic thinker, Ibn Rushd, !mown 
to the West as Averroes (1126-1198), who gave the tradition 
a new emphasis. Averroes often spoke as though the minima 
have some sort of autonomous existence. That is to say, 
A verroe s seemed to imply that the minima are present in 
bodies as actual minima. Aristotle, of course, merely 
ad t t o ] ° t 116 believed they h a po en la. eX1S ence. 
It was mainly among the Latin followers of Averroes, then, 
that the tradition developed. With the increased interest 
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in Averroism during the sixteenth century this particular 
t ad "t" al "d "t 117 r 1 10n so rece1ve a new lffipe us. By the end 
of the century it seems to have become established as 
part of the standard interpretation of Aristotle's 
philosophy. Francisco Toleto (1532-1596), a Jesuit 
scholar, averred that by his time all authors agreed 
'that miscibles are divided into natural minima'. 118 
It is only a very short step from this position to a 
more overtly atomist stance. Van Melsen has illustrated 
the increasing affiliation between the minima naturalia 
tradition and the recently revived knowledge of ancient 
atomism in the work of men like Julius Caesar Scaliger 
(1484-1558), Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and others. 119 Van 
Melsen pointed to Daniel Sennert (1572-1637) as the last 
representative of the minima naturalia tradition and there 
can be no doubt that Sennert was an important figure in 
" En 1 d 120 the revival of atomism, particularly 1n g an • 
Nevertheless, it must now be recognised that the Aristotelian 
minima naturalia tradition found its most original 
expression, after Sennert' s death, in the works of Sir 
Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. It was the Blackloists 
who were to take this tradition as far as it was to go 
and invest it with renewed vigour. When seen from this 
perspective, the Treatise on body would seem to show that 
the mechanical philosophy, in its early stages, owed as 
much to Aristotelianism as it did to Descartes and 
d" 121 Gassen 1. 
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Just as Digby and White believed it was possible to 
reconstruct the true faith oy judicious use of tradition 
and reason, so they believed all the problems of natural 
philosophy could be solved by the traditions of Aristotelianism 
and the reasoning of what White referred to as the 'Digbaean 
method,.122 This infallible combination was suggested 
by White as the sure answer to all sceptics. In his 
polemic with the Anglican Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680), 
arising from the latter's Vanity of dOgmatizing, 123 
White insisted that scepticism was the 'Mother of Infinite 
Errors and all Heresies, and that very seducing Philosophy 
and vain fallacy which the Saints warned by the Apostles, 
124 have taught us to beware of'. Aristotelianism applied 
with the Digbaean method, however, could solve all the 
problems of natural philosophy: the causes of motion, 
125 gravity, light, colours and so on. . More importantly, 
the same combination could also solve· all the problems 
of the nature of the ul 126 so • Joseph Glanvill's response, 
as we might expect from an Anglican., Was to deny the 
validity of White's 'tradition': 
If Aristotle taught the Digbaean philosophy 
he taught the atomical, which is notoriously 
known to have been the way of Democritus and 
Epicurus, which Arist~~7e frequently and 
professedly cpposeth. 
• • • 
Nevertheless, White adhered to his Catholic principles. 
He believed he had found the wB¥ to refute all sceptics 
and to establish incontrovertible truth. He was 
confident in this belief because it seemed to him that 
his philosophy did not deviate.from the Scriptures, 
from the early traditions of the Church and its 
(Aristotelian) philosophy, or from the dictates of 
th t · 1· 128 e mos rl.gorous ogl.c. 
5. Blackloism and the implications for seventeenth-
century historiography. 
The Blackloist counter-Reformation programme was an 
interesting development in its own right and would repay 
further study. Already, however, we should be able to 
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see that one or two currently cherished historiographical 
positions need to be qualified in the light of this 
Catholic contribution to the early development of mechanism 
in England. 
For example, although it is true to say that the Blackloist 
programme provides confirmation, from an unexpected quarter, 
of the importance of eschatological concerns during the 
period, it cannot be used to confirm Charles Webster's 
interpretation of how science and eschatology were 
affiliated. 129 Essentially Webster's argument is that 
eschatological considerations stimulated scientific 
developnent as an important means towards 'social and 
intellectual progress'. Eschatology, therefore, is 
married to Baconianism in Webster's historiography and 
is said to promote 'the technical, utilitarian and 
ethical dimensions of sCience,.130 Now, Webster is 
only able to argue along these lines because he has 
concentrated on one rather special aspect of eschatology. 
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Throughout The Great InstauI'ation Webster insists that 
, Puritans' were expecting an imminent millennium: a 
thousand year rule of the Saints on earth during which 
time society would be transformed into a utopian paradise. 
The puritans, therefore, turn to Baconian utilitarian 
science as a necessary first-step towards the establishment 
of this utopian society. 
In fact, Webster's argument relies for its force on an 
unfortunate failure to distinguish between two eschatological 
traditions. The millenarianism of which Webster speaks 
is only a very specialised version of more general ideas 
which should be called 'apoc~lyptic'. Admittedly there 
were those in seventeenth-century England who looked 
forward to an imminent paradise on earth, where all 
social injustice would be eradicated for a thousand years 
prior to the final Judgement Day. These thinkers were 
millenarians in the true sense, and it may well be that 
the major motivation behind such beliefs was, or gave 
, f l't' I f 131 H way to, a des1re or po 1 lC~ re orm. owever, 
the label 'millenarian' is all too often applied to 
other thinkers who (being happier with the status guo 
perhaps) recognised the dangers inherent in such 
political cravings and who preferred to believe that 
the millennium was long past, or well under way, and 
even nearing its end. 132 Such thinkers, secure in their 
self-conscious piety, looked forward to the Day of 
Judgement itself, not what Liley would see as the more 
lowly aim of a political utopia. Their views are more 
correctly labelled as apocalyptic but cunillennial. 133 
Unfortunately we do not have a census detailing which 
(or even how many) seventeenth-century thinkers were 
millennialist and which amillennialist. However, it 
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is perfectly clear that the Blackloists were amillennialists. 
Their concern is only with the state of the human soul 
after death and after the resurrection of all the dead 
on the Last Day. There is absolutely no talk of a 
thousand year rule of the Saints on earth before the 
Judgement Day. So, it would be short-sighted (not to 
say blinkered) in the extreme to suppose that the Black-
loist mechanical philosophy must have been developed in 
order to improve man's lot on earth, as a first step 
to the founding of a utopian society. On the contrary, 
the Blackloists were concerned with a much more rarefied 
objective: the establishment of the true faith. They 
wanted to show that the bodily resurrection, foretold 
in the scriptures and emphasised in the early traditions 
of the Church, was in keeping with the other rule of 
faith - reason. Their mechanist physics was developed, 
then, in order to give philosophical backing to the 
concept of the resurrection. Their natural philosophy 
affinmed that the resurrection of the body was not only 
philosophically sound but philosophically necessary. 
Similarly the other leading figure in the early development 
of the mechanical philosophy in England, Thomas Hobbes, 
also paid great attention to eschatological concerns. 
In the final part of Leviathan Hobbes discussed the 
immortality of the soul and the state of affairs after 
the Last Judgement. There is, however, no discussion 
of the millennium. 134 Indeed, perhaps it should be 
added that the prevalence of mortalism during this 
period tends to suggest that a significant number of 
thinkers from John Donne and Thom:is Browne to Richard 
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Overton, Hobbes and Milton were more concerned with the 
Last Day than they were with any thousand year preamble. 135 
Providing we bear in mind the distinction between true 
millenarianism and more general apocalyptic ideas, 
millenarianism begins to seem less significant than 
Webster would have us believe. Because Webster believes 
that most seventeenth-century natural philosophers are 
simply millenarian, and theI'(~fore expecting some sort 
of political utopia under the rule of the Saints on 
earth, then it makes perfect sense for him to suppose 
that they were fired to develop a utilitarian science 
which then became an indispensable feature in the march 
of progress. However, if we take the more correct 
view that most natural philosophers in the period 
were anticipating the Day of Judgement when all social 
and political aspirations would be ,suspended once and 
for all, then Webster's supposition seems far less 
persuasive. 
In the conclusion to The Great Instauration Webster 
claims that he has tried 'to explore the relevance of 
Puritanism to the investigation of the natural world 
in terms of contemporary priorities,.1 36 It would 
seem that he has not quite lived up to this ambition. 
In fact he has exaggerated the role of political utopian 
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motivations (presumably his own priorities) at the expense 
of more strictly religious motivations. The Millenarian-
utilitarian-utopian tradition which Webster has charted 
was undoubtedly significant, but injudicious use of the 
word 'millenarian' should not be allowed to obscure a 
separate tradition. 137 That there was a profound 
interdependence between apocalyptic (but amillennial) 
eschatology and the mechanical philosophy is clearly 
shown by the work of Digby and White. But their work 
is only the earliest in a tradition later adopted, or 
rather adapted, by thinkers like Robert Boyle, John 
138 
Evelyn, Thomas Burnet and others. 
The Blackloist programme also tends to confi:rmthe 
belief of many historians that the mechanical philo~ophy 
and its associated corpuscularian matter the 0 r,y were 
first introduced into the main-stream of English natural 
philosophy in order to promote a particular ideological 
purpose. However, the fact that the ideology of Digby 
and White was neither Puritan, Latitudinarian nor Anglican 
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means that the prevailing historiography has to be 
qualified yet again. With the addition of Catholicism 
to these other three religious ideologies it now seems 
even more obvious than it did before that the mechanical 
philosophy could be (and was) used to provide a philosophical 
foundation for almost any ideological standpoint. 
It follows that the recent attempt to argue exclusively 
for 'the Anglican origins of modern science' by 
establishing 'the relation of matter theory to ideology' 
in the work of Robert Boyle during the Restoration 
period is totally inadequate. 139 It can now be seen 
that Boyle merely had to follow the example set by 
Digby and White. The Blackloists had demonstrated 
clearly and explicitly how science could be used for 
ideological purposes long bcL'ore the Restoration and 
it was all there for the taking. There can be no 
doubt that Boyle knew the work of these two Catholics. 
Digby had ingratiated himself to Samuel Hartlib in the 
early 1650s and may well have entertained hopes that 
the Blackloist theology would hold some appeal for 
Hartlib's circle, who were also keen to establish a 
unified Church. 140 
The fact that the earliest overt attempt to use natural 
philosophy for ideological purposes was perpetrated by 
countez-refonning Catholics may also add to our undez-
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standing of the very real mistrust of the new philosophy 
shown by many thinkers. Among the factors which 
historians have already discerned in this mistrust are 
a reaction against the dogmatism of Descartes and Hobbes 
which seemed at the time to lead to materialsim and 
atheism; and a reaction against the various kinds of 
natural philosophy which became associated with various 
radical and subversive sects in the revolutionary 
. d 141 perlO • No historian could deny, however, that for 
most seventeenth-century Englishmen Roman Catholicism 
presented at least as big a threat to their society as 
atheism or enthusiasm. 
It may well be, therefore, that some of the suspicion 
directed against the new science stemmed from the knowledge 
that the Catholics were usinl~ it to promote their own 
religious and political ends. In the light of this, 
the remarkable attacks upon the new science by Henry 
stubbe (1632-1676) and Thomas Barlow (1607-1691) no 
1 . .. 142 longer seem so pecu lar or so surprlS1ng. In a 
series of pamphlets, published in 1670, stubbe vilified 
the Royal Society on a number of grounds but the charge 
that the Society was a crypto-Catholic enclave has 
always seemed the most outlandish. Nevertheless, 
considering the anti-Catholic feelings that raged 
throughout the Restoration period, Stubbe's guggestion 
that the Royal Society was bent on introducing 'a 
Popish implicit faith' may well have been the most 
damaging of his attacks. 143 stubbe spelled out the 
reasons for his belief in Campanella reviv'd. 144 He 
alleged that the encouragement to study natural 
philosophy (which the Society indulged in) was a plot 
to distract the greatest minds while the Roman Church 
sought to re-establish itself. 145 It is quite clear 
that he associated the Blackloists with such plots 
because he referred explicitly to 'the doctrines of 
Mr White, Dr Holden, Serenus Cressy, and such others 
as endeavour at present (and that with great show of 
wit and artifices) to seduce the English to that 
Apostaticall Church,.146 Although White was never a 
fellow of the Royal Society, Sir Kenelm Digby was and 
Stubbe made a point of singling him out to denounce him 
as 'the Pliny of our age for lying' .141 
Five years later, Thomas Barlow, soon to become Bishop 
of Lincoln, wrote to a friend that he was: 
not a little troubled, to see Protestants, nay 
Clergy-men and Bishops, approve and propagate, 
that which they miscall New-Philosophy; so 
that our Universities begin to be infected with 
it, little considering the Cause or Consequences 
of it, or how it tends evidently to the advantage 
of Rome, and the ruine of our Religion. 148 
Like Stubbe, Barlow believed that 'this NeW-Philosophy 
as they call it) was set on foot, and has been carried 
on by the Art s of Rome' • Barlow believed that the use 
of philosophical ar~lent to bolster religion was bound 
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to cause confusion and division. Rome had capitalized 
on this kind of confusion by promoting the study of 
natural philosophy in England and Holland where 
divisions in religion were manifold. 149 
I believe that Barlow's and Stubbe's profound suspicion 
of any attempt to use natural philosophy to promote 
particular theological doctrines is typical of orthodox 
English thought from the days of the Protectorate to 
the turn of the century. The evidence seems to -suggest 
that most English intellectuals would have implicitly 
agreed with Barlow that confusion and dissent was as 
likely to ensue from this kind of ideological use of 
natural theology as unanimity and peace. In subsequent 
chapters of this thesis I hope to show that the major 
proponents of the new philosophy in England were aware 
of the dangers of such ideologically directed science. 
The dogmatism of Descartes, of Digby and White, or of 
Hobbes could lead, whatever the intentions of their 
authors, to atheism, fanatical sectarianism, or Roman 
Catholicism. The only safe way to avoid such abuses 
in natural philosophy was to follow the lead taken 
earlier by orthodox Protestant divines who also wished 
to avoid the pit-falls of Romanism, enthusiasm and 
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atheism. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, 
Anglican intellectuals had responded to the various 
controversies about the 'rule of faith' - that is to 
say, the criteria by which one could judge what it was 
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safe to believe - by developing a position which has been 
aptly called 'constructive scepticism,.1 50 Similarly, 
the mainstream of English natural philosophy developed 
a methodology based on constructive scepticism. The 
dogmatic stance of the Blackloists, no less than that 
of Hobbes and even Descartes, was thoroughly repudiated. 
But the story is complex and to demonstrate this will 
be part of our task in subsequent chapters. 
6. Sir Kenelm Digby and the principle of motion 
We must return now to our earlier theme and ask ourselves 
how - in his efforts to account for all phenomena in 
terms of matter and motion - Digby first of all accounts 
for motion itself. We noticed earlier that one 
commentator has regarded Digby's natural philosophy as 
'impeccable' in its adherence to the canons of the 
mechanical philosophy.1 51 We must now modify this 
judgement by pointing out that although Digby explains 
all physical phenomena in terms of matter in motion, 
his philosophy by no means matches up to the stricter 
requirements of Cartesian mechanism. For, as we shall 
see, Digby's Treatise on body, like Hobbes' Little treatise 
relies heavily on a self-active agent as the motor for 
all other changes. 
It is only at a superficial glance, therefore, that 
Digby's mechanical philosophy seems 'impeccable'. 
Certainly, as we have seen, he considers it of the utmost 
importance (indeed essential) to do awa:y with all explanations 
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in terms of occult qualities. 152 In part icular he rule s 
out all suggestions of action at a distance: 
action among bodies is performed for the most 
part by the emission of little parts out of one 
body into another, as also that such little 
parts can not steame (Sic - 'stream'Y from the 
body that is their fountaine and settle upon a 
remote body without passinc through the interiacent 
bodies, which must furnish them, as it were, with 
channels and pt~3s to convey them whither they 
are to go •••• 
Nevertheless, we must ask ourselves why it is that 'little 
parts' do stream (or steam!) out of bodies - as water 
out of a 'fountaine'. Are we to conclude that Digby, 
like Hobbes, believed in bodies with 'inherent power 
to move,?154 
Generally speaking, the answer to this question is no. 
In a number of examples in the Treatise Digby provides 
a physical explanation for the continual streaming of 
'little parts' out of bodies. However, all of these 
examples rely on an unexplained motive principle. This 
self-active principle (for such we must conclude it to 
be) is light. We need not be surprised at this. After 
all, Digby's close friend, Hobbes, had already invoked 
light as an active principle in his Little treatise. 
Furthermore, we have seen that a number of Hobbes' major 
sources for this notion came from Digby's own collection 
. t 155 of manuscrl.p s. It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that Digby should rely on the tradition of light 
metaphysics to enable him to solve the crucial problem 
of the successive origins of the various motions 
occurring, ceasing and recurring in the World. Indeed, 
in view of the reverence Digby shows for the early 
traditional beliefs of his Church, he seems a much more 
likely advocate of light metaphysics than Hobbes. 156 
After an initial 'Preamble', Digby, not unnaturally, 
begins his Treatise on body by establishing the nature 
of matter. starting from a truly ingenious blend of 
Aristotelian and mechanical first principles, Digby 
manages to conclude that 'There are but foure simple 
bodies: and these are rightly named Elements,.151 The 
mechanical philosophy has been pressed into service, 
therefore, to establish the reality of the traditional 
Aristotelian elements. Having demonstrated the 
existence of the four elements Digby goes on to consider 
'their Activities compared with one another,.158 It 
is here that we find the first hints of activity within 
matter. Compared with earth and water, Digby tells us: 
fire is more active than either of them; as it 
will appeare clearly if we consider, how when 
fire is applyed to fewell, and the violence of 
blowing is added to its own motion; it 
incorporateth it selfe with the fewell, and in 
a small time converteth great part of it into 
its own nature, and shattereth the rest into 
smoke and ashes. 159 
Subsequently, Digby explains how fire 'cometh out of 
fewell and worketh upon other bodies'. Fire breaks 
out of a piece of fuel (the process we would call 
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ignition) principally because 'the activity of that 
fierce body, will not let it lye still and rest,.160 
So, during the hp.ating process more and more particles 
of fire are incorporated into the fuel, but this process: 
doth so exceedingly condense them into a narrower 
roome than the ire nature affecteth, that as soon 
as they gett liberty, and grow masters of the 
fewel, (which at first was theire prison) they 
enlarge theire place, and consequently come out 
and flye abroad; ever ayming right forwardes 
from the point where they begin theire journey: 
for the violence wherewith they seeke to extend 
themselves into a larger roome, when they have 
liberty to do so; will admitt no motio~6~ut the 
shortest, which is, by a straight line. 
What Digby is describing here is a process of auto-
diffusion. Just as the light metaphysical tradition 
regarded the ability of light to spread itself out, 
spontaneously from a point source, as its most 
characteristic property, so Digby suggests: 
the most simple and primary motion of fire, is 
a fluxe in a direct ltg~ from the center of it, 
to its circumference. 1 
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It comes as no surprise, therefore, to see Digby following 
up this account of fire with a lengthy discussion of the 
nature of light. 163 Only after this does he feel fully 
equipped to embark upon an exposition 'Of local motion,.164 
For Digby fire and light are simply denser and rarer 
manifestations of the same corporeal entity. It is at 
this point in his system that Digby has to admit to a 
divergence from the beliefs of his beloved Aristotle. 
As Digby is all too well aware, Aristotle 'leadeth the 
daunce to hold light a quality, and mainly to deny it 
any bodily subsistence,. 165 
Aristotle was led to his belief that light was a state 
or quality of the medium because it appeared that light 
simply could not be material. Principal among the 
arguments against the corporeality of light was its 
alleged instantaneous propagation and its simultaneous 
existence in the same place as other bodies, such as 
air or glass. Digby had no difficulty refuting the 
latter argument: 
118 
the ayre being a very divisible body, doth without 
resistance yield as much place as is requisite for 
light. And that light, though our eyes iudge it 
diffused everywhere, yet it is not truly in every 
atome of ayre: but to make us see it everywhere, 
it sufficeth that it be in every part of the 
ayre which is as big as the blacke or sight LPupi17 
of our eye; so that we cannot set our eye in 
any positigg whereit receiveth not impressions 
of light. 1 
The instantaneous propagation of light was a rather 
more tenacious doctrine. It was so strongly held that 
even Descartes formulated his own concept of light in 
order to accoounodate it, and Hobbes quickly changed his 
theory of light after writing The little treatise because 
he could no longer accept his early views about the finite 
speed of light. 161 Digby, therefore, must be credited 
as the first mechanical philosopher to insist upon the 
finite velocity of light. He ventures to predict that 
an experimental determination of the speed of light may 
soon be possible but his own approach to the problem 
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~s entirely discursive. Essentially, he argues 
that it would be impossible to tell in everyday life. 
Thus, we know that sound travels slowly in comparison 
to light, he points out, because of familiar phenomena 
like seeing the flash of a cannon before hearing it: 
But shut your eyes !fie continuey, or enquire of 
a blind man, and then neither you nor he can 
tell whether these soundes fill your eares at 
the very instant they were begotten, or h~ve 
spent some time in their iourney to you. 169 
ll~ 
The traditional argument that we see the sun at the very 
instant that it appears over the horizon, he dismisses 
with the contempt it deserves. 110 
By these and other arguments Digby insists upon the 
material nature of light. It is then an easy matter 
for him to equate it with fire. From this point on 
Digby invokes light and fire interchangeably as active 
principles, following other 'Philosophers' in ascribing 
to these principles 'spheres of activity,.171 Furthermore, 
the Sun, in Digby's system, becomes 'a constant and 
perpetuall cause' whose influence 'with his light 
and beames which reacheth farre and neere' gives fire 
its 'universal action' but whose own activity remains 
"I " ." 172 ent~ y ax~oma;II~C. 
There can be no doubt that light is the principle of 
motion in Digby's system of matter in motion. He makes 
this perfectly explicit when giving a summary of the 
nature of light: 
it beginneth from a little source; and by 
extreme multiplication and rarefaction, it 
extendeth it selfe into a great sphere. And 
then we will perceive the reason why light is 
darted from the body of the surme with that 
incredible celerity, wherewith its beames flye 
to visite the remotest parts of the world; 
and how, of necessity, it giveth motion to 
all circumstant bodies: since it is violently 
thrust forward by so extreme a rarefaction; 
and the further it go1t~, is still the more 
rarefyed and dilated. 7 
Later, Digby begins his accmmt 'Of the composition, 
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qualities, and generation of Mixed bodies' in the following 
way: 
Having now declared the vertue s by which fire 
and earth worke upon one an other, and upon the 
rest of the elements; which is, by light •••• 
Our taske shall be in this chapter first to 
observe what will result out of such action. 174 
In order to appreciate the really crucial role played 
by light in Digby's system of philosophy let us consider 
one of his most striking examples. In Chapter X of 
the Treatise on bogy Digby tries to give a mechanistic 
explanation of the operation of gravity. He begins with 
an argument from analogy. The action of the Sun on the 
Earth is said to be like that of a fire applied to a 
pot of water. Just as the particles of fire break up 
the water into flying particles of steam, so 'the 
light {Jrom the sui! rebounding from the earth with 
atomes causeth two streames in the ayre: the one 
ascending, the other descending and both of them in 
a perpendicular line'. 115 The descending flow is 
caused by the principle of fuga vacui, to replace the 
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ascending particles. It is this descending flow which 
pushes objects down and accounts for the force of gravity. 
Of course, Digby is aware that he must account for the 
fact that the downward stream of atoms is more forceful 
than the upward stream. Unfortunately, his plausibility 
becomes somewhat strained at this point. 
The downward stream is more forceful because it is more 
dense. Why is the upward stream less dense (after all, 
the whole scheme is based on a circulation and so should 
involve the same kind of particles in both directions)? 
Digby's answer relies on the notion that the upward flow 
consists of particles which are combined with the particles 
of light which broke them loose. Digby envisages this 
as similar to a termis ball bouncing against a wall with 
wet mortar. The ball will rebound off the wall with 
some of the mortar sticking to it. So a particle of 
light bounces off the earth with some moist parts of 
the earth sticking to it. The density of this 
ascending particle is now 'to be esteemed according to 
the density of the two parts', and light is the rarest 
corporeal entity. Eventually (at great heights) the 
light particles break awa:y. from their atomic partners: 
and thereby, the bulke of the parte which is left, 
becometh of a different degree of density (quantity 
for quantity) from the bulke of the entire atome, 
when light was part 196 it; and consequently it is denser than it was. 
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Even if this is granted it could still be objected that 
such invisibly small particles would not descend as quickly 
as a large heavy object and so could hardly be the cause 
of its descent. Here, Digby brings in a familiar 
Aristotelian device: 
••• the very descent of it {the objeci! occasioneth 
their striking it, for as it falleth and maketh 
itself a way through them, they divide themselves 
before it, and swell on the sides and a little 
above it, and presently close again behind it 
and over it as soone as it is past. Now that 
closing to hinder vacuity of space is a sudden 
one, and thereby attaineth great velocity which 
could carry the atomes in that degree of velocity 
further than the descending body •••• 177 
Traditional Aristotelianism, of course, distinguishes 
between the natural motion due to gravity and the 
unnatural motion of a projectile. Digby has quite 
simply recognised that the doctrine of antiperistasis, 
usually invoked to explain projectile motion, is perfectly 
compatible with the precepts of the mechanical philosophy. 
He does not hesitate, therefore, to apply this doctrine 
to a body in free-fall and so immediately dispose of the 
'occult' explanations of fall used by the scholastics. 
This example is only one of many which demonstrate Digby's 
agility of mind and his truly original and yet undeniably 
Aristotelian approach to problems of natural philosophy. 
Even so there are still some nagging doubts left in the 
mind of the reader confronted with Digby's explanation 
of gravity. For one thing, gravity has been invoked 
earlier in the Treatise in order to define the very 
nature of a dense body. But now we find gravity being 
explained in tenns of the impact of dense particles. 
However, Digby is fully aware of this problem: 
In our investigation of the Elements, we tooke 
for a principle thereunto that gravity is 
sometimes more, sometimes lesse, than the 
density of the body in which it is. But in 
our explication of ••• gravity, we seem to 
putt that gravity and density is all one. 178 
Digby's resolution of the problem is quite significant 
and worth remarking: 
We are therefore to consider, that density (in 
it selfe) doth signify a difficultie to have 
the partes of its subject in which it is, 
separated one from an other; and that gravity 
(likewise in it selfe) doth signify a quantity, 
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by which a heavey body doth descend towardes the 
center; or (which is consequent thereunto) a force 
to make an other body descend. Now this power, 
we have shewed, doth belong unto density, so farre 
forth as a dense body being strucken by an other, 
doth not yield by suffering its partes to be 
divided; but, with its whole bulke striketh 
the next before it, and divideth it, if it be 
more divisible than it selfe is. So that you 
see, density hath the name of density, in 
consideration of a passive quality or rather 
of an impassibility, which it hath; and the 
same density is called gravity, in respect of 
an active quality it hath which followeth this 
impassibility.17~ 
Digby's distinction between an active and a passive 
quality in this passage has an ancient pedigree but in the 
context of a mechanical philosophy the distinction takes 
on a new life. It may well' be that this distinction 
influenced Isaac Newton's own extremely complex 
conception of force. For Newton's concept of force 
is by no means a monolithic concept. In the opening 
pages of Newton's Principia mathematica he refers to 
a passive vis insita and a more active vis impressa 
and refers to gravity as a 'centripetal force' which 
he defines in a way strikingly similar to Digby's own 
definition just quoted: 'A centripetal force is that 
by which bodies are drawn or impelled ••• towards a 
point as to a centre,.180 
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The probability that Newton's general conception of force 
owes something to Digby's Treatise on body is enhanced 
when we remember that Newton's early note-book, entitled 
Questiones guaedam philosophicae contains detailed notes 
taken from it. In particular, Newton wrote at length 
about Digby' 6 explanation of gravity. 181 Furthennore, 
Digby's Treatise on body has been proposed more than 
once as a likely source for another important aspect of 
Newton's conception of force: the notion that 'To 
every action there is always opposed an equal reaction,.182 
It is my contention that these matters taken together 
argue strongly for the influence of Digby not just on 
Newton's third law of motion but upon his more general 
conception of the nature of force. 
We need not try to pursue any further the possible influence 
of Digby upon Newton - no doubt the suggestion can never 
be demonstrated more forcefully. Our point in concentrating 
on this particular example of Digby's natural philosophy 
is to show how crucial and f1.Uldamental the behaviour 
of light is to Digby's explanatory scheme. Even such 
a 1.Uliversal problem as the discent of bodies due to 
gravity is in Digby's scheme, entirely dependent on the 
activity of particles of light. It is impossible to 
deny that light, for all its corporeality, plays a 
fundamental metaphysical role in Digby's phYSics. 183 
The early history of the mechanical philosophy in 
England, then, was intimately b01.Uld up with the much 
older tradition of light metaphysics. Wal ter Warner's 
system remained in manuscript and known only to a few, 
and Hobbes chose not to proceed to publication with 
the same 'first principles' he outlined in his Little 
treatise. It is only in Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise 
on body that these ideas were made public. By this 
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time, of course, the much more rigorous system of Descartes 
was becoming well-known. Descartes' system did not rely 
on an unexplained perpetual source of activity like the 
Sun, nor what might well be regarded as an 'occult' 
belief in the autodiffusion of light. To Hobbes, at 
least, the light metaphysical version of the mechanical 
philosophy seemed already to be superseded. 
It is my belief that Hobbes' realisation of the superior 
logical coherence and rigour of the Cartesian S,Ystem, 
together with his own bitter rivalry with Descartes 
caused him to delay publication until he flet he could 
match, or rather better, the Cartesian system. Digby's 
priorities, however, lay elsewhere. For Digby the 
important thing was to establish the immortality of 
sould and to set in train the Blackloist plan for 
ecumenical Chuxch refor.m. We return now to consider 
the development of the mechanical philosophy in the 
work of Hobbes. First of all, however, we must 
consider his likely reaction to the ideological efforts 
of his Catholic friend. 
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CHAPrER 4 
THE FAILURE OF srRICT MECHANISM IN ENGLAND: 
THOMAS HOBBES AND DE CORPORE 
We have seen that the Blackloists, particularly Sir 
Kenelm Digby and Thomas White, made the ideological 
use of the mechanical philosophy perfectly explicit. 1 
From now on we shall have to consider the role played 
by ideological factors in the subsequent development of 
the mechanical philosophy in England. Each chapter, 
therefore, will begin with a survey of the ways in 
which our protagonists used the mechanical philosophy 
to promote a particular ideology or, if appropriate, 
how they reacted against the ideological use of natural 
philosophy. There are two reasons why this kind of 
investigation is essential here. Firstly, there can be 
no doubt that the particular forms that the mechanical 
2 philosophy took and its predominant methodology were 
conditioned by ideological factors and the reactions 
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to them. Secondly, this has now become a major feature -
perhaps the major feature - in the historiography of the 
subject and so can hardly be ignored. The first part 
of this chapter, therefore, will concentrate on Hobbes' 
attitude to the use of the mechanical philosophy for 
religio-political purposes. After all, there can be 
no denying Hobbes' pre-eminence as a political ideologue, 
and a number of scholars, as we shall see, have supposed 
that Hobbes' political doctrines grew out of his 
materialistic natural philosophy. 
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In the second section we will continue the story which 
we began in Chapter 2. I will argue that the reason 
for Hobbes' failure to publish his system of mechanical 
philosophy before 1655 was his inability to dispense with 
unexplained, active principles. Before the completion 
of De corpore in its published form, Hobbes' natural 
philosophy did not match up to the rigorous standard 
set by Descartes' strict mechanism. Only during the 
last few years before the appearance of De corpore in 
print did Hobbes feel that he could explain all physical 
phenomena in terms of the actions, reactions and inter-
actions of inert, passive matter set in motion at the 
Creation by the 'Author of Nature,.3 However, I 
hope to show that in spite of Hobbes' own confidence 
about the strictness of his mechanical theories he 
satisfied no-one else. Hobbes' strict version of 
the mechanical philosophy, therefore, must be counted 
as a failure. 
In the final section of this chapter I try to further 
illustrate my suggestion that the early development of 
the mechanical philosophy owed much to the ideas perpetuated 
in the Hellenistic and medieval traditions of light 
metaphysics. I hope to do this by pointing to a 
parallelism between the early careers of Hobbes and 
Descartes. Remaining with this comparison between 
these two thinkers I endeavour to show that Hobbes' 
concept of 'endeavour' or conatus once again reveals 
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a flaw in the 'strictness' of Hobbes' philosophy -
revealing hints of animistic thinking. Finally, I 
argue that the late appearance of Hobbes' system gave 
him one advantage over his French rival, by enabling 
him to take into account Kepler's first law of 
planetary motion which Descartes had overlooked. 
1. Hobbes and the ideological use of natural philosophy. 
Thereis undoubtedly a sense in which Hobbes ~ using his 
natural philosophy to promote his political doctrines. 
However, I believe this is true only in a trivial sense 
when compared to the endeavours of the Blackloists. 
Admittedly, Leviathan4 is shot through with Hobbes' 
materialist views and the rationalist approach which 
Hobbes employs to establish his political principles is 
essentially equivalent to his rationalist method in 
natural philosophy. However, it is not possible to 
extend these links between his science and his politics 
any further. Hobbes compared his own achievement, as 
founder of 'Civil Philosophy', in De cive with the 
achievements in natural philosophy of Copernicus, Harvey, 
Galileo, Kepler, Gassendi, Mersenne and 'the College of 
Physicians in London,.5 It would be ludicrous to 
suppose from this comparison that Hobbes' political 
ideas were closely indebted to details of the natural 
philosophy of any, much less, all of these men. The 
comparison is simply between levels of achievement and 
may possibly suggest some methodological affiliation 
but that is all. I believe that precisely the same is 
true of any comparison between Hobbes' political ideas 
and his own natural philosophy. Indeed, Hobbes makes 
it perfectly clear that the principles of politics 
can be derived independently of and without reference 
to the behaviour of body or matter in general. When 
Hobbes published De cive prior to De corpore and De 
hamine which should naturally come first, he gave a 
brief but significant apology: 
Therefore, it happens that What was last in order 
is yet come forth first in time. And the rather, 
because I saw that, grolmded on its oWri. principles 
sufficiently known by experience, it would not 
stand in need of the former sections. 6 
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Even so, the exact relationship between Hobbes' political 
ideas and his mechanical natural philosophy is still being 
debated. It seems that the majority of scholars of 
Hobbes' thought tend to agree with the late nineteenth-
century historian George Croom Robertson that: 
however Hobbes might wish by afterthought t'o connect 
his theory of political society with the principles 
of his general mechanical philosophy, ••• it sprang 
originally from a different line of consideration. 7 
Recently the opposite case has been strenuously argued by 
8 J.W.N. Watkins and T. A. Spragens. It seems to me, 
however, that these ultimately fail to establish their 
case beyond the acknowledged importance of methodology 
and a generally materialistic outlook in Hobbes' work. 
It may well be that the Watkins-~pragens school of thought, 
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if we may call it such, would wish to use the phenomenon 
of Blackloism to defend their case. We have seen that 
Digby's Treatise on body shows certain fundamental 
similarities to Hobbes' early work in natural philosophy, 
and there can be no doubt that White drew heavily upon 
Hobbes' political writings for his Grounds of obedience 
and government. 9 In view of Hobbes' influence upon 
the Blackloists perhaps we ought to recognise him as 
the first thinker to use the mechanical philosophy for 
ideological purposes. Let us consider this. 
Certainly Digby and White owe a good deal to Hobbes but it is 
equally clear that Hobbes gained as much as he gave. The 
recent discovery and publication of Hobbes' critique 
of Thomas White's De mundo shows that Hobbes worked 
out and refined his own natural philosophy during the 
course of this detailed scrutiny of White's work. 10 It 
is worth reminding ourselves also that Hobbes was 
actually accused of taking some of his ideas from Digby 
11 by Seth Ward. Admittedly this accusation is to be 
found in the context of a savage attack on Hobbes but 
there are clear indications that Ward was partiallv 
justified with respect to all the other thinkers he cites. 
We have seen that there is certainly truth in Ward's 
suggestion that Hobbes took many ideas from 'Mr Warners 
Papers' and it is well known that the rancour which 
existed between Descartes and Hobbes was largely due to 
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Descartes' conviction that Hobbes was plagiarising his 
ideas, while Hobbes himself acknowledged in private 
correspondence his admiration for the system of 
G d " 12 assen ~. 
We are not seeking to undermine Hobbes' reputation and 
reveal him as a plagiarist. Whatever the influences 
upon him, his own system is sufficiently different to 
reject such charges. Nevertheless, it must be 
recognised that he did not arrive at his system as a 
resul t of abstract rational thought without external 
influence. Indeed we have on record at least one 
incident which suggests, rather amusingly, that Hobbes 
was easily led by fellow philosophers. On being 
shown a geometrical solution by Descartes to a problem 
about oscillations, Hobbes 'praised it very much at first 
but after Monsr Robervall doubted if it, Mr Hobbes 
seemeth to doute too'. 13 According to Jean Jacquot, 
Hobbes' change of mind here is 'typical'. 14 It would 
seem, then, that there was a very free interchange of 
ideas about natural philosophy at this time and it 
would be as foolish to dismiss Digby and White as mere 
plagiarists of Hobbes as it would be to accept the 
accusations of Ward against Hobbes. 
Even so, it could still be argued that Hobbes was the 
major figure in the transfonnation of the mechanical 
philosophy from a convenient heuristic system of 
natural philosophy to a philosophically rigorous 
foundation on which to establish a religious and 
political ideology. If this is the case then the 
Blackloist programme has to be seen as a rear-guard 
action to turn this new (Hobbesian) way of arguing 
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around and to make it serve theends of Roman Catholicism. 
Such an interpretation of the Blackloist programme seems 
unlikely on internal grounds which have already been 
detailed. But much more revealing in this context is 
the fact that Hobbes frequently professes himself to 
be totally opposed to the ideological use of natural 
philosophy. 
The clearest indications of just how much Hobbes 
differs from the Blackloists in his attitude to ideologically 
directed philosophy is afforded by Hobbes' own reactions 
to Thomas White's De mundo. In the third dialogue 
of the De mundo White addresses himself to problems of 
natural theology, in which he seeks to establish the 
existence and some of the attributes of God by means 
of arguments from natural philosophy. Hobbes is 
unequivocal in his reaction: 'But our author, or 
anyone else who promises demonstrations of this kind 
is not proceeding correctly,.1 5 Hobbes goes on to 
insist that it is not only 'unphilosophical' but also 
an affront to theology because it implies limitations 
to God's will or omnipotence, and a sin against religion 
'-'4 
because it seeks to replace faith with philosophy even 
though 'articles of faith' are 'the limbs of religion'. 16 
Any attempt to use philosophy to establish theological 
truths is, for Hobbes, anathema. His main objection 
is that such an enterprise is dangerous both to the 
individual soul and to the peace and unity of the 
Church. Hobbes puts it like this: 
••• the promises of the Divine Mercy have been 
given not to philosophers but to the faithful, 
that is, to those who accept the authority 
of the Church. To what end, then, should one 
wish to employ natural reason in enquiring into 
the articles of faith? For, if reason convince 
us upon matters that conform to faith, we lose the 
grace of faith; if upon matters contrary [to fai t'iJ, 
not only will you be forced to say one thing and 
think another, but also you will be less obedient 
to the authority of the Church; [and to be thuil 
is against the salvation of the soul. 17 
And on the more general level: 
For a private person to call for a re-examination 
of matters that have once and for all been settled 
and determined by the authority of the Supreme 
Power is absurd and directly counter to the reasons 
for the Church's peace and unity. Nay, rulers 
must strive with the greatest zeal not to allow men 
to argue out any article of faith, for the belief 
of countless other Christians will be endangered 
by the mind of one man. 18 
Now it may well be thought that what is revealed here 
is an unfamiliar aspect of Hobbes' thought. Indeed, 
until very recently it has generally been assumed that 
Hobbes was as much of an atheist as any of his contemporary 
enemies took him to be. 19 The obvious references to 
religious and theological ideas in Leviathan and his 
other works were taken to be either insincere efforts 
to avoid censure or elaborate efforts at reductio ad 
20 
absurdum. Fortunately, the details of Hobbes' 
religious beliefs and their undoubted significance 
for his political thought are now being established. 21 
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Hobbes consistently and repeatedly stated that religious 
dissent was the major cause of civil strife and, in 
particular, the main cause of the English civil wars. 22 
In view of his protracted efforts to establish the 
safest grounds of government in his various political 
treatises we should expect to find much of his time 
spent dealing with the means to establish the true Church. 
This is indeed the case. With every new version of his 
political philosophy, religion plays an increasingly 
large part and takes up more space. The culmination 
of this, of course, is in Leviathan where half of the 
book deals with religious matters. 23 
In order to understand Hobbes' position on these matters, 
however, it is essential to draw a clear distinction 
between the practical aspects of Church government and 
organisation and the abstract theology of religious 
doctrines. Certainly Hobbes' ideas about the 
organisation of the Church as an institution are dictated 
by his political theories. He takes Anglicanism to its 
logical conclusion, making his absolutist sovereign the 
supreme power in Church as well as state. With regard 
to Church government Hobbes is entirely pragmatic and 
as with his politics advocates a strong authoritarian 
rule which countenances no disobedience. 24 But this 
is very different to his attitudes about theological 
doctrines. With regard to doctrines Hobbes is almost 
entirely fideistic and it is here that the crucial 
difference between him. and White is manifested. 
It should not be forgotten that White too recognised 
the need for practical political commitments with 
regard to Church organisation. Although obviously 
different in detail, there is no difference in approach 
between Hobbes' efforts to establiSh a totally Erastian 
Church, and White's promises to government to set up 
a Blackloist episcopacy concerned only with spiritual 
matters, free from all Papal influence, and answerable 
ID the government. 25 Hobbes and White had totally 
different approaches to theological questions, however. 
White, as we have seen,used philosophy or 'right reason' 
to establish the doctrines of his faith while Hobbes 
certainly repudiated any such efforts. For Hobbes, 
theological beliefs could only be establiShed by 
scripture. His reaction to the debate between . 
Catholic and Protestant was entirely within one of 
the oldest traditions of Reformation thought: 'controversy 
between the Papist and the reformed Churches could not 
choose but make every man, to the best of his power, 
examine by the Scriptures, which one of them was in 
the right,.26 For Hobbes it was important that we 
should live 'without mingling our religion with points 
of natural philosophy,.27 
If evidence were needed of Hobbes' sincerity on this 
matter then surely Leviathan provides it in abundance. 
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Time and again Hobbes con:} i.ders a particular aspect of 
belief by a thorough analysis of scriptural pronouncements. 
In fact the most instructive example of this, for our 
purposes, is provided by Hobbes' own attempts to 
establish the truth of his own mortalist or psychopannychist 
beliefs. Hobbes' approach can be directly compared wi th 
that of Thomas White, whose careful philosophical analysis 
of the nature of changeability, the state of the disembodied 
soul, and the meaning of eternal torment we have already 
28 
seen. 
In view of Hobbes' own total rejection of the concept of 
incorporeal or disembodied spirits it is hardly surprising 
that he looks forward to a general resurrection in which 
body and soul will be resurrected to be judged and then 
suffer punishment or reward. Similarly, he insists 
that the place of this 'world to come' is simply the 
earth itself, not a coelum empyreum. However, Hobbes, 
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unlike White, never introduces his materialist natural 
philosophy into the discussion. His only concession 
to the notion that philosophy could be relevant occurs 
in a single phrase: 
That the place wherein men axe to live Eternally, 
after the Resurrection is the ••• Caelum empyreum, 
(whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor 
ground in Reason) is not easily to be drawn from 
any text that I can find. 29 
But even here, Hobbes is not giving any rational grounds 
for a paxticulax theologic~ doctrine but is merely 
making a negative point. Elsewhere he explicitly 
denies that there can be any natural immortality of 
the soul but insists that eternal life is only granted 
by God's grace: 
Therefore where Job saith, man riseth not till the 
Heavens be no more; it is all one, as if he had 
said, the Immortal life (and Soule and Life in the 
Scripture do usually signifie the same thing) 
beginneth not in man, till the Resurrection, and 
day of Judgement; and hath for cause, not this 
specificall nature and generation; but the Promise. 
For st. Peter saies not, Wee look for new heavens 30 
and a new eaxth from Nature but from Promise. 
The reasons for this remaxkable difference in approach 
between Hobbes and White are certainly complex and merit 
a careful exposition in themselves. In brief, it should 
be pointed out that Hobbes has no need to go to the 
same lengths as White because he is writing wi thin 
a tradition (albeit a minor one) of Protestant theology. 
Luther himself, for whom Hobbes expresses great admiration 
was a psychOpannychist. 31 Luther denounced the newly 
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establiShed doctrine of the natural immortality of 
the soul (decreed at the fifth Lateran Council in 1513) 
on the grounds that it was inspired by Pagan philosophy 
(principally the newly discovered philosophy of Plato 
as expounded by Ficino and others). His insistence 
that the Scriptural promise of 'eternal life' had 
nothing to do with a concept of the soul led him to 
outline his mortalist belief in the resurrection of 
body and soul together. Hobbes shows himself to be 
influenced by Luther on this, in the passage quoted 
above when he says that soul and life in scripture are 
the same thing. 32 
By contrast White is breaking the traditions of his 
own Church and must, therefore, provide some extra 
backing from philosophy to justifY his departure. 
A second difference between Hobbes and White is the former's 
belief (again reminiscent of Luther) that complex 
philosophical arguments form part of the deceptive 
techniques used by the Roman Church to establiSh the 
'Kingdom of Darknesse' over mankind. 33 
But probably tbe most fundamental difference arises 
from Hobbes' need to allow for authoritarian pronouncement 
about doctrines which could be contradicted if philosophy 
were used to analyse them. 'It must not be thougnt 
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that the articles of faith are LPhilosophic~ 
problems', he says, 'they are laws, and it is 
inequitable for a private individual to interpret them 
otherwise than as they are formula ted' .34 Even during 
his outline of eschatology Hob::es defers his own ideas 
to the ipse dixit of the 'Sovereign Power': 
••• the Kingdom of God is to be on Earth. But 
because this doctrine (though proved out of place 
of Scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear 
to most men a novelty; I do but propound it; 
maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox 
of Religion; but attending the end of that 
dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority, 
(not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) 
by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved, 
or rejected; and whose commands ••• must by all 
men, that mean to be protected by their Laws, 
be obeyed.35 
It should be perfectly clear by now that Hobbes was 
extremely suspicious of any attempts to use natural 
philosophy to establish theological doctrines. In 
view of his extreme anti-Catholic stance, his knowledge 
of White and his Blackloist machinations can only 
have reinforced him in this view. While White took 
pride in the fact that it was impossible to sB3 where 
his divinity ended and his philosophy began,36 Hobbes 
alWB3s kept them separate. That he saw his natural 
philosophy as distinct from his political philosophy 
is clearly implied by the closing words of Leviathan. 
He declares that he can now return to his 'interrupted 
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Speculations of Bodies Naturall' which he believes will 
be less controversial than his speculation about the 
'Artificiall Body' of society because 'such Truth, 
as opposeth no man's profit, nor pleasure is to all 
men welcome,.37 It would seem from this that Hobbes 
regarded natural philosophy as a purely intellectual 
pursuit which was divorced from all scheming for 
profit or pleasure. In view of the foregoing it 
would seem that Hobbes was not in the least bit 
disingenuous when he said this. Natural philosophy, 
therefore, seems to have played little or no part in 
Hobbes' religio-political ideology. 
2. Hobbes and the problem of matter in motion. 
Although Hobbes used his preoccupation with his political 
writings as an excuse for the long delay in producing 
his system of natural philosophy, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that internal difficulties presented 
further hindrances. The final version of De corpore 
did not appear in print until 1655 but there were 
evidently earlier versions of the work in existence over 
ten years before this. Brandt has pointed out that in 
his Ballistica of 1644 Mersenne refers to De motu, 1000 
et tempore by Hobbes and indicates that Chapter 28 
concerns itself with hardness as does Chapter 28 of 
De corpore. 38 Furthermore, Sir Charles Cavendish 
wrote to John Pell at the end of 1644 to say that Hobbes 
was 'nowe putting in order' his philosophy. However, 
Cavendish was quick to add: 'I feare that will take 
a longe time'. 39 We do not know what made Cavendish 
s83 this but he clearly had privileged lmowledge of 
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the problems confronting Hobbes. When he read Hobbes' 
manuscript in the following year his suspicions were 
confirmed and he reported to Pell: 'I doubt it will be 
long ere Mr Hobbes publish anything; so far as I have 
read, I like very well; he proceeds every day somewhat 
but he has a great deal to do' .40 Whatever the state 
of completion of this early version of De corpore in 
1644 we now know that Hobbes had also found time to 
write his lengthy and detailed critique of White's 
De mundo sometime between 1642 and 1644. It can 
hardly be lack of time to write which caused Hobbes' 
delay in going to press. Like Cavendish, Hobbes no 
doubt felt there were various problems which he still 
had. to resolve. Indeed, in a letter written in 1649 
Hobbes admitted that the proofs of certain propositions 
were causing him great difficulties. 41 
We cannot state now with any certainty just what these 
difficulties were: it may well be that there were a 
number of detailed considerations which Hobbes was 
unhappy with. We can be fairly certain, however, 
that at least part of the trouble concerned the 
fundamental assumptions of the new philosophy. Between 
143 
the Little treatise of the 1630s and the De corpore 
Hobbes made major changes in his conceptions of both 
matter and motion, the two fundamentals of the new 
mechanical philosophy. These changes and the delay 
in publication of De corpore clearly testify to 
Hobbes' dissatisfaction with and diffidenae about 
his fundamental principles. 
His changing ideas about the nature of matter, involve 
the concept of extension and the nature of space. I 
have already indicated in Chapter 1 the difficulties 
presented by the concept of space to early modern 
thought and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
study Hobbes' views in detail,42 suffice it to say 
that while Hobbes believes in the possibility of void 
space in the early 16408 by 1655 he is adamant about its 
impossibility. Correspondingly, Hobbes' particulate 
concept of matter gives way to a more continuist outlook. 
For example, it will be remembered that Hobbes interpreted 
the medieval concept of species in a quasi-atomist way 
in his Little treatise. 43 By 1651, however, he dismisses 
the idea that 'the Cause of Sense' is 'an ubiquity of 
Species' as one of the 'absurdities' of natural 
philosophy. 44 The reason for Hobbes' change of mind 
becomes clear in De corpore when we read: 
For as for those that say anything may be moved 
or produced by itself, by species, by its own 
power, by substantial forms, by incorporeal 
substances, by instinct, by anti-peristasis, 
by antipathy, sympathy, occul t guali ty, and 
other empty words of schoolmen, their saying 
so is to no purposc. 45 
The concept of species, Hobbes now recognised did not 
satisfy the demands of strict mechanism. It was 
tantamount torelying on self-activating or active 
matter. There can be little doubt that Hobbes 
arrived at his new position under the influence of 
the strictly mechanistic Descartes, and by way of 
reaction against theRoman Catholic philosophies of 
the 'schoolmen' and probably the Blackloists. 46 
It followed from his rejection of corpuscular species 
that Hobbes was in need of a new theory of light. 
Having dropped the idea of innumerable light particles 
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spreading out from the source, he turned to a mediumistic 
explanation in which light was propagated as a series 
of shocks through a continuous medium. The details 
of this have been superbly expounded by Brandt and we 
need not dwell on them here. 47 Essentially it depends 
on the new concept that a body is said to be luminous 
when it manifests an alternate expansion and contraction 
which sends pulses through the surrounding medium. 
As Brandt points out, Hobbes could see a number of 
advantages in this conception compared to the emanationist 
view. He now has a clear means of explaining why li81 t 
is propagated equally in all directions, and why it 
gets weaker with increa3ed distance from the source. 48 
More importantly, Hobbes can now (so he believes) drop 
his earlier insistence that light travels at finite 
speed and reconcile the concept of local motion with 
instantaneous propagation. Finally, his new theory 
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is not open to the objection that luminous bodies or 
any body which emits species will gradually be consumed. 
The early immaterialist tradition of light metaphysics 
taught that a light source could emanate its effects 
without diminishing itself. Hobbes' translation of 
this emanationist concept into material terms immediately 
raised the objection that the material of the source 
must eventually be totall.y dispersed. 49 
Hobbes stuck to his second theory of light throughout 
the 1640s. He employed it in his critique of White, 
and in his three short optical treatises. 50 Further-
more, in the preface to his Ballistica, Mersenne 
described this new version of Hobbes' light theory 
and even explained how Hobbes used the expansion and 
contraction of the luminous Sun as a cause of the 
Earth's motion. 51 According to Brandt, Mersenne 
took his information about Hobbes' theory of light and 
its role in cosmology from the early draft version of 
the De corpore. 52 However, by the time De corpore 
appeared in print this theory of light has completely 
disappeared, to be replaced by yet another theory. 
Brandt expresses his 'great astonishment,53 at this 
late change in Hobbes' theory but makes no attempt to 
account for it. From the perspective presented here, 
ho' 'ever, the reason is perfectly clear. Hobbes' need 
for a new theory is thoroughly comprehensible if we 
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accept my contention that one of the over-riding concerns 
of the avant-garde theorists of the mechanical philosophy 
was to explain why matter is in motion and what keeps it 
in motion. The earliest answer to these problems, as 
we have seen, was to rely on the traditional notion of 
a self-moving, autodiffusive principle, light. This 
was Hobbes' own solution in the Little treatise. It 
also explains why theories of optics pl~ such a large 
and important role in the early development of the 
mechanical philosophy and ~so adds another dimension 
to Brandt's astute judgement that the Little treatise 
was 'Hobbes' most important work on natural philosophy,.54 
However, Hobbes quickly began to see these ideas as 
'vain philosophy,55 which was lamentably occult in 
comparison with the more rigorously mechanistic 
Cartesian philosophy. Now, although Hobbes' new 
theory of luminosity rejected the notion of auto-
diffusive light and relied on a more mechanistic account 
wi th a number of advantages, it still had one major 
flaw. The perpetual contraction and expansion of a 
body like the Sun still remained to be explained. 
In fact, Hobbes never did find an explanation for this 
perpetual pulsating motion and so he had to produce the 
third explanation which Brandt found so surprising. 
Before considering Hobbes' final version it is worth 
pointing out that this second version was clearly inspired 
by William Harvey's work on the motion of the heart. 
Hobbes describes the pulsation of the Sun in terms of 
systole and diastole, a clear sign that he is thinking of 
an analogy with the heart. 56 Hobbes was, therefore, 
inverting Harvey's own analogy in De motu cordis between 
the sun and the heart, 'the Sun of the Microcosm,.51 
Hobbes' second theory of light, then, was not significantly 
better than his first version. Ultimately he was still 
relying on a concept of self-active matter, even if 
this matter was all confined to the Sun (and 
presumably other stars).58 The major inspiration on 
this phase of Hobbes' development, William Harvey, 
was insistent upon the innate activity of the heart 
which had 'in it life, motion and sense,.59 Indeed, 
even Hobbes' notion of the Sun as a pulsating body may 
have been taken directly from Harvey: 
the Sun deserves to be called the heart of the 
world, by whose vertue and pulsati9n, the blood 
is mov'd, perfected, made animate. bO 
It would seem that Hobbes, for a while at least, tried 
to take Harvey literally. 
Hobbes clung to his pulsific theory of luminosity for 
a number of years but he evidently abandoned it sometime 
before 1655. His final, published theory of light 
once again relied upon the perpetual motion of luminous 
bodies but this time the motion was explained in a w~ 
which Hobbes believed to be both strictly mechanical and 
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of a high pedigree. The key to this new explanatory 
system was Hoobes' concept of 'simple circular motion'. 
Frithiof Brandt has pointed out that Hobbes merely 
describes this unique concept in geometrical terms with 
hardly any attempt to expl ain it mechanically. 61 
Nevertheless, we can reconstruct Hobbes' explanation 
quite easily because, as Brandt convincingly shows, 
Hobbes is drawing upon Galileo's doctrineof circular 
, t' 62 lner lao 
There can be no doubt that Hobbes admired Galileo 
more than any other thinker and it is almost certain 
that his belief in a fundwnental circular motion 
comes from Galileo's physics. As Brandt says: 'it 
is to Hobbes as to Galileo a fundamental principle 
that 'by nature' there exist revolvingmotions,.63 
Because of his own previous immersion in the study of 
Galileo, Hobbes seems to assume that no further explanation 
of the 'mechanical ' reality of these simple circular 
t " 64 mo lons lS necessary. Once the motion has been 
initiated it will continue, all Hobbes need do is 
describe the geometry of this motion and the geometrical 
rules for the transmission of this motion to other 
bodies. 65 
Before considering Hobbes' latest theory in more detail 
let us recapitulate the stages in the development of 
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his natural philosophy. In his efforts to describe all 
physical phenomena in terms of matter and motion Hobbes 
first of all relies upon the notion of self-active particles 
of matter flowing ceaselessly from gross bodies. 
Essentially Hobbes is operating here within the tradition 
of light metaphysics, inspired largely by the work of 
Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon and Walter Warner. 
Various considerations lead Hobbes to abandon his 
allegiance to this venerable tradition and to adopt 
instead the vitalist tradition which was contemporaneously 
being forcefully promulgated by William Harvey.66 During 
this phase of his career Hobbes regarded the pulsific 
motion of his 'animated' Sun as the ultimate source of 
all other motions in the universe. 67 Finally, as a 
result of his rivalry with Descartes and his determination 
to match his strict mechanical philosophy, Hobbes abandons 
all trace of self-active movements and regards the motion 
of the Sun to be merely an inertial motion initiated 
by God at the Creation and subsequently causing motion 
throughout the world by transference and transmission. 
What, then, is the nature of this 'simple circular 
motion' displayed by the Sun? 
The simple circular motion, initiated by God and 
continuing in accordance with the principle of circular 
inertia discovered by Galileo, consists of a gyration 
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in a small circle about a particular point. The 
clearest analogy of this motion (which is also made 
to carry some explanatory function) which Hobbes 
provides is that seen in the characteristic motion 
of a sieve in operation. According to Hobbes: 
This as it is the most simple, so it is the most 
frequent of all circular motions; being the same 
which is used by all men when they tuIn anything 
round with their arms, as they do in grinding or 
sifting. 68 
The Sun's light, as in the pulsation theory, is 
transmitted through the ambient medium but not 
simultaneously on all sides. (See figs. 4 and 5). 
The shock wave of light, as it were, is transmitted 
all around in the different directions successively, 
as the Sun's rapid gyratory motion takes it first one 
way and then another. By the same means the whole 
of the surrounding 'air' is stirred by the Sun's motion 
and given its own'seethine' motion. 69 This motion 
or 'fermentation' of the air can now be used to account 
for various other phenomena including not only obvious 
corollaries such as winds, but also heat, cold and 
even hardness and softness. 70 Hardness, for example, 
can be caused by a rapid simple circular motion of the 
small particles of the body, so that 'greater and less 
degree of hardness depends upon the quantity and 
velocity of those small bodies, and upon the narrowness 
71 
of the place both together'. It is interesting to 
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Fig. 4 shows the Sun dilatin~~ and contracting about a fixed 
centre, C, and so generatine pulses of light (shown as arrows) 
simultaneouslY on all sides. 
Fig. 5 shows the Sun in three successive positions as its 
centre moves in 11 small circ Ie arolmd the point C. The points 
A,B and D show the successiva posItions ot the centre of the 
Sun as it moves. Pulses of light are given otf in a correspond-
ingly successive rn~hton -mel ~ si!llultaneously on all sides. 
'rho gyrat t:>n of the Sun is L~) rnpid th~t the stacc'lto natllre 
of the light p'llnes is lndi~:!ernible. 
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note that Hobbes has used here a hypothesis that he 
had evidently arrived at by 1648, since Cavendish 
wrote to Pell in that year and told of a dispute about 
hardness between Hobbes and Descartes: 
Mr Hobbes conceiving the cause of it to be an 
ext ream quick motion of the atomes or minute 
partes of a bodie which hinders an other bodie 
from entering and Mr de Cartes conceived it a 
close joining of the partes at rest, which appeares 
to me more reasonable. 72 
Cavendish's scepticism about Hobbes' explanation may 
help to explain Cavendish's earlier suspicions that 
Hobbes had a long way to go before perfecting his 
system. Whatever Cavendish may have thought, 
however, Hobbes' theory of hardness can be seen as 
an excellent example of what Brandt sees as Hobbes' 
doctrine 'by which even the static is made kinetic,.73 
This in turn shows how deeply Hobbes was committed to 
the rubric of the mechanical philosophy; to explain 
all things in terms of matterin motion. 
It is not necessary to go any further into the details 
of Hobbes' system. As 3randt saystbehind all of 
Hobbes' physical hypotheses 'the simple circular 
motion in the full world occupies the principal 
place,.74 And the reason for this is that it is 
regarded by Hobbes as his guarantee of a motive 
principle: circular motion will continue indefinitely, 
as he believed Galileo had convincingly shown. 
Unfortunately for Hobbes not everyone was quite so 
steeped in Galilean mechanics as he. 
Hobbes published his system the concept of circular 
inertia had long been superseded by the concept of 
rectilinear inertia. Indeed, Hobbes himself refers 
to rectilinear inertia in De corpore but, as Brandt 
was dismayed to realise, it is clear that Hobbes had 
no real conception of its importance, and fails to 
notice its incompatibility with circular inertia. 75 
As a result, the strictness of Hobbes' mechanistic 
system went unrecognised. In fact Hobbes' system 
was dismissed because he was believed to have held 
'this regular motion of each atom' - the simple 
circular motion - to be 'naturae suae congenitus,.76 
Robert Boyle's refutation of Hobbes' concept of simple 
circular motion is especially interesting because it 
reveals how much other contemporary philosophers had 
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to rely upon innate motions in their matter. Assuming, 
as Boyle did, that the motion of Hobbes' particles was 
innate then Hobbes' system has no advantage over that 
of the Gassendists. So, if we accept Hobbes' innate 
motions then we must ask: 
whether or no Gassendus, and those other Atomists 
that admit creation, ~ not hence countenance 
their grand supposition of the congenite motion 
of atoms, which granted, would destroy the best 
part of Mr Hobbes' philosophy.77 
Boyle himself, at this time, was struggling to explain 
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the 'spring of the air and, as we shall see, his most 
favoured explanation seemed to rely on inherent motion. 78 
Once again, therefore, Boyle is able to point out that 
if Hobbes can assume inherent motions of particles so 
can he: 
Those likewise, that fancy a spring properly so 
called in particular ~erial corpuscles, will 
hence perhaps take occasion to think they may 
suppose an ingenite motion fit for their turn, 
as. well as he an ingenite motus circularis 
simpl.ex •••• But whatever becomes of this 
motus circularis simplex, I need not be much 
sollicitous, having formerly shewn, that the 
admission of it would not disprove what I have 
delivered concerning the spring of the air. 79 
The fact that Boyle has failed to realise the strictly 
mechanical nature of Hobbes' system is brought out in 
the comparison of Hobbes with Descartes: 
the Cartesians will think it at least as allowable 
for them to. suppose the motion he will not grant 
in their materia subtilis, as for Mr Hobbes to 
assume it in his particulae terreae; especially 
since he seems to make each such atom put into 
and kept in a regular motion; whereas they 
assume but the having of one general impulse 
given to the whole mass of matter •••• How 
well likewise his hypothesis will agree with his 
fundamental doctrine, that Nihil movetur nisi 
a corpore contiguo & motu: 'Nothing is moved 
but by a contiguous bod.v tha. t is in motion': I 
leave him to consider. SO 
A closer reading of De corpore would have revealed to 
Boyle that, like the Cartesians, Hobbes only invoked 
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God to give one initial impetus to the central body 
of the world; from then on the simple circular motions 
of all other bodies were established fully in accordance 
with Hobbes' law of motion. 81 
It is important to note that Boyle's rejection of Hobbes' 
philosophy does not stem from the fact that Hobbes relies 
on the inherent motions of matter. Boyle merely points 
out that this gives Hobbes' system no advantage over 
alternative systems. Furthennore, as the particular 
kind of inherent motion which Hobbes attributes to 
matter seems implausible on a number of grounds and 
there is no 'unquestionable example or experiment' 
h o h I h to 82 w. 1C revea s suc mo 10ns, Boyle concludes that 
Hobbes' system carried too many disadvantages compared 
to alternative systems. 
The real reason behind Boyle's rejection is Hobbes' 
unfortunate reputation as an atheist. Ironically, 
" Hobbes' atheism is suCh an idee fixe with Boyle that 
he dismisses Hobbes' invocations of God in the De 
corpore as disdngenuous: 
for philosophers that are known to wish very well 
to religion, andto have done it good service, have 
been very shy of having recourse, as he has, to 8 
creation, for the explaining of particular phenomena. 3 
Boyle makes the major reason for his refutation of Hobbes 
perfectly explicit in the Preface to his Examen of Mr 
T. Hobbes: 
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It was also suggested to me, thatthe dangerous 
opinions about some important, if not fundamental, 
articles of religion, I had met with in his 
Leviathan, and some other of his writings, having 
made but too great impressions upon divers persons 
(who, though said to be for the mostpart either 
of greater quality, or of greater wit than learning, 
do yet divers of them deserve better principles) 
these errors being chiefly recommended by the 
opinion they had of Mr Hobbes' demonstrative way 
of philosophy;84 it might possibly prove some 
service to higher truths than those in controversy 
between him and me, to shew, that in the Physics 
themselves, his opinions, and even his ratiocinations, 
have no such great advantage over these, of some 
orthodox Christian Naturalists. 85 
We have already seen that Hobbes' reputation for atheism 
was (and to a large extent remains) based upon misconceptions 
of his arguments. 86 And we have now observed that Boyle's 
rejection of his principle of motion was also somewhat 
misconceived. Whatever the justice or injustice of 
these matters, the fact remains that Hobbes' natural 
philosophy - the only determined effort to construct 
a mechanical philosophy equivalent in its strictness 
to that of Descartes87 - was a failure. 
2. Hobbes, Descartes and the early development of 
the mechanical philosophy. 
I said at the beginning of this chapter that Hobbes 
developed his mechanical philosophy not only under the 
shadow of Thomas White, during his detailed refutation 
of the priest's De mundo, but also as a reaction to 
many aspects of Descartes' philosophy. Indeed, it is 
quite obvious that Hobbes saw Descartes (rather than 
White) as his main rival ~nd these feelings were to 
a large extent reciprocated. Here again, Brandt has 
uncovered the biographical background to the rancour 
bet-,'leen the two men and has roIlsidered most of the 
technical disputes about points of detail which were 
used in their battles. 88 In this section I wish to 
supplement Brandt's comparison between these two 
leading exponents of mechanical philosophy by bringing 
to light a number of important features which have not 
been noticed, either by Brandt or anyone else. 
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We have shown that there is a clear progression in Hobbes' 
natural philosophy from an atomistic system heavily dependent 
on self-moved particles of light, which are ultimately 
derived from the tradition of light metaphysics, to a 
more rigorous mechanistic philosophy in which self-
movers have been replaced by a concept of passive matter 
having inertial motions ~ontinuing indefinitely after 
initiation by God. There is ample evidence to ~~ggest 
that Descartes' own philosophy, in spite of appearances, 
developed in a strikingly parallel way. 
The most immediately obvious suggestion of the metaphysical 
importance of light in De~cartes' system is provided by 
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the sub-title of his first work on natural philosophy. 
Le monde bears the alternative title: Trait~ de la 
lumi~re. Descartes himself frequently referred to 
Le monde simply as the treatise 'on light~ Consider, 
for example, his clear statement in a letter to Father 
Vatier (February 22, 1638): 
, 
'Ie traite qui contient tout Ie cors /Sic: corps17 
de rna Physique porte Ie nom de la Lumi~re,.89 
Descartes' explanation of light in tenns of mechanical 
principles was the starting point for his whole unified 
mechanical system of nature. The most recent and most 
detailed study of Descartes' natural philosophy refers 
to Le monde as Descartes' 'light cosmology' and argues 
that 'in Le monde the micro-mechanical theory of light 
became the conceptual kernel from which sprang a mechanical 
philosophy of nature concfJived on a cosmic scale, and 
the principles which lay behind his theory of light 
emerged there with the status of -laws of nature-,.90 
However, it is easy to see that already in Le monde, 
Descartes' explanation of light is entirely mechanistic, 
rather like Hobbes' explanation in De corpore. There 
is no conception of light as formed of self-moving 
corpuscular species which we have taken to be 
characteristic of the seventeenth-century version of 
light metaphysics. Even Descartes' earliest explanations 
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of light explain it in tenus of a pressure wave 
through the medium of his aether. 91 It would seem 
that, among the earliest exponents of a mechanical 
philosophy, \'lamer, Hobbes, Digby, White and Descartes, 
only the Frenchman was advanced enough in his thinking 
to leap straight to a bonQ fide mechanist explanation 
without passing through an earlier stage dependent on 
light metaphysical principles. Drawing heavily upon 
the meticulous researches of John Schuster, however, 
I believe it is possible to indicate that Descartes' 
appearance in this regard is merely a twist of fate 
and that, in reality, whatever his own writings may 
suggest, Descartes did pass through an earlier phase 
of thought similar to that of Warner, Hobbes, and 
Digby.92 
According to Schuster, Descartes began his career in 
natural philosophy as a mathematician seeking to solve 
various problems in mechanics which had been bequeathed 
by antiquity. At this point, therefore, Descartes 
was not a system builder but was part of the new 
tradition of philosophy dealing in a piecemeal way 
with various problems, rather like Galileo and Thomas 
Harriot. 93 His initiation to the mechanistic vision 
of the world was provided by the Dutchman, Isaac 
BeeCkman (1588-1637). Beeckman was very much Descartes' 
mentor durine his first stay in Holland from 1618 to 1620, 
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and Beeckman was one of the earliest thinkers to 
recognise the heuristic value of atomism for explaining 
various problems which proved difficult for Aristotelian 
philosophy. After a period of absence from Holland, 
Descartes re-established contact with Beeckman in the 
autumn of 1628. It is this second period of close 
contact between the two men that is crucial to our 
argument. We know that Descartes had access to 
Beeckman's Journal and the entries for that journal, 
between July 1628 and June 1629.reveal that Beeckman 
was absorbed in some extremely significant speculation. 
The background to these speculations was a thorough 
examination of the works of Kepler and a desire to 
establish a restitutio astronomiae on which Beeckman 
could provide not simply a mathematical description of 
heavenly motions but a mechanical explanation of those 
motions. 94 In a series of different hypotheses proposed 
by Beeckman to account for the constancy of planetary 
distances from the sun, light plays an important 
heuristic role. 
Beeckrnan's first effort along these lines is to explain 
'why the moon does not fall to the earth': 
Let the rays of the sun reflected from the 
earth have a power of attracting the moon, but 
let the earth itself have a power of repulsion ••• 
so now I say that the rays of the sun reflected 
from the earth retain their power much further 
/diutius7 then the rays of the earth itself; 
since they come there from a more remote place; 
and for this reason: there is a scanty proportion 
between the distance from the sun to the earth 
and the earth to the moon and the distance merely 
from the sun to the earth. Therefore, the sun's 
rays have as much virtue near the moon where it 
is now, as it would if it were next to the earth. 
However, the earth has much more power near to 
itself than near the moon, where it now is, 
because there is a very great proportion between 
the distance from the earth to the moon, where 
it is now, and the distance from the earth to 
the moon should it be next to the summits of the 
Learth'il mountains. Therefore, the earth 
strongly repells the moon when it is near; 
but this force disappears gradually as it flows 
away from the earth. In this way the moon can 
neither recede further from the earth nor approach 
closer to it. 95 
In a later entry Beeckman extends this idea to account 
for the steady orbital distances of all the planets 
(including the earth) from the sun. In this case he 
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invokes light from the stars as well as sunlight in his 
explanation: 'the light or corporeal virtue of the 
eighth heaven reflected from the sun draws all the 
planets to it Lthe s~, but the sun repells from 
itself' .96 
Subsequently the Dutchman drops the notion of a power 
or virtue from the stars reflected by the sun and 
proposes instead that the sun has a magnetic attractive 
virtue. This attractive force, however, operates in 
opposition to a repulsive force brought about by the 
constant stream of particles of light and heat which 
are emitted by the sun. 97 This marks a significant 
advance in his argument. His first speculation 
is clearly occult because he can give no satisfactory 
account of why reflected light attracts and direct 
illumination repells. Although this new hypothesis 
relies on the occult power of magnetism this can be 
defended up to a point on grounds of experience. 98 
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The repulsive power of emitted light and heat particles 
presents no problem at all as it is based fi~ly on a 
mechanical analogy, and is immediately comprehensible. 
Beeckman quiCkly manages to improve his hypothesis even 
further by doing away with occult magnetism. He simply 
argues thatthe stars give off emanations which push the 
planets to the centre while the pressure of light and 
heat given-off by the sun pushes them out from the 
centre. 99 Already, it is easy to see that there are 
a number of parallels here between Beeckman's speculations 
and those we have seen in Warner's papers, Hobbes" 
Little treatise and Digby's Treatise on bogy.100 
Beeckman even gives an atomistic interpretation of 
species in the same way as Hobbes: 'the species of 
things are corporeal fluxions from things', and 'what 
the optical theorists (Optici) call visible species 
b d o ,101 are 0 ~es • 
Perhaps the most significant congruence for the 
development of the mechanical philosophy is to be 
found between Beeckman's Journal and Warner's papers. 
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At the beginning of Beeckman's contemplation of Kepler's 
. . 102 AstronoDlJ.a nova, wri tten in the autumn of 1628, he 
declared: 
I will discuss ~in) these things more accurately 
than him LRepler , on account of the principle 
mentioned in the previous section, Which he did not 
wish to lmow, namely that light et cetera are 
corporeal, but also because he did not lmow what 
is very true: all thin~o once moved, always move 
unless they are impeded. 3 
Wri~ing at roughly the same time (certainly before 1630) 
Warner, in his discussion of causation, insisted: 
If a thing be set in motion or in any state and 
afterwards left by the cause, that motion or 
state whatsoever is it self a sufficient cause 
of his own continuance till it be resisted 
hindred or altered by some contrary ••• 
And again: 
In the alteration from quiet to motion it is manifest 
••• that the state of the patient being, by 
supposition, motion during the application, it doth 
keep and continue the state of motion, without 
interruption after the recesse of the agent, 
eternally unless it be hindred or stopped by a 
contrary force and look in what degree of velocity 
it was at the very instant of the separation of 
the agent, in that state of the same vlbQcity it 
doth continue till the next encounter. 4 
These early statements. of the principle of inertia are 
obviously intimately bound up with the early development 
of the mechanical philosophy and it is significant that 
both men mention it in close connection with the active 
power of light. 105 
It would seem, therefore, that just as Hobbes received 
inspiration from Walter Warner and his theories, so 
Descartes was inspired and influenced by the speculations 
of Isaac Beeckman. Certainly, John Schuster, after a 
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thorough absorption in the writings of both Descartes 
and Beeckman expresses his own conviction that Descartes 
was influenced by these Journal entries. 106 llieonly 
real distinction between Hobbes and Descartes is that 
Hobbes set down on paper a naive, not fully mechanistic 
account of philosophical principlesin his Little treatise, 
while Descartes, as far as we know, was quick witted 
enough to leap-frog beyond this stage. If we bear in 
mind this, admittedly important, distinction the 
essential parallelism can be stated as follows. On 
the one hand Walter Warner develops a natural philosophy 
which relies for its explanatory power on the motion of 
light, Hobbes, recognising that the motion of the light 
itself is ultimately unexplained, gradually develops 
a more rigorous mechanistic account. While on the 
other hand Isaac Beeckman develops a natural philosophy 
which relies for its heuristic on the motion of light 
particles; Descartes, realising that the motion of 
light itself needs to be explained, quickly develops 
. h . t" t 107 a more r~gorous mec ~s lC accoun • 
The parallels do not end there. Just as Hobbes was 
accused of plagiarising from Warner's papers so Descartes 
was accused of plagiarising Beeckman's Journal. These 
accusations came from Beeckman himself and they do 
serve to show that Descartes must have had the opportunity 
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108 to study the Journal closely. In view of Beeckman's 
comparative obscurity today one is inclined to 
sympathise with the strength of Beeckman's feeling 
on this matter. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that 
Descartes has gone far beyond Beeckman in his natural 
philosophical synthesis. Descartes, like Hobbes, must 
have seen (and seen more quickly than Hobbes) the problems 
confronting the materialist version of light metaphysics: 
why was the Slll1 not exhausted? did light travel with 
infinite speed? and so on. 109 
It was Descartes' development of the concept of conatus 
(inclination or endeavour) which enabled him to solve 
these problems and account for light in terms of a 
shock instantaneously transmitted through the plenum. 
Here again there is an undeniable similarity between 
the theories of Descartes and Hobbes. In this case, 
however, it is certainly Descartes who has the more 
rigorous and self-consistent conception of what 
exactly conatus is and what is its role. 
Briefly, Descartes adheres to the notion of rectilinear 
inertia. The fact that the matter in the universe 
moves circularly is merely a consequence of the full-
ness of the universe and the need for a continuous 
110 
circular displacement to allow any movement at all. 
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Because of the crush of ambient JIB tter there is always, 
in effect, a net force on the matter in a vortex towards 
the centre, analogous to the tension in a sling when 
a stone is whirled around before being thrown. Any 
given particle of matter in the vortex, however, has 
a tendency to move tangentially. According to Descartes 
only part of this tangential tendency is counter-acted 
by the force toward the centre (otherwise the body would 
move towards the centre) while another component of the 
tangential tendency manifests itself centrifugally, 
radially outwards from the centre. It is this conatus, 
this centrifugal tendency which causes the sensation 
of light in sentient beings and the other phenomena 
associated with light. There is, therefore, no 
actual transmission of a physical object merely a 
transmission of action, a slight pressure, through 
th d · 111 e me l.um. 
The conception of conatus as it is used by Descartes, 
then, is an integral and indispensable part of his 
mechanical philosophy. Furthermore, as Schuster points 
out, it clearly derives from the mathematical device 
of the parallelogram of forces, and so provides a 
way for Descartes to apply the mathematical analyses 
112 
of statics to kinetic problems. Similarly, 
Frithiof Brandt insists that 'only by means of the 
conatus concept does Hobbes succeed in fully applying 
his doctrine of motion by which even the static is 
167 
made kinetic,.113 However, it should not go unnoticed 
that Hobbes, unlike Descartes, does not need the 
concept of conatus to account for light. As we have 
seen, Hobbes explained light pressure through the medium 
by envisaging a pulsating light source or, later, a 
gyratory light source pushing first one way, then 
th . I· . I 114 ano er success~ve y ~n a c~rc e. If we bear this 
in mind it makes Hobbes' adaption of the principle of 
conatus a rather more ad hoc affair than it is for 
Descartes. 
The ad hoc nature of conatus in Hobbes' philosophy seems 
to be verified even by the nature of its first appearance 
in De corpore. It only appears in Part III and is 
introduced at the end of a recapitulation of eleven 
principles of motion Which have been mentioned earlier 
in the work. Furthermore it is introduced out of the 
blue, so to speak, and simply defined rather than 
developed as the result of an argument, as is the case 
with Descartes' conatus. 115 MOreover, as Brandt 
recognises, the earliest use of conatus by Hobbes was 
as an analogy between appetite and impulse in motion. 
In chapter 7 of the Elements of Law, for example, Hobbes 
declares: 
This motion, in Which consisteth pleasure or 
pain, is also a solicitation or provocation 
either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, 
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or to retire from the thing that displeaseth. 
And this solicitation is the endeavour or internal 
beginning of animal motion, which when the object 
delighteth, is called APPETITE; when it displeaseth, 
it is called AVERSION •••• 116 
Hobbes, even in his later, more rigorously mechanistic 
phase never manages to fully dissociate his concept of 
conatus from these animistic beginnings. This is 
underscored later in De corpore when a discussion of 
conatus leads Hobbes into saying: 'To what has been 
said of motion, I will add what I have to say concerning 
habit' • In spite of careful definitions to the effect 
that 'Habit ••• is a generation of motion, not of 
motion simply, but an easy conducting of the moved 
body in a certain and designed waY',117 the reader 
is left in little doubt that Hobbes' mechanism is 
tainted here by animism. 
It rather seems to this interpreter, then, that Hobbes' 
use of the concept of conatus was adopted in large 
measure from the work of Descartes. While Hobbes 
was perfectly capable of recognising its usefulness 
for explaining some static phenomena in kinetic terms 
(such as weight118) he never recognised just how 
intimately and how elegantly it was bound up with 
what Schuster calls Descartes' 'light cosmology'. 
Had he done so he might have embraced it more whole-
heartedly and abandoned his own cumbersome device: 
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the gyrations of the 'simple circular motion'. 
If Hobbes' inadequate understanding of the concept 
of conatus must count against him in any comparison 
with Descartes, there is one aspect of Hobbes' system 
which must be counted as an advantage over the 
Cartesian system. Descartes theory of planetary motions, 
as E.J. Aiton has shown, took no account of Kepler's 
astronomical work. By contrast, Hobbes managed to 
provide a mechanistic account in support of Kepler's 
elliptical orbits. It is worth considering Hobbes' 
argumentation here because, as far as I know, nobody 
has commented upon it before. Furthermore it provides 
an excellent example of Hobbes' method as it was applied 
to one of the major considerations for the new philosophy: 
how to account for planetary motions. Before examining 
Hobbes' argument we should remind ourselves of the 
Cartesian position. 
There are a number of places in the Principles and 
elsewhere in which Descartes points out that 'les 
mouvements des Cieux ne sont pas parfaitement circulaires,.119 
There are even one or two places where he refers to the 
th f f II " 120 orbit of the Moon as having e orm 0 an e ~pse. 
However, these comments cannot be taken to be an 
attempt to accommodate Y.epler's first law of planetary 
motion within the Cartesian system. This can be 
seen by considering a letter whiCh Descartes wrote 
in 1648 or 1649 to an anonymous correspondent. Here 
Descartes explains that: 
I have not described in my Principles all the 
motions of each planet, but I have supposed in 
general all those that the observers have found 
and I have attempted to explain the causes ••• 121 
The motions that 'observe:r:~ have found' which lead him 
to suppose that the planets do not move in perfect 
circles show no knowledge of Kepler's astronomy. The 
planets, Descartes points out: 
deviate irregularly from the regular circle that 
one imagines they should describe ••• so that 
dive~s Apogees or Aphelions, and Perihelio~s or 
Perigees have been attributed to them •••• 22 
The designation 'elliptical' is only applied to the 
MOon's orbit and yet any suggestion of Keplerian 
influence is belied by the fact that theEarth is 
said to occupy the centre of the orbit. It would 
seem that Aiton's judgement is correct: there is no 
evidence that Descartes even knew of Kepler's law.123 
We now turn to Hobbes. 
No sooner does Hobbes introduce his concept of simple 
circular motion than he goes on to insist that' such 
things as are moved with simple circular motion, 
t . I . It· ,1 24 bege s~mp e c~rcu ar mo lon • This transmission 
of the simple motion only occurs, of course, through 
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a material medium. Hobbes follows up this geometrical 
111 
proof with a rather more interesting one. He introduces 
it like this: 
If in a fluid medium, whose parts are stirred 
by a body moved with simple lCircul~ motion, 
there float another body, which hath superficies 
either wholly hard, or wholly fluid, the parts of 
this boqy shall approach the centre equally on 
all sides; that is to say, the motion of the 
body shall be circular, and concentric with the 
motion of the movent. But if it have one side 
hard and the other fluid, then both those motions 
shall not have the same centre, nor shall the 
floating body be moved in the circumference of 
a perfect circle. 125 
Hobbes demonstrates this by supposing a spherical body 
consisting of a solid hemisphere and a (fairly tenacious 
or Viscous) fluid hemisphere which is separated from 
a solid sphere by a fluid medium. Now as the solid 
body moves with a simple circular motion the surrounding 
medium will pick up this motion and begin to 'seethe' 
so that all its parts 'do continually change their 
places'. 126 Now, if we consider the heterogenous body 
to have its liquid hemisphere turned towards the 
rotating body then the small parts of the liquid at the 
surface must 'enter into the places of the small parts 
of the medium which are contiguous to them' (on the 
principle of fuga vacui). Because the liquid is 
tenacious, however, it will not break up but will 
bulge out to fill the spaces in the medium without 
undergoing any gross change of place. If the solid 
hemisphere is turned towards the rotating body, however, 
then: 
By reason ••• of the :"3aid change of place of 
the parts [Of the mediu:i! which are oontiguous 
to it, the hard superficies must, of necessity, 
seeing by supposition there is no empty_~ace, 
either come nearer to A Lthe central bo~, or 
else its smallest parts must supply the contiguous 
places of the medium, which otherwise could be 
empty. But this cannot be, by reason of the 
supposed hardness; and therefore the other 
must needs bLte namely, that the body come 
nearer to A the centre7. 127 
-
It only remains for Hobbes to point out that any 
such body rotating around another will not always 
keep one side to the central body and so 'it is 
sometimes near, sometimes further off from the centre' 
and is not, therefore, carried in a perfect circle. 
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Later Hobbes seeks to explain 'the eccentricity of the 
annual motion of the earth': 
When the earth is in the beginning of Capricorn 
••• , the sun appears in the be~ of Cancer ••• ; 
and then is the midst of summer. But in the midst 
of summer, the northern parts of the earth are 
towards the sun, which is almost all dry land, 
containing all Europe and much the greatest part 
of Asia and America. But when the Earth is in 
the beginning of Cancer ••• , she is in the midst 
of winter, and that part of the earth is towards 
the sun, which contains those great seas called 
the South Sea and the Indian Sea ~ich are of 
far greater extent than all the dry land in that 
hemisphere. Wherefore by the last article ••• 
when the earth is in [CanceiJ, it will come 
nearer to its first movement, that is to the sun 
••• that is to say, the earth is nearer to the 
sun in the midst of winter ••• than in the midst 
of sunnner. 128 
Hobbes makes it perfectly explicit that he is in agreement 
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wi th Kepler on this matter and claims to have eJeplained 
why the motion of the Earth is not a perfect circle 
'but either an elliptical, or almost an elliptical 
1 . ,129 me • Nevertheless, this argument, ingenious 
though it was, was insufficient to win converts to 
Hobbes' system. As we said at the end of the previous 
section, as far as Hobbes' contemporaries were concerned, 
his system was a failure. 
So far we have been considering what may be called the 
'home-grown' versions of the new philosophy in seventeenth-
century England. While these efforts are extremely 
important in their own ri ch tit has to be admitted 
that they failed to win over large numbers of philosophical. 
converts. Warner never satisfactorily completed his 
system and it remained largely :m.seen amongst his other 
130 papers. Digby and White attracted some attention 
during the Interregnum but as Catholics, known to be 
engaged in various political efforts on behalf of 
recusants, their philosophy would be unlikely to win 
fUll acclaim even from readers unaware of its ideological 
intentions. Ironically , although Hobbes' philosophy 
~ innocent of any extra-scientific designs it was not 
regarded that way. Hobbes' materialism was seen as 
an elaborate argument for atheism and was therefore 
even more insidious than Blackloism. 131 Even so, 
the new philosophy did spread and the effort to 
explain all phenomena in terms of matter and motion 
became the new orthodo:xy in natural philosophy. The 
major influence, therefore, must have come from the 
Continent where Descartes and Gassendi were engaged 
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on expounding different versions of this new philosophy. 
We turn now to see how each of these were popularised 
in England. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE :&STABLISHMENT OF THE MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY: 
HENRY MJRE ANTI WALTER CHARLEroN 
In this chapter I hope to show that the two single 
most important thinkers responsible for the 
popularisation of the mechanical philosophy in its 
early stages in England were Henry More (1614-1687) 
and Walter Charleton (1619-1707). The former was 
one of the earliest and one of the most forceful 
advocates on behalf of Descartes (1596-1650) while 
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the latter was the leading English proselyte of Pierre 
Gassendi (1592-1655). Neither More nor Charleton 
are remembered today as leading contributors to the 
progress of science1 and there can be little doubt 
that they both regarded the mechanical philosophy 
as a crucial means of settling the religious disputes 
of mid-century England. Accordingly, the first section 
of the chapter will consider this aspect of their 
natural philosophical endeavours. 
More's espousal of Cartesianism in order to promote 
his own kind of liberal Anglicanism has attracted much 
scholarly attention and is now well-known. 2 However, 
the full extent of the Cartesian influence upon More's 
concept of the soul and his eschatological beliefs 
has never been recognised. By providing a brief survey 
of these matters here I hope to supplement the work 
of earlier scholars in this field andalso to provide 
evidence, further to that presented in Chapter 3, of 
the close links between the mechanical philosophy and 
seventeenth-century eschatological concerns. 
The ideological intentions underlying Charleton's 
work is not so well-known and I will try to establish 
them in a brief survey of his early writings. I will 
then try to show that Charleton's approach to the 
ideological use of natural philosophy was more likely 
to have been influential upon his contemporaries than 
the approach of Henry More, which was liable to seem 
dangerously counter-productive. My argument will, I 
hope, provide extra force to the conclusion of Richard 
Popkin, Henry van Leeuwen and others that one of the 
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most important responses to the 'crisis of European 
thought,3 wc.s the development of the position of 'mitigated 
scepticism' • 4 A cautious incredulity was regarded by 
the orthodox intelligentsia as the only safe response 
to the dogmatism of Roman Catholics and fanatical or 
'enthusiastic' Protestant sects. All dogmatic positions 
in intellectual debates wore thought to be open to 
distortion and abuse by these subversive elements in 
English society and thus became discredited in the 
eyes of the orthodoxy. The mitigated sceptical approach 
was developed primarily by Mersenne and Gassendi, as 
Popkin has shown,5 and was first applied in English 
natural philosophy, I contend, by Walter Charleton. 
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Henry MOre, by contrast, was as dogmatic as any 'enthusiast' 
in his early philosophical writings and only realised 
the dangers of this approach in the early years of the 
Restoration era. Ultimately, it was Charleton's 
probabilist philosophy of science which held sway in 
6 late seventeenth-century England. 
Sections 2 and 3 deal respectively with More's and 
Cha~leton's responses to the problem of activity in 
matter theory. My task here is straightforward since 
each man is perfectly explicit about his reliance on ' 
an active principle. More's superimposition of a 
'hylarchic' principle onto Cartesian mechanics has 
been closely studied by historians and much of it needs 
no repeating. 7 I will merely point out one or two 
unnoticed aspects of More's 'spirit of nature' to 
underscore the main thrust of my thesis. In particular 
I hope to show that More was influenced to some extent 
by light metaphysical traditions. Furthermore, I 
believe there are indications that MOre's adaptions 
to the Cartesian system did not simply stem from his 
religious concerns but that he, no less than other 
mechanical philosophers in England, recognised 
inadequacies in the natural philosophy of Descartes. 
In Charleton's case I will simply point out his belief 
in active matter. We do not have to search far for 
the evidence for this. Nevertheless, it is not 
something that it is well-known about Charleton or 
about Gassendist philosophy in general. It is' 
important for us to spend some time, therefore, in 
establishing what Robert Boyle calls the Gassendists' 
'grand supposition of the congenite motion of atoms,.8 
1. Henry More, Walter Charleton and the Anglican 
origins of modern science. 
Both Henry MOre and Walter Charleton turned to the 
mechanical philosophy in their published writings as 
a means of settling the religious disputes of mid-
century England. 9 They can be seen, therefore, as 
following the precedent established in England by 
Digby and White. Like them, More and Charleton 
firmly believed that natural philosophy could be 
invoked to establish or to bolster religious doctrines 
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and to convert atheists and heretics to the true faith. 
Furthermore, their separate enterprises were more 
likely to succeed than that of the Blackloists because 
they were Protestant and not Catholic. Even so, 
it should be remarked, their task was not an easy one 
since they were both arguing for Anglicanism at a time 
when the Church of England was proscribed by the 
rebel government. In spite of these similarities 
there are very important differences between the two 
men. They were working almost entirely independently 
of one another. MOre waG devoted to Cartesianism 
while Charleton, who spent some time in Paris as a 
member of Mersenne's circle, entered the lists as a 
champion for Gassendi. As a result they each played 
the predominant role in popularising their respective 
mentor's work in England. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of More's influence 
179 
is the fact that Cartesianism made much greater headway 
in Cambridge than it did in Oxford. 10 One of MOre's 
disciples, Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680) 'lamented that 
his friends did not first send him to Cambridge, 
because ••• that new philosophy and art of philosophizing 
were there more than here in Oxon,.11 While another 
disciple, John Hall, a fellow of St. John's went so 
far as to suggest reform of the Universities to bring 
them in line with Cartesian principles. 12 Alongside 
MOre's pedagogical influence was the influence of his 
writings. Between 1648 when More first became 
acquainted with Descartes' writings (and, indeed, 
Descartes himself), and 1662 when he wrote an extensive 
defense of Cartesianism to his correspondent known 
only as 'V.C.', there can be no doubting MOre's 
admiration for Descartes. 13 In a letter to Samuel 
Hartl1b (d. 1670?) in 1648 More insisted that 'all that 
have attempted anything in naturall Philosophy hitherto 
are mere shrimps and fumblers in comparison of him' 
14 
and that Descartes was 'the very Miracle of the world'. 
Walter Charleton, on the other hand, reserves most of 
his praise for Gassendi. In the 'Preparatory 
Advertisement to the Reader' which prefaces The Darknes 
of Atheism15 he admits to being under the influence of 
Descartes and others but 'chiefly of Gassendus (in 
Animadvers. in phys. Epicu r'i. ) the leaves of whose most 
learned Works, we blush not to confesse our selves to 
have been so conversant in, that we have sulleyed them 
by often revolution'. 16 Charleton's most important 
contribution to the spread of Gassendism, however, 
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was undoubtedly the fact that he provided a translation 
and close paraphrase in English of the natural philosophical 
part of Gassendi's Animadversiones as his Physiologia 
Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana. 17 Here again, thanks 
to the work of other scholars it has now been well 
established that Charleton's Physiologia was an 
important influence upon Robert Boyle and the young 
18 Isaac Newton. 
Henry More is entirely explicit about declaring the 
reasons for his interest in Descartes' philosophy. 
As a leading member of the so-called Cambridge Platonists 
he wholeheartedly endorses the Platonic emphasis on 
the unity of knowledge, whatever the source might be. 19 
Because he believed that 'no revelation is from God 
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that is repugnant to sense righly circumstantiated', 
More insisted: 
I can ex animo avow to all the world that there is 
no real clashing at all betwixt any genuine point 
of Christianity and what true philosophy and right 
reason does determine or allow, but that ••• 
there is a perpetual peace and agreement betwixt 
truth and truth ••• and that they are blind 
superstitionists or superficiary philophasters that 
imagine any such digladation betwixt true philosophy 
and real Christianity.20 
The Cartesian philosophy, then, was to play the role of 
confirming by 'right reason' the 'real Christianity' 
which was evident to More: 
there is no other philosophy, unless one except 
the Platonic, which combats the atheists so 
strongly down to the foundations of their stronghold 
and which destroys their dwellings so happily as 
the Cartesian philosophy if properly understood. 21 
It was by means of the Cartesian philosophy that 'such 
as are intended to serve the Church will be armed betimes 
with sufficient strangth to grapple with their proudest 
22 Deriders or Opposers'. And it is precisely for this 
reason that More's major philosophical works repeatedly 
, 
expound upon or refer to the work of Rene Descartes. 
In his Antidote against atheism,23 for example, More 
endeavoured to prove the existence of God by three 
different kinds of argument. The first two of these 
were clearly derived from Descartes. In Book I he 
adapted Descartes ontological argument based on the 
idea of 'a Being absolutely perfect', which must 
182 
necessarily exist. Book II sought to establish 
God's existence by the argument from design using 
many of the designs of Descartes if not strictly 
those to be found actually in Nature. The third book 
was More's own contribution: being an examination of 
what would now be called 'paranormal' phenomena but 
which MOre referred to as 'supernatural,.24 Similarly, 
in the 'Philosophick part of Conjectura cabbalistica, 
More attempted to show that the ancient Pythagorean 
philosophy which gave rise to Platonism was derived from 
the Jewish traditions of the Mosaical philosophy and, 
most importantly, it was tantamount to Cartesianism. 25 
But perhaps the most significant work along these 
lines is More's examination of The immortality of the 
26 
soul. 
We have already seen how important the nature of the 
soul and its state after the death of the body were in 
seventeenth-century thought. Mortalism was an 
increasingly popular heresy, intimately bound up with 
the major differences betwe"en Catholic and Protestant, 
and which also seemed, for orthodox thinkers at least, 
1:> have implications of atheism. 27 When More wrote 
his treatise on the soul in 1659 Digby's attempt to 
use the new natural philosophy to settle disputes 
about the nature of the soul was well-lmown, and 
Hobbes had made his mortalism explicit in the hated 
Leviathan. 28 More's work was undoubtedly written 
in response to these works as well as in response 
to the gerleral threat of atheism which More recognised 
all around him. 29 
The immortality of the soul consists of three books. 
The first attempts to establish the existence of 
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'spiritual' or incorporeal entities and to define their 
nature and principal characteristics. At the end of 
the first book More declares: 
we have demonstrated beyond all Evasion, from 
the Phaenomena of the Universe. That of 
necessity there must be such a thing in the 
world as Incorporeal Substance; let inconsiderable 
philosophasters hoot at it, and deride it as much 
as their Follies plea0e.30 
The second book sets out to establish that the human 
soul is just such a 'Spirit or Immaterial Substance in 
Man', and proceeds to establish in some detail the 
nature of this Spirit and its relationship to the 
individual man. In the third and final book More 
turns to 'the state of the soul after Death,.31 
The details of Mpre's pneumatology, as far as I know, 
have not received close scrutiny even from historians 
of religion. It seems to me, however, that these 
aspects are of the utmost importance forunderstanding 
More's reaction to and use of the Cartesian philosophy. 
In particular I believe it will suggest that the current 
interpretation of More's '~)pirit of Nature' - his 
hylarchic principle - may well be somewhat misleading. 32 
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MOre's 'Spirit of Nature' is usually regarded as an 
incorporeal or immaterial entity which is basically 
inimical to the demands of the mechanical philosophy. 
More's insistence upon the necessity of this hylarchic 
principle is therefore regarded as a theological 
imposition upon the mechanical philosophy. I believe 
that the spirit of nature is, however, by no means as 
immaterial or incorporeal as we might suppose if we 
take More's talk of 'Incorporeal' and 'Immaterial 
Substance' at their face value. Indeed, it seems to 
me that the very notion of incorporeality is used in 
a highly paradoxical way by More. This is best 
brought out by a study of More's doctrines on the 
immortal soul. 
It is now well-known, thanks to the work of Burtt and 
, 
Koyre, that More extended Descartes' category of ~ 
extensa to include spiritual entities, including souls 
(which Descartes placed in a separate category as ~ 
cogitans).33 MOre's reason for doing this was his 
belief that if something exists it must exist in space. 34 
Descartes belief that res cogitans do not occupy space 
was vigorously dismissed by MOre as 'nullibism'. MOre 
clearly believed that nullibism would lead inexorably 
to atheism. 35 It is usually assumed that More's 
reaction Shows a failure to understand or, at best, 
by . 36 an unconcern for, the details of Descartes' metap s~cs. 
However, I believe it is possible that MOre's position 
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has not been properly understood. If we assume that 
MOre believed the soul to be a natural member of the 
Cartesian category of res extensa because it was 
material and extended then his divergence from 
Cartesianism is by no means as great as has been 
supposed. We do not have to rely on assumption, 
however: there are clear indications of the nateriality 
of souls in More's book on The immortality of the soul. 37 
At the beginning of Book III More describes three 
states of the soul, or rather three substantial 
vehicles in which it always inheres. The soul must 
always be 'united vitally with some matter or other,38 
because, as Descartes has shown, 'the universe is 
everywhere thick-set with matter,.39 Thi s remains 
true even after the death of the body: 
it is plain that the nature of the soul is such, 
as that she cannot act but in dependence on 
matter, and that her oper.ations are some way or 
other always modified thereby. And therefore 
if the soul acts at all after death, (which we 
have demonstrated she does) it is evident that 
she is not released from all vital union with all 
kind of matter whatsoever ••• 40 
Upon release from the earthly body, therefore, the 
soul inheres either in an a~rial or in an aethereal 
body. These three kinds of body are related to the 
three kinds of matter which form the basis of Descartes' 
41 
matter theory. The aethereal vehicle of the soul, 
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for example, is identified with Descartes' first 
element, 'which is the most subtile and active Body 
that is in the World, and is of the very same nature 
that the Heaven and Stars are, that is to say, is 
the very Body of Light,.42 The a~real body performs 
a number of useful functions. More seems to regard 
it as an easily acceptable half-way stage between 
the bodily soul and the 'disembodied' or aethereal 
soul so that nature need not admit 'of so great a 
Chasme'. It also provides a convenient means of 
explaining (and insisting upon the reality of) ghosts. 
The normal state of affairs after death is for the 
soul to leave its terrestrial vehicle in the a~real 
mode which it may stay in for 'many ages', before 
aspiring to the aethereal state. As More says: 
'there are very few that arrive to that high Happiness, 
us to acquire a Celesti~l Vehicle immediately upon 
their quitting the Terrestrial one,.43 
More believed that by this means he had opened the 
way for easily intelligible speculations about the 
nature of life after bodily death: 
So that we need not bemoan the shrivell'd 
condition of the deceased, as if they were 
stript almost of all Substance corporeal, and 
were too thinly clad to enjoy themselves as to 
any Object of Sense. For they have no less 
body than we our selves have, only this Body 
is far more active than ours, being more 
spiritualized, that ic to say, having greater 
degrees of Motion communicated unto it.44 
It would seem from this that More was as much infected 
by the increasing materialism45 of his age as anyone. 
While men like Donne, Overton, Milton and other 
mortalists could only envisage a life after death 
in terms of a bodily resurrection, More could rely 
on a spiritualized but nonetheless bodily future life: 
It is manifest that the Soul ••• loseth nothing 
by Death, but is a very considerable gainer 
thereby. For she does not only possess as much 
Body as before, with as full and solid dimensions, 
but has that accession cast in, of having this 
Bo~ more invigor~ted with Life and MOtion then 
it was formerly.4 
However, this does not mean that More was a crypto-
mortalist. On the contrary he developed his ideas, 
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as did Digby and White,47 in order to refute mortalism. 
It would seem that More's strategy in this refutation 
was to go some way towards meeting them. Like them, 
he accepts that' even the purest Angels have corporeal 
Vehicles' because any admission of 'purely Immaterial' 
entities would make it 'easy for the Psychopannychites 
to support their Opinion of the Sleep of the Soul': 
For the Soul being utterly rescinded from all 
that is corporeal, and having no vital union 
therewi th at all, they will be very prone to infer, 
that it is impossible she should !mow any thing 
ad extra, if she can so much as dream. For 
even that power also may seem incompetible to 
her in such a state, she having such ~ essential 
aptitude for vital union with Matter. 8 
More's explanation of punishments or rewards in the 
'middle-state' of souls (to use White's phrase)49 betweElf 
death and the general resurrection is reminiscent of the 
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Blackloists' attempts to avoid the heresy of mortalism 
in that it relies upon the torments or satisfaction 
of the individual's conscience. However, More's 
conception, is much more consistent than that of the 
Blackloists. While Digby and White, together with 
Descartes, Hobbes and Gassendi, consider memory to be 
a faculty associated with body or, at the highest level, 
the animal or sensitive s~~1,50 More insists that 
memory is essential to the individual soul in all 
its levels. Having insisted upon this it is now 
perfectly legitimate for More to suppose that the 
torments of a guilty conscience or the bliss of a 
clear conscience continue in the soul after death. 51 
More, having begun to undermine mortalism in this way, 
went on to consider the grounds for apocalyptic expectations. 
More finds the arguments for an imminent end of the world 
untenable on rational grounds and concludes that 
speculation about any Last Day is beyond the bounds 
of 'natural Light and Philosophy,.52 More's conclusion 
to the whole treatise, then, is that souls endure a 
heaven or a hell immediately after the death of the 
body. Souls in torment are held in the a~real mode 
and sometimes appear as ghosts, while the rewarded soul 
achieves the aethereal state: 
Who after death once reach th'Aethe:eal P:ain~ 
Are straight made Gods, and never dle agaLn.5) 
More's purpose in describing such a materialistic 
eschatology is to render normally abstruse theological 
doctrines easily intelligible to the common man: 
So in my description of the state of the other 
world, I am not very sollicitous whether things 
be just so as I have set them down: but because 
some men utterly misbelieve the thing, because 
they can frame no particular conceit what the 
Receptions and Entertains of those Aerial 
inhabitants may be, or how they pass away their 
time; with many other intricacies which use to 
entangle this Theory; I thought it of main 
concernment to take aw~y this Objection against 
the Life to come (viz. That no man can conceive 
what it is, and therefore it is not at all, 
which is the ordinary Exception also against the 
Existence of all Incorporeal Substances) by a 
punctual and rational Description of this future 
state. 54 
It should be perfectly clear from all this that More 
wholeheartedly adopted the Cartesian philosophy and 
its three 'elements' or consistencies of matter and 
used them to develop an original pneumatology and 
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eschatology. In so doing he extended the materialist 
side of the Cartesian duality to absorb those things 
which Descartes thought of as immaterial, non-spatial 
res cogitans. This being so, we have every reason 
to suppose that More's 'spirit of nature' was conceived 
in a similarly materialistic way. If this conclusion 
must remain speculative, I believe it can be demonstrated 
that the 'spirit of nature' is more Cartesian in its 
conception than has previously been realised. We will 
return to this in Section 2. 
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Walter Charleton is not so explicit about his ideological 
intentions as Henry More, but, providing we look at the 
Physiologia within the context of Charleton's whole 
output, it is not difficult to see what those intentions 
were. Charleton's first work of philosophy is highly 
significant for illuminating his designs. The darlmes 
of atheism dispelled by the light of nature (1652) is 
sub-titled a physico-theologicall treatise and it is 
remarkable for being the first of the genre which was 
to become so popular later in the century.55 The 
whole work is a sustained and systematic account of 
the various arguments from design. 'The heart of a 
pismire is more magisterial than the Eschurial', 
Charleton claims, 'the proboscis of a flea more evident 
of industry in its construction than Roman Aqueducts 
th I t V . ,56 or e Arsena a em. ce • Subsequently he insists 
that 'the meanest piece of nature throwes disparagement 
and contempt upon the greatest masterpiece of Art,.57 
In the preface to this work Charleton tells us that 
since religion and the authority of the Church have 
been shattered by 'our Fatall Civil Warr', he determined 
'to erect an intire Fabrick of Physicall Science upon 
Principles which seem to our judgement to be the most 
solid and permanent'. In so doing he hoped to 
catubliah the exiGtcncc of God because 'no one thing 
in nature can be known, unless the Authour of Nature 
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be first knowne,.58 That such an enterprise is a 
fit one for a philosopher rather than a divine he 
justifies on the grounds that 'a Natural man, persisting 
in the state of infidelity' will not be persuaded by 
Scripture but only by 'Reasons Apodictical,.59 The 
new mechanical philosophy evidently seemed the ideal 
medium foraccomplishing this conversion of all atheists. 
This is best illustrated by a long quotation which sums 
up the main themes of the Darknes of atheism. 
Suppose we, in short, that God in the first act 
of his Wisdome and Power, out of the Tohu, or 
nothing, created such a proportionate congeries, 
or just mass of Atoms, as was necessary to the 
constitution of the Universe: suppose we also, 
that all those Atoms, in theinstant of their 
creation received immediately from God a 
faculty of self-motion, and consequently of 
concurring, crowding, justling, repelling, 
resilition, exsilition, and reciprocal complectence, 
concatenation, revinction, & c. according to the 
respective preordination in the Divine intellect: 
and then will all the subsequent operations of 
nature remain so clear and easie, that a meer 
Ethnick by the guidance of these two lamps, 
Sense and Ratiocination, may progress to a 
physical theo~o£ them, and thereby solve all the 
Phaenomena's ~ with less apostasie from first 
Principles proposed, then by any other hypothesis 
yet excogitated. A meer Ethnick, I say; for we, 
who have devolved unto us the inestimable blessing 
of Moses history of the creation, have far other 
thoughts of that method or order, wherein the World 
was founded and finished by God: but the pure 
Natural Man, who wants the illumination of sacred 
writ, can follow no other conduct, but what, by tge 
light of nature, appears most consonant to truth. 0 
Charleton's next published work (two years later) was 
the Physiologia. On the face of it this seems to be 
a straightforward exegesis of the. Epicurean philosophy 
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as revived (and Christianized) by Pierre Gassendi, 
it is hard to detect any ideological intentions in it. 
However, the title page somewhat mysteriously announces 
that the Physiologia is 'The First Part' of a longer 
work. Furthermore we are told at the end of the book 
that Charleton hopes to follow-up this treatise on body 
with a second treatise on the soul: 
without which this first must be imperfect; and 
that is for a description of the nature of that 
••• which we know to be within us ••• the Humane 
Soul. 61 
Unfortunately, Charleton never managed to supply 'the 
second part' of his treatise in the form he would have 
wished. What we do have, however, is a (presumably) 
much lighter work entitled The immortality of the 
human soul, demonstrated by the light of nature. In 
two dialogues. 62 It is in this work that we learn the 
reasons for Charleton's failure to complete his original 
plan. After a catalogue of woe Athanasius, Charleton's 
mouthpiece in the dialogue, sums up: 'In a word ••• 
for almost these two last years, I have been continually 
toss'd up and down by a Tempest of Calamity,.63 Even 
so, it is safe to assume that what Charleton presents 
in these dialogues is something like what he would have 
said at greater length were it not for the Civil wars 
. 64 
and the machinations of his ene~es. 
At the outset of his discussion Charleton (AthanasiUs) 
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declares it to be an ineluctable fact that the soul's 
immortality follows naturally from its immateriality. 
The argument is entirely similar to that of Digby in 
the Two treatises: dissolution is a process of breaking 
down into parts. What lacks matter must also lack 
parts and so cannot be dissolved. 65 The immaterial 
soul could only be destroyed by total annihilation but 
only God could do this (by the opposite process to 
his creation ex nihiJo). Lucretius, the second inter-
locutor (modelled on Charleton's friend John Evelyn, 
1620-1706), makes a series of objections to this idea 
but Athanasius deals with them all. Immortal material 
bodies, like celestial bodies, for example, are declared 
to be immortal only by the grace of God, while the soul 
is naturally immortal. 66 The dialogue proceeds by 
seeking to establish the premise that the soul is 
immaterial. 
The arguments are clearly derived, as we might expect, 
from Gassendi, Descartes, and Sir Kenelrn Digby.67 Unfortunately, 
due to the abbreviated nature of the treatise Charleton 
does not develop an eschatological doctrine. The state 
of the soul after death is raised by Lucretius who asks 
how the disembodied soul can know anything without sense 
organs to attain knowledge. Athanasius dismisses this 
as a mere confusion of knowledge with sensation - knowledge, 
he adds, is understanding not perception. At this point, 
significantly, Athanasius refers Lucretius to Digby's 
68 speculations on the condition of a separate soul. 
If we consider the dialogues on The immortality of the 
soul to be an intimation of a more substantial work 
which was to be the sequel to the Physiologia then it 
is easy to see that Charleton's advocacy of Gassendist 
atomism was designed to play an ideological role. other 
works by Charleton tend to confirm his awareness of the 
ideological power of natural philosophy. In one of his 
later works he tried to show The harmony of natural and 
positive Divine laws and, as the publisher's preface 
says: 
it was written by the Author to no other end, 
but to confirm his Faith by inquiring into the 
Reasonableness and Purity of it, and to augment 
his piety toward God. In a word that he might 
offer to the Divine majesty, not the sacrifice 
of Foolg~ but ••• Worship consentaneous to right 
reason. 
Furthermore, Charleton's single contribution to the new 
discipline of archaeology,70 the Chorea gigantum of 1663, 
seems to have been written as a 'Politick' exercise to 
demonstrate the antiquity of the concept of constitutional 
monarchy. 71 
Clearly, Charleton was no stranger to the idea of using 
intellectual argument to promote a particular ideological 
position and it is, therefore, safe to conclude that 
Gausendi' s ver~;ion of the new philosophy was popuLtrized 
in England as a result of his efforts at just the same 
time that Henry More was popularizing the version of 
Descartes and with similar ideological intentions. 
Indeed, although Charleton's reputation stands not so 
high as More's today, there is good reason to believe 
that during the Interregnum and the early years of the 
Restoration period, Charleton was more likely to win 
converts than the Cambridge Divine. In order to 
understand why this was, however, we must first consider 
an extremely important aspect of seventeenth-century 
intellectual life. 
Thanks largely to the work of Richard H. Popkin it is 
now recognised that scepticism played a crucial role 
in the development of the early modern world-view. 
More specifically, the intellectual movement described 
by Popkin as 'constructive scepticism' played a dominant 
role in the scientific revolution and contributed more 
than any other single factor to the development of the 
new corpuscular, mathematical and experimental 
philosophies of the seventeenth century.72 The leading 
figure in this scientific wing of the new sceptical 
movement was the Minim friar, Marin Mersenne (1588-
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1648), who has not unjustly been seen as the man who gave 
birth to the mechanical philosophy.73 Mersenne's circle 
of intellectual friends included both Descartes and 
Gassendi as well as Hobbes and Digby. During the Civil 
War period in England and the early years of the 
Interregnum many royalist English thinkers converged on 
Paris to be near their king, the young, uncrowned 
Charles II. A number of these thinkers were introduced, 
probably by Hobbes, into Mersenne's circle. The new 
members of this circle of natural philosophers included 
for a time William Petty, John Evelyn and Walter 
Charleton. 74 
Now, Mersenne himself was not interested in natural 
philosophy merely for its own sake or through idle 
curiosity. He saw it as a safe and essential means 
to combat atheism and to settle the religious disputes 
of his age. Not surprisingly, he influenced all the 
leading members of his circle to see natural philosophy 
in the same way. Mersenne's earliest efforts along 
these lines were typical of other Catholic thinkers in 
so far as they were uncompromisingly dogmatic. Reason, 
and in particular the arguments of natural philosophy 
were used to bolster the teachings of scripture and 
t dit " 75 ru l.on. Descartes, an early associate of Mersenne 
and a thinker who shared with him the experience of a 
Jesuit education at La FI~che, also took up this 
dogmatic use of natural philosophy to counter atheism 
76 
and heresy. 
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However, as a result of what Popkin sees as a sceptical 
crisis in early modern thought, Mersenne (unlike Descartes) 
soon developed the position of 'constructive or mitigated 
scepticism'. Mersenne's major ally in this enterprise 
was not Descartes but Pierre Gassendi. 77 Mersenne and 
Gassendi recognised that no dogmatic argument could 
prevail against the negative attitudes of the committed 
Pyrrhonist. They forestalled the extreme and nihilistic 
sceptical arguments, therefore, by going some way to 
meet them and admitting that certain knowledge could 
not be achieved. Nevertheless, they insisted that 
there were sufficient pragmatic grounds for accepting 
many beliefs as true until God should reveal the truth 
to us. Gassendi's work on the Epicurean philosophy, 
therefore, was a prolonged exercise in hypotheticalism. 
Gassendi was not seeking to establish the truth about 
reality but merely about appearances. 78 
The new tradition of constructive scepticism became 
extremely important in seventeenth-century England. 
In the early part of the century it was used to great 
effect by William Chillingworth, Viscount Falkland and 
others to defend Protestant theology against the dogmatism 
of Roman Catholicism. 79 During the turbulent years of 
the 1640s and 50s constructive scepticism became an 
essential and effective weapon in the fight against 
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rth d . 1 0 0 80 uno 0 oxy l.Il re J.g1on. The real threat to the 
stability of society in these years was seen to come 
from various kinds of dogmatists. Apart from Roman 
Catholics there were numerous fanatical or 'enthusiastic' 
religious sects who all claimed to have a monopoly on 
truth. That these enthusiastic sects were subversive 
there can be no doubt. Generally finding their 
adherents among the poor and lower classes, if not the 
entirely dispossessed, they tended to take up extremist 
political positions like antinomianism. 81 A further 
dogmatic stance which was considered by the orthodoxy 
to be totally subversive of any civilized society was 
atheism. Paradoxically, atheism was not seen as a 
fom of extreme scepticism but tended to be regarded 
rather as one more subversive, antinomian sect. As 
Henry More put it: 'Atheism and Enthusiasm, though 
they seem extremely opposite one to another, yet in 
82 
many things they do very nearly agree'. 
In view of the association of any dogmatic stance with 
subversive movements it is not difficult to see why 
mitigated scepticism became the predominant philosophical 
outlook among English intellectuals. Thomas Browne 
declared that 'the wisest heads prove, at last, almost 
ail S cepticks' , 83 and it is easy to find many such 
wise heads among seventeenth-century English thinkers, 
from divines to natural philosophers. For such men 
scepticism essentially involved a suspension of judgement 
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t °al ° 84 on con rovers1 1ssues. The best we can hope for, 
they would have claimed, is to reach a position which 
enables us to be reasonably confident of what we know 
for all practical everyday purposes. Clearly, this 
attitude will guarantee a 'common-sense' approach which 
is unlikely to lead to any change in the status guo. 
Ever mindful of the excesses of the radical sects, 
the comparatively well-off intellectual would have 
affi~atively answered Montaigne's question: 'Is it 
not better for a man to suspend his owne persuasion, 
than to meddle with sedicious and quarrelsome divisions?,.85 
Pierre Bayle, saw straight through to the heart of the 
matter when he declared that 'Pyrrhonism ••• is not very 
dangerous with respect to Natural Philosophy or the 
86 
state' • 
In view of all this it is reasonable to assume that if 
Henry More and Walter Charleton were to have any immediate 
influence on philosphical thought they would have to 
take up the cause of constructive scepticism. Walter 
Charleton recognised this much earlier than More and 
I believe that thi s may have increased Charleton' s 
influence. Charleton' s earliest appearances in print 
show the strong influence of John Baptista van Helmont 
(1579-1644) the spagyrical chemist. Alchemists and 
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other occult philosophers, as P.M. Rattansi has shown, 
tended to be associated with enthusiasm. 87 For example, 
Thomas Hall (1610-1665), a presbyterian minister, attacked 
the radical John Webster (1610-1682) for being of the 
'Familiasticall-Levellin~agical temper', as shown by 
his advocacy of Paracelsus and his belief in -private 
° °t al °11 ° to 88 I 1650 ha 1 sp1.r1. u 1. UIn1.na 1.on. nCr eton would 
have been open to the same charge (though it would 
certainly have been unjust).89 However, by 1654 with 
the appearance of the Physiologia, Charleton established 
himself as a hypotheticalist philosopher acceptable to 
even the most orthodox. 90 
Charleton repeatedly insists that his philosophy is 'at 
most but ingenious conjecture' and that his ambition is 
only to take 'the copy of Nature from her shadow, and 
from the reflex of her sensible Operations to describe 
her in such a symmetrical Form, as may appear most 
plausibly satisfactory to the solution of all her 
Phaenomena' .91 Perhaps the most explicit and most 
memorable statement of Charleton's probabilism appears 
in the closing words of the Physiologia: 
I conjure you, by your own Humanity to remember 
and testifie, that in this my Conversation with 
you, you have found me so far from being Magisterial 
in any of the Opinions I praesented; that considering 
my own Humor of Indifferency, and constant Dubiosity 
(frequently professed ••• ) it hath somewhat of 
wonder in it that I ever proposed them to Others: 
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nor, indeed, can anything solve that wonder, 
but my Hopes, thereby secretly to undermine that 
lofty Confidence of younger Heads, in the 
Certitude of Positions and Axioms Physiological; 
and by my declared Scepticism even in such Notions, 
as my self have laboured to assert by the firmest 
Grounds and strongest Inducements to Belief, to 
reduce them to the safer level of 
Quo magis quaerimus, magis dubitamus. 92 
By contrast, although Henry More was always alert to the 
dangers of religious enthusiasm,93 he was slow to realise 
the dangers lurking in the dogmatic approach of Carlesianism. 
Writing in 1647, More chided those who prefer 'that sad 
gTound of incredulity before anything lesse than a 
Demonstration,94 and over ten years later in The 
immortality of the soul he still shows contempt for 
scepticism: 
it is a disease incurable and a thing rather to 
be pitied or laught at, than seriously opposed. 
For when a man is so fugitive and unsettled, that 
he will not stand to the verdict of his own 
Faculties, one can no more fasten anything upon 
him than he can write in the water or tye lolots 
of the wind. 95 
More's answer to sceptics was to proceed rationally from 
various axioms and to declare that he had thereby 'demonstrated 
with evidence no less than Mathematical,.96 
By 1665, however, More had finally realised the danger 
implicit in Cartesianism: its dogmatic claims to t:ruth 
can be used to repudiate all instances of fideism az:d 
to bolster an atheistic view of the world. More's 
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distress about his failure to notice this sooner is 
evident in a letter he wrote to Hobert J10yle: 
I have, from my very first letters toDes Cartes, 
till this last book of mine ,/Enchiridion metaphysicum7, 
always expressed my opinion, that this mechanical 
way would not hold in all phaenomena, as I always 
verily thought but thi s would not save us from 
being accounted amongst the wits, one of their 
gang; and a perfect Cartesian, as to the hypothesis; 
and, indeed, no less than an infidel and atheist. 
And I was informed ••• that a considerable company 
of men appeared ••• mere scoffers at religion, 
and atheistical, that professed themselves Cartesians: 
and that his philosophy may naturally have such 
an influence as this, I can neither deny, nor 
could conceal in my preface to this book;. for it 
had been to the prejudice of religion, and to my 
great reproach, for me, who have been, from my 
youth to this very day, so open a stickler for the 
support of natural religion, and for Christianity 
itself, in the best mode thereof, to be found of 
so little judgement as not to discern, how 
prejudicial Des Cartes's mechanical pretensions 
are to the belief of a God. Certainly, all those 
of the atheistical party, that have observed my 
zeal in the behalf of religeon, in almost all my 
wri tings, must, as once I heard a !mown physician 
say of them of our profession, that God has sent 
none but a company of fools upon his errand, take 
me to be one of the chief of them; or think me 
a juggler and deceiver, I not declaring against 
that philosophy which is the pillar of many 09 these men's infidelity, and of their atheism. 7 
More was too optimistic in supposing that only scoffers 
and 'wits' would think him an atheist. Robert Boyle 
himself, though always reluctant to become embroiled 
in personal polemics, saw distinct atheistical 
implications in Henry More'a interpretation of nature 
and was moved sufficient ly to say so in print and at 
some length in his Free inguiry into the vulgarly 
received notion of nature. 98 Boyle's anxiety about 
More's dogmas, as J.E. McGuire and others have shown, 
stemmed from his belief that the 'hylarchic principle' 
could be interpreted in a 0pinozistic way as a god in 
nature - in short, it could lead to pantheism. 99 The 
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same anxiety is briefly alluded to in Boyle's Hydrostatical 
discourse of 1672. Objecting to More's 'hylarchic 
principle' Boyle declares: 
truth ought to be pleaded for only by truth; 
so I take that which the doctor contends for, 
to be evincible in the right est way of proceeding 
by a person of far leGs learning than he, without 
introducing any precarious principle; especially 
experience having shewn, that the generality of 
heathen philosophers were convinced of the being 
of a divine architect of the world ••• 100 
Boyle makes it perfectly clear that the way to avoid 
all such 'precarious principles' is to curtail all 
tendencies to dogmatism: 
if I had been with those Jesuits, that are said 
to have presented the first watch to the king of 
China, who took it to be a living creature, I 
should have thought I had fairly accounted for it, 
if, by the shape, size, motion, & c. of the spring-
wheels, balance, and other parts of the watch I had 
shown, that an engine of such a structure would 
necessarily mark the hours, though I could not 
have brought an argument to convince the Chinese 
monarch, that it was not endowed with life. 101 
According to Boyle, therefore, More's dogmatism, though 
different from Descartes', was equally dangerous. Only 
102 
a circumspect scepticism was unlikely to lead one astray. 
The fact that Descartes was regarded by most English 
thinkers as a dangerous dogmatist can hardly be denied 
in spite of the efforts of the historian and philosopher 
204 
of science, Laurens Laudan, to demonstrate that Descartes 
was regarded as a probabilist. 103 Laudan's attempt to 
show that it was due to Descartes' influence that hypothe-
ticalism became the predominant methodology of science 
between 1650 and 1665 suffers primarily from insufficient 
knowledge of the historical background. In particular 
Laudan shows no knowledge whatsoever of Pierre Gassendi's 
influence. Fortunately, a useful corrective to Laudan's 
thesis was quickly provided by G.A.J. Rogers. 104 Rogers 
was easily able to show that Descartes was by no means 
a probabilist but even he did not point to the real 
influence behind English methodological thought. 
The evidence that Laudan produces to indicate that Boyle 
and Joseph Glanvill, both undeniably sceptical in their 
approach,105 derived their probabilism from Descartes 
is a case of putting the cart before the horse. Glanvill 
and Boyle were both continually engaged in composing 
apologetics for the new philosophy in order to refute 
the numerous charges of atheism brought against it. 
Since dogmatic thinkers were always suspected of 
atheistic (or heterodox) intentions it was important 
to claim that Descartes was not a dogmatist. 106 If we 
look at writers not concerned to defend the new philosophy 
we get a far more representative picture. Edward 
Stillingfleet (1635-1699), Bishop of Worcester, presented 
a fair account of Descartes' attitude in his Origines 
sacrae: 
••• sometimes he is content to let it pass as 
a bare HYpothesis, agreeing with the Phaenomena 
of the World; but withal he saith, That he makes 
use of no Principles but such as are most evident, 
and deduces nothing from them but by Mathematical 
consequences. And in an Epistle to Mersennus, 
to whom he opened his Mind more freely, he saith, 
That he should think he mew nothing in Physicks, 
if he could only tell how things might be, if he 
could not demonstrate that they could be no 
otherwise. 10 I 
Meric Casabon (1599-1671), another Churchman and son 
of the famous scholar Isaac Casaubon, was more caustic 
about Descartes' method: 
But for his Method: I tooke him for one, Whom 
excessive pride and self-conceit (which doth 
happen unto many) had absolutely bereaved of his 
witts. I could not beleeve that such stuffe, 
205 
soe ridiculous, soe blasphemous (as I apprehended it, 
and doe still) could proceed from a sober man. 
A cracked brain man, an Enthusiast, such a one 
as Acosta gives us the relation of ••• 108 
On the other hand, Casaubon always speaks highly of 
Gassendi and applauds in particular his denunciation 
of Descartes in the Disquisitio metaphysica. According 
to Casaubon, Gassendi 'doth lay him open very sufficiently: 
more need not be said by any man to show the vanitie, 
futilitie, nugacitie, of that confident, if not brainsick 
undertaker' • 109 
There can be little doubt, then, that the vogue for 
constructive scepticism in both theology and natural 
philosophy assured that the philosophy of Gassendi 
drew at least as much attention as that of Descartes in 
t 1 k f 0 0 lot 110 spite of i s ac 0 orlglna 1 y. Charleton's early 
translation of Gassendi's philosophy into English would 
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have appealed, therefore, to those, like Glanvill and 
Casaubon, whose attitude was one of cautious scepticism. 
Foremost among those !mown to have been influenced by 
Charleton's Physiologia were Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton. 111 
One final point remains to be emphasised about the ideological 
background to the rise of the new philosophy and its 
corpuscular matter theory. As we said at the beginning 
of this chapter, both More and Charleton were staunchly 
committed Anglicans. Neither of them could be accused 
of trimming or compromising their beliefs in any way. 
Henry More is known even to have used the Anglican 
liturgy in public as well as private at a time when it 
was forbidden by law. 112 Charleton was raised by Anglican 
parents and was always loyal to the monarchy, taking no 
advantage at all during the Interregnum. He seems 
genuinely to have regarded even the licentious Charles 
II as the devoted head of the Church. 113 If it is true, 
as we have argued, that these two men played the largest 
individual roles in inaugurating the mechanical philosophy 
into the mainstream of Ehglish philosophical thought,114 
it follows that the thesis that the scientific revolution 
in England was brought about by Puritan thinkers is, once 
again, seriously questioned. 
We have already pointed-out that the earliest contributors 
to the development of the mechanical philosophy in England, 
Digby, White and Hobbes severely undennines the Puritanism-
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and-science thesis. Digby and White were Catholics, 
while Hobbes must be counted, like More and Charleton, 
as an Anglican. Although Hobbes' religious position 
suggests some Puritan features, his mortalism and 
insistence upon Biblical literalism for example, it can 
hardly be denied that one of the major endeavours of 
his political writings was to establish the monarch 
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as the head of a state church. 
So, the major figures in the establishment of the theoretical 
foundations of the English scientific revolution were 
anything but Puritan (no matter how loosely the term 
Puritan is defined).116 In fact, advocates of the 
Merton thesis have always had to rely upon a vision 
of science as a strictly practical (in the most mundane 
sense), utilitarian endeavour which is far more reminiscent 
of technology than it is of natural philosophy. 117 Even 
Charles Webster, whose Great Instauration is the most 
consistent and persuasive work in this genre, has to 
admit that the view of science he portrays may not be 
recogniseable as science to the modern reader. 118 He 
admi ts tha t he has been concerned with the 'technical, 
utilitarian' dimension of science and not with what 
he calls 'serious scientific work' by which, presumably 
he means theory construction. 119 We have already seen 
in Chapter 4 that Webster's mistaken insistence upon 
the prevalence of utopian millenarianiam (as oppo~ed 
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to a more unearthly apocalypticism) derives from his 
need to establish his thesis. 120 Similarly, it 
seems that the attention some historians have paid 
to the role of Francis Bacon in the scientific 
revolution is to serve the same ends. The utili tarian 
aspects of Bacon's pronouncements are seized upon and 
exaggerated at the expense of the rest of his thinking. 121 
Alexandre Koyr~ has defined the true role of Bacon as 
'completely negligible' and, if that is taking it too 
far, it certainly emerges from Van Leeuwen's researches 
into the sceptical background to English methodology 
that Bacon's role has been somewhat overinflated. 122 
While the Hartlib circle and a few other 'Puritan' 
thinkers who form the core of Webster's researches 
can be seen to be engaged upon utilitarian utopian 
schemes the overall impact of these endeavours on 
broader developments is in some doubt. There is plenty 
of evidence to suggest that utilitarian schemes were 
rejected or ignored by scientifically inclined 
intellectuals. Indeed, it should not be forgotten 
that for many at this time 'usefulness' was defined in 
terms of the moral and religious purposes to which 
science could be put, not its ability to improve the 
life-style of the artisan. 123 If we take the strong 
line recently adopted by the Newtonian scholar, Richard 
S. Westfall, and insist tint it is impossible 'to 
describe such empirically derived knowledge and 
practices, which had no connection with a theoretical 
framework, as part of sci ence " then we can finally 
reject the Puritanism-and-science thesis. 124 Michael 
Hunter has recently affirmed that 'science was always 
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primarily a theoretical activity and its most significant 
contemporary milieu was therefore in intellectual life'. 
We can now extend this to say that the specific milieu 
for the development of theoretical science, even in the 
days of the Puritan conunonweal th, was Anglican. 125 
2. Henry More and the spirit of nature. 
We turn now to consider some of the details of Henry 
More's doctrines of natural philosophy and the implications 
these had for the peculiar development of the mechanical 
philosophy in England. It is usually believed that, 
although MOre popularized the Cartesian philosophy in 
England, his own understanding of it was somewhat 
inadequate. We must bear this opinion in mind as we 
proceed before making a judgement upon it, bu t it can 
be admitted straight away that, as Marjorie Nicolson 
has pointed out, MOre 'found in his great contemporary 
126 less what he sought than what he brought'. The 
point is that More's great enthusiasm for the Cartesian 
system derived from the very beginning from MOre's belief 
that Cartesian mechanism simply could not explain all 
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physical phenomena. He was so sure of this himself 
that he believed it would be obvious to all students 
of the mechanical philosophy. Once the fundamental 
inadequacy of the explanatory power of strict mechanism 
was noticed, More believed, the natural philosopher 
would have to rely on some kind of 'spiritual' entity 
in his explanations. It was for just this reason 
that More recommended the teaChing of the Cartesian 
system in Universities: 
'l'ha t the Students of Philosophy may be thoroughly 
exercised in the just extent of the Mechanical 
Powers of Matter, how farre they will reach, and 
where they fall short. Which will be the best 
assistance to Religion that Reason and the Knowledge 
of Nature can afford. 127 
The 'rational and religious" mind, More believed, would 
be forced to conclude that strictly mechanical explanations 
left crucial lacunae in any explanation of physical 
phenomena and these could only be breached by the 
introduction of an immaterial 'Spirit of Nature,.128 
B,y now, it should come as no surprise to learn that 
More introduced the spirit of nature into the Cartesian 
system in order to account for motion and activity. 
Although More accepts that 'Matter it self once moved 
can move other Matter' 129 he insists that matter 'is 
not active of it self, because it is reducible to rest'. 
This last point, he claims, 'is an Argument not only 
that Self activity belongs to a Spirit,but that there 
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is such a thing as a Spirit in the world'. Anyone 
who denies this and insists that there is nothing but 
Matter, according to MOre, 'must of necessity (as I 
have intimated already) confess that this Matter moves 
it self, though it be very incongruous so to affirm,.130 
So, the spirit of nature is the active principle in MOre's 
universe which operates on 'inert and stupid' matter 131 
to produce the various phenomena of the world: 
I ask ••• if there be not in nature an incorporeal 
substance which, while it can impress on any body 
all the qualities of body, or at least most of 
them, such as motion, figure, position of parts, 
etc ••• would be further able, since it is almost 
certain that this substance removes and stops 
bodies, to add whatever is involved in such motion, 
that is it can unite, divide, scatter, bind, form 
the small parts, order the forms, set in circular 
motion those which arc disposed for it, or move 
them in any way whatever, arrest their circular 
motion and do such similar things with them as are 
necessary to produce .•• light'1~~lours and the 
other objects of the senses ••• 
What we must try to do is understand precisely how 
MOre envisaged this spirit of nature. 
So far, we have noticed in our so-called 'mechanical 
philosophies' a tendency to rely upon the neo-Platonic 
and medieval tradition of light-metaphysics (albeit in 
an adapted form) to provide an active, self-moving 
principle. 133 If this was so pervasive in the natural 
philosophy of the time, we should certainly expect 
More, who traced his philosophy 'over the high and aery 
hills of Platonism' 134 to make use of the tradition. 
We Shall pursue this possibility first. 
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When More published the second, enlarged, edition of 
his Antidote against atheism he added a lengthy Appendix 
to answer 'certain Obj ections' made against the first 
edition. 135 One of these objections was that More's 
concept of a spirit contained a fundamental inconsistency 
because it was said to be both extended and indivisible. 
MOre's response was to 'represent the property of a 
Spirit in this Symbole or HierogIYphick'. or, as we 
would say, with a revealing analogy. 
Suppose a Point of light from which rays out 
a luminous Orb according to the known principles 
of Opticks: This Orb of light does very much 
resemble the nature of a Spirit, w~gh is diffus'd 
and extended, and yet indivisible. 
MOre points out that although a luminous sphere of light 
emanating from a central point is extended it is absurd 
to imagine that one luminous ray could be separated 
from the rest 'by any Engine or Art whatsoever'. In 
short, 'the p~ts of a Spirit can be no more separated, 
though they be dilated, then you can cut off the Rayes 
of the ~ by a pair of Scissors made of pellucid 
Crystall,.1 37 
In order to get the most force from this analogy More 
has to deny the Aristotelian definition of light as 
merely an accidental modification of the medium and 
insist that light is, in fact, a substance in the same 
. . t 138 manner as sp1r1 • Accordingly, he continues: 
• • • 
Orb 
And 
there is no difficulty to imagine such an 
as this a Substance as well as a '@anti. ty. 
indeed the Sphere of light it self, it not 
inhering in any Subject in the space it occupies, 
looks far more like a Substance than any Accident. 
And what we fancie unadvisedly to befal Light 
and Colours, that any point of them will thus ray 
orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted 
in Spiritual substances, whose central essence 
spreads out into a Secondary substance, as the 
luminous rays t39 conceived to shoot out from 
a lucid Point. 
This distinction between 'central essence' and 'secondary 
substance' shows that More has found a new use for the 
old distinction of light metaphysicians between the 
lux inhering in a shining body or point and the lumen 
or 'brightness' which spreads out beyond. More can 
now use this distinction and a further analogy to 
overcome another objection to his initial theory. 
Evidently More's concept of spirit was said to involve 
a property of self-generation or creation ex nihilO. 
In the Appendix More repudiates this interpretation 
by means of the following analogy: 
It is manifest that ••• rays LPf lighil that are 
hindred from shooting out so far as they would, 
need not lose their virtue or Being, but only be 
reflected back toward the shining Center; and 
the obstacle being renoved they may shoot out 
to their full length again: so that there is 
no generation of a new ra'4 but an omission of 
what was actually before. 0 
The analogy between light and the spirit of nature is 
so close that More is reluctant to lay it aside. Four 
years later, in The immortality of the soul he takes 
it up again and embellishes it. He introduces it 
for the same reason as before: as an example of an 
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entity extended yet indivisible or, as he usually says, 
indiscerpible. However, he also tells us that the 
'secondary substance' of the spirit of nature is 
able to 'actuate grand Proportions of matter' as it 
emanates outward in a 'sphere of life and activity,.141 
In order to explain how such a substance could 'actuate' 
matter, More simply makes it an axiom that any 'Thlanative 
Cause' is 'such a cause as merely by Being, no other 
activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect'. 
He insists that there must be such a cause in the 
world because 'something must move it self,.142 
MOre's spirit of nature, therefore, is conceived of in 
two modes, a 'Primary or Centrall Substance' and a 
'Secondary or Emanatory Substance',1 43 which is capable 
of transmitting motion or activity to inert matter merely 
by its presence. This is entirely reminiscent of 
traditional light metaphysics which, as mentioned above, 
distinguishes between ~ and lumen and also regards 
light, if not as a causative principle, as a universal 
formative principle. 144 
Significant though these parts of More's discussion 
are for this thesis, the fact remains that they are 
merely close analogies. MOre never slips into treating 
his spirit of nature as light itself. He is always 
careful to maintain a strong distinction between them. 
It is not possible to be certain as to why this is so. 
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It may be that More would have regarded an unreconstructed 
version of light metaphysics as too mystical for him 
and more the preserve of neo-Platonist thinkers like 
Robert Fludd or Thomas Vaughan. 145 Alternatively, it 
may well have been that More was aware of the way in 
which light had been used by Hobbes and Digby as a kind 
of self-active matter- a position which MOre was always 
146 concerned to deny. We are not much nearer, therefore, 
to understanding the intl?llectual antecedents of More's 
concept. 
A careful consideration of some of More's other 
pronouncements on the spirit of nature, however, reveals 
some particularly intriguing features of his concept 
which have not previously been noticed. It is immediately 
obvious to the reader of More's works that the spirit of 
nature is in some sense an intermediary between God and 
matter - a means by which God may be said to act in the 
universe and yet, at the same time, to maintain a certain 
level of transcendence. 147 This is evident, for example, 
in this passage from The true notion of a spirit: 
One LPropertil at least every Spiritual Substance 
hath: as also the faculty of moving; insomuch 
that every spirit either moves it self by it 
self, or the Matter, or both, or at least the 
Matter either mediately or immediately; or 
lastly, both ways. For so all things moved 
are moved by God, ge being the Fountain of all 
Life and Motion. 4 
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Similarly, we are repeatedly told that the Spirit of 
1 ~ 9 Nature is 'the vicarious power of God' upon the universe. ~ 
Furthermore, after one of his more lengthy explications 
of Spirit as the motive principle in matter, More 
concludes: 
That no matter whatsoever of its own Nature has 
any active Principle of Motion, though it be 
receptive thereof; but that when God created 
it, he superadded an impress of Motion upon it, 
such a measure and proportion to all of it, 
which remains still much-what the same for 
quantity in the whole, though theparts of Matter 
in their various occursion of one to another 
have not alwaies the same proportion of it ••• 
More goes on to say that God need only conserve the 
matter and 'the Matter thus conserved will faithfully 
retain one part with another, the whole summe of Motion 
first communicated to it,.1 50 Remarkably, the spirit 
of nature seems to have receded entirely and More's 
account of motion has become indistinguishable from 
Descartes'. 
This cannot be written-off as a momentary lapse on 
More's part. In 'The Preface general' written for the 
collection of his philosophical writings in 1662 he takes 
a similar (if not quite so obvious) line. The spirit 
of nature is described as: 
a mute copy of the eternal Word (that is, of 
that Divine Wisedome that is entirely everywhere) 
is in every part naturally appointed to do all 
the best services that Matter is capable of ••• 
according to that Platform of which it is the 
Transcript, I mean according to the comprehension 
and Purpose of those Idea's of things which are 
in the eternal Intellect of God. 
The crucial point about the particular definition is 
that it leads More to say that spirit 'is the lowest 
Substantial Activity from the all-wise God, containing 
in it certain general Modes and Lawes of Nature,.151 
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The spirit of nature, therefore, seems to be nothing 
more than a complex concept which can be analysed into 
two or three simpler Cartesian concepts: an initial 
impetus given to the world by God, and the conservation 
of transference of thatinitial input of activity according 
to laws of nature. 
There are further suggestions that More is not so far 
removed from Des~artes as is generally believed. He 
always insists that the spirit of nature operates blindly 
without perception or intelligence. He takes his best 
demonstration of this from Boyle's experiments with the 
air-pump. If the receiver of the pump is fitted with 
a valve, the air trying to beat its way back into the 
receiver after evacuation will shut the valve and so 
strongly that 'it will bear up with it a ten-pound 
weight,.1 52 This kind of 'self-thwarting' activity 
clearly shows that 'Aire it self' has no 'Power, Knowledge, 
and liberty of will', 'nor that there are any such 
Divine particles interspersed in the Aire that have'. 
MOre's conclusion, in the best traditions of the 
mechanical philosophy is 'that the Impetus of Motion 
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in all matter is blinde and necessary, and that there 
is no Matter at all that is free and knowing but moves 
and acts of it self ••• according to the mere Mechanical 
laws of MOtion,.153 
In view of this it would seem that More was perfectly 
justified in denying that he had 'introduced an obscure 
Principle forignorance and Sloth to take sanctuary in, 
and hinder that expected progress tba t may be made in 
the Mechanick Philosophy,.1 54 He was surely correct 
in saying that Descartes had taken the mechanical 
philosophy as far as it could go and that More's own 
contribution was not to undermine it but to refine it: 
Nor needs the acknowledgement of this Principle 
Lthe spirit of naturi7 to damp our endeavours in 
••• 
the search of the Mechanical causes of the Phaenomena 
of Nature, but rather make us more circumspect 
to distinguish what is the result of the more 
Mechanical powers of Matter and I"btion, and what 
of an Higher Principle. 155 
It is easy with hindsight to see that MOre was correct 
about the non-mechanical origins of gravity - one of 
his favourite examples. 156 A less obvious example is 
his account of condensation and rarefaction. More 
accepted the universal belief that matter is mutually 
inpenetrable, and he also accepted the atomists' 
belief that the particles of matter cannot change their 
individual sizes and densities. Rarefaction, therefore, 
has to be explained in terms of increased distance, 
and condensation by decreased distance between the 
particles. The problem is, how are the particles 
kept apart in the case of rarefaction? More's spirit 
is perfectly capable of altering a body from within 
because all alteration is 'nothing else but the 
varying of either the Figures, or postures, or the degrees 
of motion in the particles,.1 57 In the case of rarefaction 
and condensation the alteration in the arrangement of 
the particles is brought abol1t by a particular property 
of the spirit which More calls 'essential Spissitude'. 
MOre is simply taking advantage of the self-penetrative 
power of spirit; unlike matter, spirit can redouble 
itself into more space or contract itself into less -
as it does so it may hold apart or bring together the 
particles of matter around it.158 
It would seem, then, that More did not misunderstand 
Descartes, as some scholars have implied, and nor was 
he biassed against the mechanical philosophy merely 
b f h o 10 0 0 159 H d t d ecause 0 ~s re ~~ous v~ews. e un ers 00 
Descartes well enough and was quick to see that the 
mechanical philosophy really did have its limitations. 
Not merely because it could not explain sympathetic 
resonances in strings or sJ~pathetic cures but also 
because it could not explain magnetism, gravity, 
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condensation and rarefaction and vario~s other phenomena. 160 
We said earlier that More was of the opinion that those 
who repudiated his concept of ~irit must 'confess that 
••• 
Matt . t If' 161 er moves ~ se • We will turn now to consider 
MOre's companion in bringing European mechanical philosophies 
to the attention of the English public, and we will see 
whether More was correct in his judgement. 
3. Walter Charleton and active matter. 
Charleton has been described as an accurate 'barometer' 
of the various trends in seventeenth-century science162 
and a recent important article on Charleton has tried 
to amplify and illustrate this by outlining his intellectual 
development. 163 According to this article, Charleton's 
work can be seen to undergo a dramatic change between 
1650 and 1654, from an 'overwhelmingly Renaissance-
alchemical flavour' to a 'blatantly atomistic' and 'modern' 
164 
approach. Unfortunately this superficially persuasive 
argument is based upon an over-simplistic conception of 
the development of 'modernism' which we are seeking here 
to deny. The vitalistic elements in theearliest 
philosophical writings of Charleton do not give place 
to a thoroughgoing mechanism but remain even in his 
much later writings. Furthermore, the new philosophy 
of corpuscularian mechanism is by far the most predominant 
221 
world-view in his writings from the very beginning. 165 
Even Rattansi's interpretation of Charleton's career, 
involving a change from dangerous radical Paracelsianism 
to the more conservative mechanism, begins to break 
down wh co ·d d· t f btl t· 166 en nSl ere ln erms 0 a more su e perspec lve. 
We saw in section one of this chapter that the major 
conservative approach to natural philosophy by mid-century 
was that of mitigated scepticism, as opposed to any 
dogmatic pronouncements abrnlt the nature of truth or 
reality. There is a clear indication of Charleton's 
fundamental conservatism even in his earliest and most 
Paracelsian (or rather Helmontian) work when he provides 
the following conclusion: 
All this I now assent to; but invite 
Each wiser head to make me's Proselyte. 
My Mercury is not fixt: My Virgin faith 
Scorns to submit to what an Author sai th, 
Barely because he said it. To enquire, 
To doubt, is to advance our judgement higher. 
For I've been told, that Knowledg ~g,t doth lie 
Enshrin'd in Sceptical Neutralitie. 
But the major feature of Charleton's Ternary of paradoxes 
which gives the lie to suggestions of any fundamental 
change in his attitudes is its reliance on the contact 
action of material atoms to explain 'occult' phenomena. 
The first part of the Ternary is a discourse 'Of the 
Magnetick Care of Wounds' and deals with the care of 
wounds by allegedly 'sJ~pathetic' means. The essay 
itself is a translation of a piece by Van Helmont 
and cannot be regarded as Charleton' s own views with 
total safety. Even so, it is worth pointing out 
that a 'continued thread of atomes arriving at an 
object seated at remote distance ••• ' is invoked by 
Van Helmont to explain that 'the power operative on 
a distant object is natural,.168 There can be no 
doubt thatit was just this kind of proto-atomistic 
explanation which engaged Charleton's interest 
because Charleton's own 'Prolegomena to the Candid 
and Ingenuous Reader' concentrates very heavily upon 
this kind of explanation. The major influence upon 
Charleton's thinking is significant in itself: Sir 
Kenelm Digby is described as 'the choysest flower in 
our garden' and 'a noble person, who hath built up 
his Reasons to so transcendent a height of Knowledg, 
as may seem not much beneath the state of man in 
innocence l • 169 As a result Charleton's explanation 
of how the power of sympathy works is derived almost 
entirely from Digby's atomistic account of it in his 
Treatise on body and, like Digby's, Charletan' s 
account could be said to be 'impeccable' by the 
. I hil hy 170 standards of the mechanlca p osop • 
Impeccable, that is, except for one crucial aspect: 
Charleton makes no attempt to account for the motion 
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of his atoms. Roman vitriol, Charleton's name for the 
powder of sympathy, is said to be 'richly endowed' with 
a 'Radial activity' which is explained to be nothing 
more than 'imperceptible Emissions streaming in a semi-
immaterial thread of Atomes,.171 Charleton somewhat 
disingenuously claims that 'by a general consent of 
all the secretaries of Nature, and the undeniable 
testimony of trivial Experience, every mixt Body, of 
an unctuous composition doth uncessantly vent, or 
expire a circumferential steam /Sic: stre~ of 
invisible Atomes,.172 
Two years later, in The darknes of atheism, Charleton's 
co:rmni ttment to atomism is even stronger in spite of 
the fact that Epicurus is vigorously denounced as 
one of thechiefest of 'atheistical monsters' and the 
'Secretary of Hell,.173 In spite of the 'heap of 
dross' the Epicurean philosophy is said to hold some 
'rich metal': 
I have never yet found any justifiable ground, 
why Atoms may not be reputed Mundi materies, 
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the material principle of the universe, provided 
that we allow that God created the first Matter 
out of Nothing; that his Wisdome modelled and 
cast them into that excellent composure or figure, 
which the visible world now holds; and that 
ever since, by reason of the impulsion of their 
native Tendency, or primitive impression, they 
strictly conform to the laws of his beneplacuits, 
and punctually execute those several functions 
which his almighty Will then charged ¥~on their 
determinate and specifical Creations. 4 
While expounding the advantages of the atomist philosophy 
at greater length, Charleton returns to the problem of 
their motions. He admits tha tit is an 'incongruity, 
of the Epicurean philosophy that atoms have 'from all 
eternity, a faculty of motion, or impetuous tendency, 
inherent in them'. However, the root of Charleton's 
unease lies in the phrase 'from all eternity' when 
Charleton 'refines' the 'hypothesis of atoms' by 
suggesting that God imposed their motions on them , ° l.Il 
the first motion of their miraculous production ~ 
ih OI ' 175 n ~ 0 • Having rrade this refinement Charleton 
declares atomism to be superior to all other systems 
of natural philosophy because 'it fitly declares the 
radical Cause of all Motion, activity or energie in 
second causes, or natures once removed from the Primus 
motor, God' .176 
This last point dissociates Charleton's thinking from 
that of Descartes. Charleton does not consider that 
one initial impetus by God has been transferred 
successively according to the laws of motion, nor that 
God is actively and directly engaged in conserving the 
motion of the universe from moment to moment. The 
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matter itself has some inherent 'faculty of self-motion' 
which was put there at the Creation. Charleton insists 
that only 'impardonable incircumspection or forgetfulness' 
could account for the belief that matter is 'absolutely 
idle, and devoid of all motive or active virtue,.177 
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The culmination of Charleton's endeavours to rehabilitate 
the Epicurean philosophy is provided in the Pbysiologia 
but there is essentially no change in his attitude to 
the motion of atoms. Once again he denies the 
Epicurean position that the 'motive faculty' of atoms 
has been 'eternaJ.ly inherent in them', only to insist 
that 'at their creation God invigorated or impregnated 
them with an Internal Energy or Faculty Motive, which 
may be conceived the First Cause of all Natural Actions 
or Motions,.178 
The author of the Physiologia insists repeatedly upon 
motion as an essential property of his atoms: 'the 
third propriety of the Universal Matter, Atoms, is 
Mobili ty or Gravity: and from that fountain is it that 
all Concretions derive their Virtue MOtive'. It 
follows that 'Atoms are never totally deprived of their 
essential Faculty, MObility'. This irmate atomic 
motion is, naturally, translated into larger, compound 
bodies: 'That same MOTIVE VIRTUE, therefore, wherewith 
every Compound Bodie is naturally endowed, must owe its 
origine to the innate and co-essential Mobility of its 
component particles ••• ,.179 
In effect then, Char~eton has introduced into his 
mechanical philosophy an occult quality Which, as one 
contemporary critic put it, outdoes 'the most credulous 
Peripatetics'. Edward Stillingfleet, who was much 
influenced by Henry More, insisted (with good reason) 
that to say that 'Atoms move because it is their nature 
to m~e' is 'least of all pardonable in the exploders 
of substantial forms and occult qualities when the 
Origine of the whole world is resolved into an occult 
quality which gives motion to Atoms'. 180 
We have now considered all the major English thinkers 
involved in the earliest efforts to establish the new 
corpuscular natural philosophies in England prior to 
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the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660.181 In seeking 
to account for natural phenomena in terms of matter in 
motion they were all confronted with the problems of 
explaining what Charleton called 'the multiplicity 
and the perpetuity of motions ••• 182 competent to Atoms'. 
The earliest strategem was to adopt the auto-diffusive 
and self-motive principle of light which was' such an 
essential part of the earlier natural theological 
tradition of light metaphysics. By simultaneously 
insisting upon the materiality of light, however, the 
stage was set for the development of the concept of 
active matter. Digby, White and, for a While, Hobbes, 
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all relied upon the incessant activity of the sun (and 
other stars) - emitting a constant stream of invigorating 
particles of fire and light in the case of the Blackloists -
or continually pulsing in systole anddiastole in the case 
of Hobbes. 183 Hobbes' efforts to shake off this concession 
to occultism (as stillingfleet might have put it) led to 
a long delay in the publication of his De corpore and 
its ultimate failure on grounds of even greater 
° I °bOIOt 184 ~p aus~ ~ ~ y. Charleton, showing clear traces of 
influence from Digby and Hobbes as well as Gassendi 
and Descartes, simply made self-motion an inherent 
faculty of matter. Henry More, however, went 
for an alternative explanatory device - the spirit of 
nature - which he regarded as providing greater security 
against atheism as well as providing for the various 
motions of matter which could not be explained purely 
mechanically. 
In the remaining Chapters we will consider the development 
of the so-called mechanical philosophy among major thinkers 
in the Restoration period and examine their efforts to 
account for the activity of matter either in terms of 
an internal self-motive principle or an external spirit 
of nature. 
